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ABSTRACT
 
The purpose of this study was to provide designs and data to aid in the 
selection of aerodynamic surface control and thrust vector control servo­
actuators during the final definition phase of the space shuttle. The 
study consisted of four basic activities: establishment of requirements, 
industry survey, conceptual designs, and trade-off evaluation. Point 
design configurations were established for the flight control applications 
that had the greatest impact on vehicle interfaces. Parametric weight 
data was developed to provide trend information for those applications 
not specifically configured. The design cohfigurations were to employ 
any type of power and control that represent current state-of-the-art 
technology. This included hydraulic, mechanical, electromechanical, 
and gas servoactuator development. Additionally, the trade off included 
a digital configuration for comparison to the convbntional analog type. 
The parameters used in the doniparison evaluation were - weight, re­
liability, maintainability, checkout capability and cost. Weight was 
developed in quantitative form. The remainder of the parameters were 
in qualitative form to provide relative comparisons of the point designs. 
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SUMMARY
 
The objectives of this study were to survey the state of the art of flight control servo­
actuators, produce conceptual desims for space shuttle applications, and provide 
hsic information to assist in servoactuator selection during the ;inal definition phase 
of the space shuttle program. 
The study was divided into four basic activities: (1) establishment of requirements 
and ground rules for the flight control subsysterms, (2) industry survey of current 
state of the art, (3) conceptual design and point design configuirations for various flight 
control applications, and (4) trade-off evaluation. 
The principal subject of the study was redundancy mechanization. Failure criteria 
rather than reliability goals were established as a requirement. The' basic failure 
criteria requirement was fail operate, fail safe for aerodynamic flight controls and 
thrust vector controls. With respect to each subsystem this criteria established 
redundancy as follows: 
a. Aerodynamic surface controls 
(booster and orbiter). 
- fail operate, fail operate, degraded performance 
b. Thrust vector controls (TVC)/engine (orbiter) ­ fail dpet)ate, fail to null. 
c. Thrust vector controls/engine (booster - fail to null. 
The industry survey included review and analysis of hydraulic, mechanical, electro­
mechanical, gas, and digital development. Nearly all the effort and advances in the 
development of fly-by-wire multiple channel/system servoactuators has been on ana­
log hydraulic servoactuators° Development work has been conducted in the other dis­
ciplines but not of sufficient magnitude to consider them equal to the state of the art of 
hydraulic servoactuators. An annotated bibliography report GDC-DC70-013 containing 
110 references was submitted to NASA-MSC at the conclusion of the survey. 
Three point designs were established for each of the following applications: 
a. Booster elevator (largest load application on booster). 
b. Orbiter elevator (largest load application on orbiter). 
0. Orbiter aileron (smallest load application). 
d. Orbiter TVC. 
ttBooster TVC. 
All configurations except one were either analog electrohydraulic or -analog electro­
mechanical upper servo stages controlling hydraulic power to linear hydraulic actuators. 
One configuration for the orbiter aileron was an analog electromechanical using spring 
clutch servos to engage electrical power to a balscrew output. In addition, one digital 
electrohydraulic configuration was created for comparison to the aerodynamic surface 
control analog configurations. 
Some of the prominent trends and results are as follows: 
a. 	 The electromechanical configuration was heavier and contained less output redun­
dancy than the hydraulic configurations for the orbiter aileron. It would have to 
be in a stronger competitive position to be considered ftrther because commonality 
would dictate that it be used on other applications. 
b. 	 The digital configuration compared favorably with respect to weight and reliability 
on the small load application, but became heavier for large load applications due 
to the penalties involved in providing large digitizer pistons. The digital concept 
wads new and did not represent anything existing that has had the benefit of some 
development. As such there remains some doubt concerning its functional and 
performance capabilities. 
c. 	 On the largest load application (booster elevator), a four-channel, four-power 
actuator configuration/side weighs approximately 20% less (over 2000 lb total 
vehicle weight impact) than a four-channel, three-power actuator configuration. 
This weight difference is the result of failure criteria requirements. A three­
power circuit/actuator arrangement can collectively produce 300o of required 
hinge moment (100% after two failures) whereas a.four-power circuit/actuator 
arrangement can produce only 200% of required hinge moment normally to guar­
antee 100% capability after two failures. The increased weight totals for the 
three-power circuits are due to increased weights of actuators, transmission, 
power source, fuel, and hydraulic power generation over that of four power 
circuits. 
d. 	 Considering only actuators and hydraulic transmission for intermediate load ap­
plications (booster rudder and aileron, orbiter rudder), four actuators weigh 
less than three for loads down to approximately 10,000 ft-lb. The weight dif­
ferences become small, however, and future cost effective analysis must deter­
mine the weight versus complexity cross over point. 
e. 	 In a four-power circuit/actuator configuration, for the large load applications, 
reducing the actuators by two and inserting switching valves obviously reduces 
the 	overall weight. However, to go one step further and reduce the power circuits 
by two gains little or nothing because the actuators must then double in hinge 
moment capability. This is based on a groundrule of no castrastrophic actuator 
failures for either case and only one power circuit failuise for the latter case. 
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f* Self-monitoring mechanization of servo channels wvbether they be force summing 
or active/standby appears to result in higher reliability. The self-monitoring 
detection and switching for each channel is in parallel with all other channels 
whereas cross monitoring, which depends on cross connections of some form, 
is not. The reliability models used in this study were sensitive to the parallel 
versus series arrapgement of detection and switching elements. 
g. Weight and ease of installation can be improved for TVC servoactuators by reduc­
ing redmudancy of power actuators and applying the failure criteria to only the 
servo control portion. This is reasonable due to the short operating time per 
flight. 
h. Reducing the power actuator redundancy as mentioned in g, a servoactuator com­
mon to orbiter and booster and operating off vehicle APU power .has considerable 
appeal. The lowered redundancy at the output makes the booster configuration 
(22 servoactuators) more palatable and separate engine-driven hydraulic circuits 
can be eliminated. 
i. TVC servoactuators should employ mechanical feedback so that automatic center­
ing (fail to null) is achieved after failure. 
j. For aerodynamic surface controls, force summing mechanization of control 
channels using self-monitoring teclmiques is easily adaptable to manual detection 
and correction by the flight crew. 
k. An electromechanical, four-control channel mechanization is versatile in that 
one basic unit can be used to control any combination of hydraulic circuits and 
output actuators. 
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SECTION 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Studies on reusable vehicles for space applications have been conducted for a decade. 
Parametric studies over this period have derived a concept called the space shuttle. 
This concept can be classified as a vehicle that combines the technology of missiles 
and aircraft. Aircraft flight control syst6ms during this era have also been evolving 
towards "fly-by-wire," where control mechanization is electrical rather than mechani­
cal. Larger and higher performance aircraft, survivability, and better tactical weapons 
delivery are primary reasons for the need to advance the state of the art of flight con­
trols. However, until that time when the confidence and reliability of electrical.control 
can match mechanical control, fly-by--wire systems will employ multiple channels 
(systems) to a more redundant level. A major part of the fly-by-wire development has 
dealt with redundancy mechanization of servoactuators. 
The space shuttle application adds a new burden to the development of fly-by-wire 
servoactuators: space and re-entry environment. 
The objectives of this study are to produce conceptual designs of servoactuators suit­
able for use on the space shuttle with supporting data that will provide the basic infor­
mation for servoactuator selection during the final definition phase of the space shuttle. 
The approach used was to establish point designs based on two criteria: vehicle require­
ments as known at the start of this study and current state-of-the-art technology, The 
technology includes the use of electrical, mechanical, and gas power as well as hydrau­
lics. Additionally, the study includes evaluation of a digital servoactuator versus the 
conventional analog servoactuator. 
A primary objective of any design is to achieve the desired reliability with the minimum 
number of parts. As such, redundancy is a means whereby the desired reliability is 
achieved. Ideally, a servoactuator would consist of a single functional path of 100% 
reliability. Since this is not possible, the next logical step would be to add redundancy 
only as required until reliability goals are met. This procedure assumes that relia­
bility goals are known, can be properly apportioned, and failure rate data is accurate. 
Unfortunately, failure rate data for nonelectronic components is subject to error. 
The principal subject of this study is the application of redundancy mechanization tech­
niques in servoactuators applicable to the space shuttle. To accomplish this purpose 
and also to eliminate dependency on absolute reliability numbers, the requirements are 
stated in terms of failures permitted for mission success and/or mission safety (e.g., 
fail operate, fail safe). This approach is conservative and generally defines the limit 
of complexity required. 
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This introduction is Section 1 of this report. Section 2 covers the industry survey. 
separate annotated bibliography report, GDC-DCB70-013, includes references used 
herein and a glossary of terms commonly used in redundancy mechanization discussions. 
Section 3 includes a vehicle baseline description, servoactuator requirements, and 
ground rules and assumptions needed to establish point designs. Section 4 is a discus­
sion on various techniques used in servoactuator development and lists the candidate 
point designs and rationale for selection. Section 5 displays the failure modes and 
effects analysis of each design. The FMEA is a backoheck on adequacy of design to 
meet failure criteria requirements and an expose' of weak elements within a design. 
Section 6 establishes the basic parameters and data used for tradeoff evaluation. 
Section 7 covers the tradeoff evaluation. Section 8 includes the conclusions and 
recommendations. 
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SECTION 2 
INDUSTRY SURVEY 
2.1 GENERAL 
As a part of the industry survey, approximately 45 letters were sent to 36 companies. 
Follow-up telephone conversations and letters were made primarily to those companies 
that responded to the original survey letters. Activity in this regard included many 
personal contacts with representatives of the responding companies. In addition the 
Defense Documentation Center, Alexandria, Va., and the NASA linear tape were con­
tacted for data retrieval. The time period covered was mainly 1960 to 1970. 
The survey yielded approximately 150 documents of which 110 are included in the anno­
tated bibliography, report number GDC-DCB70-013. The documents may be broken 
down as follows: 
Government-sponsored reports 22 
Technical papers and articles 29 
Industry-sponsored reports 38 
Miscellanebus 21 
Information gathered is not exclusively on "multiple fault correcting" servoactuator 
development. It also includes general design data that helped form parametric data 
used in the evaluation. 
2.2 STATE OF THE ART 
2.2.1 GENERAL. Hydraulics dominate the scene not only in power control but also 
in application of redundancy mechanization techniques. Of the 110 documents described, 
in Section 2. 1, approximately 75% were concerned with the application of hydraulics. 
Development of redundancy mechanization is almost sol6 ly a hydraulic venture. The 
reason for hydraulic technology dominance is rather obvious: much of the recent de­
velopment efforts have been based on conversion of existing aircraft flight control 
systems to fly-by-wire, where a configuration was already in existence employing 
hydraulic power. 
"Redundancy mechanization" is a term used herein that describes special techniques 
used in implementing fly-by-wire control. For many reasons (survivability, better 
weapons delivery, increased manual control complexity, increased structure life, etc.) 
flight control systems are evolving towards fly-by-wire. A larger burden is placed on 
the servoactuator to accomplish more functions. As electrical command replaces 
mechanical command, redundancy is increased to offset the loss of inherent reliability 
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of a manual control system. In a pure fly-by-wire system it is logical to combine the 
electrical command conversion devices with the power control actuator. This total 
package is termed the servoactuator. Therefore, within the development of fly-by­
wire control, the servoactuator must accept multiple electrical command signals in 
addition to multiple power systems and produce a proper output. Due to anticipated 
failures and fast reaction time required, the servoactuator usually must also incor­
porate logic to accomplish automatic fault correction. The techniques used to accom­
plish this staggering task is therefore called redundancy mechanization. The following 
paragraphs briefly outline some of the development effort that has been accomplished 
or is in progress. 
2.2.2 HYDRAULIC APPLICATIONS. Many programs have been sponsored by the 
Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory (AFFDL). A triple redundant actuator was 
developed by Weston Hydraulics for a program conducted by Sperry. 1,2 * The unit 
used "force summing" of the three active command inputs with an electronic model to 
give two fail operate capability. Hydraulic Research developed a quad redundant servo­
actuator that was installed and flown in a B-47, accumulating approximately 18 flight 
hours in fly-by-wire mode. 3,4 The abctuator was an active/standby arrangement using 
hydraulic logic for fault detection and had two fail operate capability. 
4 
Hydraulic Research also built a servoactuator for the TWEAD program. This actuator 
is installed on an F4C. The control package is fail operate, fail safe and performs as 
a series servo in conjunction with manual control. Bertea built a fail operate actuator 
that employs a hydro-mechanical force summing technique called mid value logic for 
Douglas as a part of a program to evaluate a redundant fly-by-wire system. 5 The 680J 
program in quest of survivability as well as fly-by-wire has been responsible for con­
tinuing development. LTV electrosystems built a duplex integrated package that in­
corporated.two hydraulic power supplies with the servoactuator. The four control 
channels in this unit use electiomechanical rather than the conventional electrohydrau­
lie signal conversion techniques. 6 The four electromechanical actuators are force 
summed. LTV is now developing an electromechanical signal conversion control that 
uses servo motors and differentials in a velocity summing arrangement. In each case 
the outputs from the control portion operate conventional hydraulic power spools and 
actuators. In addition to the many development programs that resulted in hardware 
either for ground (non flight rated) or flight test, AFFDL has sponsored several studies 
that did not carry through to the hardware stage but are definite contributions to the 
fly-by-wire development. 
The SST is another activity that has contributed to servoactuator development. Bertea 
is now working on a quadruple system for the horizontal tail. 7 The configuration has 
four hydraulic power systems and four electrical command inputs that sum with mechani­
cal inputs from the pilot. The configuration is not purely fly-by-wire but electrical 
command redundancy is quadruple because electrical control is considered mandatory 
for safe flight. 
*Wumbers represent references at the end of the report. 
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Moog developed a triple redundant servoactuator for the Saturn S-IVB stage. 8 The 
redundancy in this case is limited to the servo channels. Detection-correction is not 
used in the unit. Fault correction consists of a failure in a control channel being over­
ridden by the two good channels. The failed channel is not de-activated. The actuator 
provides fail operate capability and can tolerate many combinations of dual faults. 
Moog refers to this design as a majority voting servoactuator. 
The programs and hardware listed above are by no means the total effort that has been 
pursued in the development of hydraulic servoactuators, but do.represent some of the 
more prominent efforts. 
Electronic models have been used as a substitute for an electrohydraulic servo channel 
to provide intelligence for comparison of signals. This was quite often necessary in 
an aircraft equipped with two hydraulic systems but requiring fail operate capability 
in the servo control portion., Fail operate normally requires a minimum of three 
signals for comparison. There seems to be some disagreement as to the effectiveness 
of using electronic models. Electrohydraulic servos have been modeled; however, 
there has been difficulty in simulating wear, temperature effects, and fluctuating load 
of an electrohydraulic servo valve. 
2.2.3 MECHANICAL/ELECTROMECHANICAL APPLICATIONS. Mechanical and 
electromechanical are grouped together because of their similarity. The servoactuator 
or actuating device is essentially the same in either system. The major difference is 
in power transmission. A pure mechanical system uses mechanical shafting from the 
power source to the servoactuator. An electromechanical system uses electrical power 
transmission and electric motors at the servo. 
The development of electromechanical servoactuators for primary flight controls and 
specifically fly-by-wire flight controls is not as advanced as its hydraulic counterpart. 
Development has been progressing but practically no hardware testing has been accom­
plished on multiple system servoactuators for large load applications. The primary 
advantages an electromechanical system has over hydraulics is long term storage at 
cold temperature, elemination of fluids and seals, and adaptability to environmental 
extremes. 
Curtiss Wright designed and built an all-mechanical aileron control system for the 
North American F-100 simulator. 9 Mechanical shafting delivered power from the 
power source to the servo clutch. A torroidal clutch was used to clutch in power on 
command to power hinge actuators located at the aileront. This system was "flown" on 
the simulator for evaluation. The conclusions were that the mechanical system servo 
performance capabilities compared favorably with those of a hydraulic servoactuator.10 
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There have been many electromechanical servo applications primarily for small power 
applications. Examples of these applications are: 
Marc Condor missile steering: Spring clutch servo 
Mark 37 torpedo fin control: Magnetic clutch servo 
QH-50C helicopter: Magnetic clutch servo 
Sergeant missile: Magnetic clutch servo 
K0-135 - horizontal stab. Magnetic clutch servo 
manual trim: 
Apollo service module - Magnetic clutch servo 
engine gifnballing: 
None of these applications would classify as automatic-fault-correcting servoactuators 
although the Apollo system has a redundant power supply, command, and servo clutch 
arrangement that can be switched in manually. 
2.2.3.1 Servo Clutch. The heart of the electromechanical servoactuator is the servo 
clutch. Figure 2-1 is a simplified schematic of an eiectromechanical arrangement. 
The servo clutch is analogous to the electrohydraulic servo and power spool in a hy­
draulic system. The three basic types that have been used in servo applications are 
the torroidal clutch, spring clutch, and magnetic clutch. 
L___J q CLUTCHI SERVOLOAD I_ 
COMMAND SIGNAL GEARING OUTPUT 
CONVERSION l 
POWER SOURCE 
& GEARING 
Figure 2-1. Electromechanical System 
The torroidal clutch has a continuous rotating input shaft, variable rollers, center 
torroid, and differential rollers attached to the output shaft. See Figure 2-2. In the 
position shown there is no rotation of the output shaft. A command input changes the 
angle of the variable rollers which in turn causes the center torroid to change speed 
with respect to the input shaft. This causes rotation of the differential rollers and 
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Figure 2-2. Torroidal Clutch 
output shaft. The unit is bi-directional and has good resolhtion. Disadvantages of this 
device are the requirement for a lubrication sump, high heat generation, 'and high 
force inputs for large step inputs due to the gyro effect. 
The spring clutch consists of an input shaft, spring energizer, two springs to give bi­
directional output, an output shaft, and brake as shown in Figure 2-3 (only one spring 
assembly is shown). The spring clutch is by nature an on-off device. When on, the 
clutch transmits power at full rate. Problem areas for this device include lowei'ed 
response as size increases (spring inertia), dead zone (spring engagement motion), 
and high threshold (there must be positive clutch engagement). It is attractive in that 
there is no appreciable heat generation. To eliminate the first two problems the unit 
can be designed such that the spring rotates with the input shaft and clearances reduced 
so that spring engagement travel is minimized. This, however, eliminates the brake 
from the design which in effect disconnects the output from ground when there is no 
error signal. 
An example of the magnetic clutch is shown in Figure 2-4. When the clutch coil is 
energized, the magnetic field is produced, crosses the powder gap, and causes radial 
alignment of the iron particles in the gap forming chains across the gap. These 
chains couple input to the output (drive disc) where the output torque is proportional to 
input current. This type clutohhas been applied successfully, as mentionedbefore, for 
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Figure 2-3. Spring Clutch 
Figure 2-4. Magnetic :Particle Clutch ' 
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small power applications. However as size increases- response lowers as seen by 
observing Figure 2-5. Also there are problems in repeatability where experience has 
shown that due to shearing action the magnetic particles start to lose their effective­
ness and the output torque versus input current relationship changes after repeated 
cycling. The clutch would suffer severe heating problems unless a brake is used when 
applied to control of aerodynamic surfaces because the clutch absorbs power when 
holding against an external load. 
2.2.3.2 Harmonic Drives. A harmonic drive is basically a gear reduction device. 
However, there is some development effort to adapt this technique to servo control. 
In addition to describing 20 operational applications of harmonic drives, Reference 11 
describes a potential electromagnetic servo solution. Figure 2-6 is a schematized 
version of the device. "A series of electromagnets are positioned about the flexspline, 
and are progressively excited to produce a rotating field vector which serves to radially 
deflect the low inertia flexspline. Mechanical rotation occurs only at the low speed 
circular spline and output shaft. This type of structure appears capable of very high 
acceleration rates well in excess of those obtainable with state-of-the-art electrome­
chanical drives and servoactuators. 
2.2.4 GAS APPLICATIONS. Some development work. has been accomplished on 
pneumatic servoactuators but very little hardware is in existence. Bendix conducted 
a study for the Air Force Flight Dynamics laboratory evaluating the feasibility of 
-1 
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Figure 2-5. Typical Frequency Response Curves -TMagnetic Clutch 
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Figure 2-6. Electromagneiic Harmonic Drive 
applying the Bendix D3mavector* actuator (operating on 50 psig compressor bleed air) 
to actuate flight control surfaces. 12 A pneumatic servoactuator was built and tested 
by Parker-Hannifin under contract to NASA-MSFC. 13 The unit was designed to use 
-250'F hydrogen gas. Weston built and tested a pneumatic digital servoactuator under 
contract to NASA-MSFC. This unit was also designed to use -250 0 F hydrogen gas. 
The work on pneumatic development has been essentailly to advance the state-of-the­
art of pneumatic servos to the level that hydraulics reached nearly 20 years dgo. As 
such there is no specific correlation between pneumatic servo development and fly-by­
wire development. 
2.2.5 DIGITAL APPLICATIONS. Most of the development effort on digital servo 
actuators has been in the field of hydraulics. The industry survey did not disclose any 
effort conducted on multiple channel servoactuators. 
*Trademark of the Bendix Corporation 
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There is very little operational hardware in existence. The Convair 990 commercial 
jet uses a digital open loop arrangement for low rate trim of the horizontal stabilizer. 
There have been feasibility studies and breadboard models tested of single channel 
digital servos. 14 , 1 5 ,16 
Digital servoactuators fall into two broad categories and are classified in relation to 
the input signal characteristics. 
a. 	 Incremental - The input signal is in the form of a series of pulses some­
times referred to as a pulse train. In this case a hydraulic 
control unit might consist of a single valve, digital pump, 
and associated sequencing and polarity valves as shown in 
block form, Figure 2-7. 
b. Parallel-binary -	 The input signal is in the form of parallel or simultaneous 
signals to multiple coils of a valve or to multiple valves. 
An example of a multiple coil valve is shown in Figure 2-8. 
Each coil produces twice the output of the adjacent coil. 
The smallest coil is sized to produce the smallest incre­
mental change required. 	 Thus, the valve can receive one 
or more pulses in the same time interval and produce an 
output proportioned to digital input. The digital/analog 
interface is at the first stage of the valve in this case. 
Another example of parallel mechanization is shown in 
Figure 2-9. Here the unit is completely in digital form to 
the output actuator. The actuator in-this case is arranged 
in binary parallel form. 
An incremental type digital servoactuator has less severe failure modes than its analog 
equivalent in that a hardover signal is only one pulse or one incremental change at the 
output. However, this type is usually severely rate limited because of the limiting 
valve cycling frequency and the small incremental change per cycle required to achieve 
positional accuracy; 
The parallel types begin to resemble analog with respect to failure modes. The worst 
hardover in this case is equivalent to a half hardover in a conventional analog servo­
actuator.
 
The digital strut appears to be impractical when applied to large load applications 
because of the size and complexity of the output actuator. 
2.3 SUMMARY 
Table 2-1 summarizes in general the state of the art for the various disciplines. A 
conspicious trend is the absence of multiple systems (redundancy mechanization) 
development except in hydraulic analog servoactuators. 
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Table 2-1. State of the Art Summary 
POWER ACTUATION OPERATIONAL 
FLIGHT CONTROL SERVOS OPERATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT TESTING 
MULTIPLE CHANNEL & POW SERVOS -
WITH AUTOMATIC FAUDT CORRECTING 
OPERATIONAL 
DEVELOP' ENT TESTING 
STUDIES 
Z2CHAMCAL 
YES 
YES 
(SMALL (2 11P) 
- NO 
1O0 
NO 
ELBOT/1-cSC 
'YES 
YES 
(SMALL (2 HP') 
NO 
NO 
NO 
GAS 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
NO 
NO 
HYDAUIC 
IES 
YES 
YES 
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2.4 RECOMMENDATIONS
 
Based on the survey, the following types of serv.oactuators were considered further:
 
a. ' Hydraulic analog for all applications.
 
b. Electromechanical analog for orbiter aileron only.
 
An electromechanical arrangement was considered to be more adaptable to the orbiter 
aileron application because of the low load requirements and severe environment. 
(Refer to Section 3 for requirements.) 
One digital configuration was studied to provide a comparison with analog soitvoactuators. 
Neither the electromechanical nor digital configuration as shown in Section 4 is taken 
from previous studies per se. They are configured to meet automatic fault correcting 
criteria as established in this report and as such represent new concepts employing 
redundancy mechanization. 
Gas servo applications are not considered further. They appear to be the least desir­
able of all the disciplines in terms of development effort required to achieve operational 
status within the short term future slated for space shuttle development. The scope of 
this study is to configure point designs that have the best chance of succeeding using 
the technology of today (1970). 
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SECTION 3"
 
REQUIREMENTS
 
3.1 GENERAL
 
For purpose of establishing point design configurations the following vehicle baseline 
definition, servoactuator requirements, ground rules, and assumptions apply. 
3.2 	 VEHICLE BASELINE DESCRIPTION 
3.2.1 GENERAL. The space shuttle concept consists of a two-stage, fully reusable 
system mounted in a piggyback fashion at liftoff. The lower vehicle acts as the booster, 
the upper vehicle completes the orbital phase of the mission. 
During the boost phase, only the booster vehicle's rocket engines are operating and 
propellant is supplied from this stage. At staging, the orbital stage's rocket engines 
ignite and continue thrusting .to orbit. The booster element enters from the staging 
altitude and decelerates to subsonic velocity where it st Lrts its cruise engines and flies 
back to the launch site unmanned under automatic control. Following preflight checkout, 
both elements are ready for payload integration, vertical assembly, refueling, and 
relaunch. 
The vehicles are both equipped with a fixed wing and a horizontal and vertical tail. Roll, 
pitch, and yaw control is achieved by using aileron, elevator, and rudder control sur­
faces. The surfaces are not split. 
3.2.2 VEHICLE. STATISTICS 
a. Orbiter 
Approximate gross landing weight 200,000 lb 
Number of rocket engines 2 
Thrust rating/engine 400,000 lb (S.L.) 
Both engines gimballed 
b. 	 Booster 
Approximate gross landing weight 500,000 lb 
Number of rocket engines 11 
Thrust rating/engine 400,000 lb (S. L.) 
All engines gimballed 
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3.2.3 ALLOWABLE FAILURES "ROCKET ENGINES AND TVC
 
a. Orbiter - Critical Mission Segment 
Lose one engine and/or TVC* - safe abort 
b. Booster 
Lose one engine and/or TVC* - complete mission 
Lose two engines and/or TVC* - safe abort 
3.2.4 ALLOWABLE FAILURES - AERODYNAMIC SURFACE CONTROLS. None. 
Elevators, rudder, and ailerons must function. 
3.3 SERVOACTUATOR REQUIREMENTS 
3.3. 1 PERFORMANCE. For all functions the following characteristics apply:' 
Positional accuracy 0.2% of total travel 
Frequency response (no load, closed loop) 
Frequency
 
Amplitude ratio at 10% of valve saturation ±3 db 
Phase lag input amplitude 45 deg 
Refer to Table 3-1 for other performance criteria. 
3.3.2 ENVIRONMENT. See Figures 3-1 and 3-2 for temperature-time histories 
for the orbiter and booster, respectively. 
3.4 GROUND RULES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
3.4.1 INTERFACES 
3.4.1.1 Command Channels. There are four electrical command channels available 
for use. It is assumed that all four signals are identical and proper to the servoactua­
tor interface. The servoamplifier and summing point are included in the servoactuator. 
*Fail to null position - hardover failures not allowed, (e. g., no engine shutdowns 
permitted due to thrust vector control (TVC) failize). 
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Table 3-1. Performance Requirements 
Function Stage 
Max Static 
Hinge 
Moment 
Ft-Lb 
Max Rate 
No 
Load 
Deg/Sec 
Total 
Travel 
Deg. Redundancy Required 
Degraded 
Performance 
(after 1 
failure) 
Degraded 
Performance 
(after 2 
failures) 
Ailerori Orbiter 4,800/side 40 ±30 Fail Operate, Fail Operate Negligible 
Degraded Perf. 
67% Max 1-. M. 
75o Max Rate 
Aileron Booster 19,200/side 40 ±30 Same As Above. Same As 
Above. 
Same As Above. 
Rudder Orbiter 27,000 30 ±30 Same As Above. Same As 
Above. 
Same As Above. 
C, 
TVC 
each axis 
Booster 65,000 *10 ± 7 Fail to Null 
TVC 
each axis 
Orbiter 65,000 *10 ± 7 Fail Operate, Fail To Null Negligible 
Rudder Booster 135,000 30 ±30 Fail Operate, Fail Operate 
Degraded Perf. 
Same As 
Above. 
67%o Max H.M. 
75%6 Max Rate 
Elevator 
(ea of 
2 Units) 
Orbiter 66,500 30 ±40 Same As Above. Same As 
Above. 
100% Max H. M. 
75% Rate 
Elevator 
(ea of 2 
Units) 
Booster 325,000 30 ±40 Same As Above. Same As 
Above. 
100% Max H. M. 
75% Rate 
*TVO Actuators Are Always Loaded. 0At 10 /Sc, Hinge Moment Is 44,000 Ft-Lbs. 
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Figure 3-1. Orbiter -Internal Structural Temperature vs. Time 
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3.4.1.2 Power Sources 
a. Electrical 
Number of systems available 4 
115/200 Vac, 3 phase, 400 Hz 
b. Hydraulic 
Number of systems available 
Vehicle APU 4
 
Rocket engine accessory pad As required
 
Pressure
 
No flow 4000 psi 
Full flow 2500 psi 
Temperature 
Maximum - Normal operating 3500 F 
Minimum - Non-operating -20O F 
An operating pressure of 4000 psig maximum is chosen as a ground rule based ontrends 
of present day large aircraft. The B-70 used 400.0 psig and the SST has gone to 4000 
psig after many studies on the merits of 4000 psig versus the standard 3000 psig. 
Boeing showed a net 1%weight saving in favor of'4000 psig but noted that the weight 
savings may be lost or reversed if the flijht control actuators' sizes were determined 
by stiffness requirements. 1 7 Subsequent to that study, Boeing selected 4000 psig. 
Results of an actuator weight study by Moog showed that optimum pressure is from 
3000 to 4000 psi for usual size loads (1000 to 10, 000 ft-lb torque) but becomes higher 
for larger loads. However, the magnitude of weight improvement in the actuator is 
small. 1 8 Perhaps that particular tradeoff of optimum pressure should be conducted 
for each new aerospace application; however, that tradeoff is not within the scope of 
this study. Regardless of the eventual selection, 4000 psig used here will still yield 
valid comparison evaluations. 
The pressure droop characteristic (2500 psi, maximum flow) is another ground rule 
established in anticipation of the eventual design requirements. That ground rule is 
discussed further in Section 3.4.2. 
The 3500F maximum operating fluid temperature is chosen as a reasonable compro­
mise between two design considerations that tug in opposite directions - stiffness and 
thermal conditioning. flulk-modulus (e.g., actuator physical stiffness) lowers as fluid 
temperature increases. The weight penalty for transferring heat from a hydraulic 
system naturally goes up as jmaximum fluid operating temperature is lowered. 
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3.4.2 OUTPUT POWER. Preliminary data on surface hinge moment and rate 
requirements usually define the end limits; that is, maximum stall hinge moment 
and maximum no load rate. The output of a hydraulic system will give a parabolic 
curve (A) as shown in Figure 3-3, and this curve usually defines the requirements of 
hinge moment versus rate. However, the intermediate points are not defined and it 
is questionable whether they represent real requirements. If a constant output 
horsepower curve (B) can be defined as the real limit of hinge moment versus rate 
required for the intermediate points, then a reduction in delivered horsepower is 
possible. By allowing hydraulic pressure to droop with increased flow, the output 
will resemble curve C. Shown another way the required developed power in the 
hydraulic system is significantly reduced as shown in Figure 3-4. This affects APU 
size, APU fuel, transmission line size, and valve size. The APU and fuel weights 
reduce and the hydraulic transmission line size and valve weight increase (e. g. , 
lower allowable pressure drop). However, for the space shuttle application, only 
warm oil need be considered where tubing friction losses are low. The resulting 
increase in line weights is more than offset by savings in APU and fuel weight. 
There are some undesirable features in allowing the pressure to droop. One is 
that the servovalve flow gain becomes non-linear as shown in Figure 3-5. The flow 
gain is normally defined as output flow rate versus valve input at a constant pressure 
drop. The slope (flow gain) varies from a maximum for small valve inputs to a 
• /. CURVE A 
\k// / CURVE Bt/CVRVEC 
% BINGE 
MIOMENT 
50 
50 100%IRTE 
Figure 3-3. Hinge Moment vs. Rate 
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Surface Rate 
minimum for full valve input due to the reduction in inlet pressure. This variance 
may be approximately 25% but is not considered to be a problem. The valve can be 
designed to compensate for this non-linearity. 
Allowing pressure to droop is not valid if maximum rate at high hinge moment 
(typical of TVC) is defined as a requirement. 
3.4.3 ALLOWABLE CORRECTION (SWITCHING) TRANSIENTS. The MSC space 
shuttle straight wing orbiter was examined to determine the vehicle response to 
control surface failure transients. Failure transients were simulated as triangular 
pulses having a specified failure surface rate and a specified area. The vehicle was 
examined at a cruise altitude of 20,000 ft and a velocity of 250 knots and at surface 
rates of 5 to 30 deg/sec and accumulated errors of 0.2 and 0. 5 deg-sec. Maximum 
error for the case of 30 deg/sec surface rate and 0. 5 deg-sec accumulated error for 
an elevator trailing edge down failure is +0. 048g and -0. 044 g. These accelerations 
are within the failure transient specification contained in IIL-F-8785B, "Flying 
Qualities of Piloted Airplanes," paragraph 3.5.5, which requires transients to be 
less than ±0. 05g for a first failure. 
The 0. 5 deg-sec transient is well within the capability of an automatic fault correcting 
actuator. For example, in a position summing arrangement, assuming a control 
channel (sedondary actuator) time constant of 0.02 sec, an output rate due to one 
channel hardover of 30 deg/sec, a failure not sensed until the channel is hardover, 
and a 30 millisecond switching time, the output transient would be approximately 
0. 1 deg-sec. 
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The 0.5 deg-sec transient may also be applied to the orbiter TVC as a reasonable 
allowable transient. The booster TVC criteria is not based on degree-seconds since 
one engine could go hardover and control could be maintained. The limit is simply 
physical restraint and the allowable transient is more liberal than for all other appli­
cations. 
The allowable transients listed above are much more iiberal than can normally be 
permitted on high performance aircraft (which established correction transient 
allowables for most servoactuator designs). As such, correction transients become 
diminished in importance as evaluation criteria for this study. 
3.4.4 DUTY CYCLE. Duty cycles are defined so that power source fuel weight can 
be determined. Duty cycles are established for aerodynamic surface controls only. 
Thrust vector controls operate for only short durations (approximately three minutes 
compared to approximately two hours for aerodynamic surface controls on the booster) 
and exert a minor influence on fuel weight. The duty cycle is given in terms applicable 
to hydraulic systems for the largest surface or demand on eaclf vehicle. As such fuel 
weight will only be a factor in the ldrgest surface servoactuator tradeoff comparison. 
See Table 3-2 for mission segments and duration. 
Table 3-2. Mission Segments and Duration 
TIME - SECONDS 
MISSION SEMENT ORBITER BOOSTER 
ENTRY 2000 920
 
TRANSITION 100 100 
CRUISE 600 4700 
LANDING 300 480 
MISSION DURATION 3000 6200 
The duty cycles are 
a. Entry 15% of maximum elevator rate - continuous 
Transition i00o of maximum elevator rate - i0%of the time 
Landing 
b. Cruise 59o of maximum elevator rate - continuous 
100% of maximum elevator rate - 1% of the time 
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From the above data an average power in %of maximum delivered power can be 
derived: 
Maximum Delivered Power = 100% Elevator Rate x 2500 psi 
Constant HP Loss (Pump & System Leakage 10% of a 4000 psi System 
10% x000× Max Del power 
16% of lMax Del power/4000\
 
Continuous Cycling @15% = 15% 24% of Max Del power 
/4000 
@5 4000) = 8%%of Max Del power\ 2500/ 
[at lower surface rates pump discharge pressure is approximate 4000 psi] 
Steady State Power = Constant Losses + Continuous Cycling 
HPAVE =HPS.S. + K(HPd - HPs.s) HPAVE Average Power 
=HPS.S. Steady State Power 
K = % of Time @Max Rate 
HP d Delivered Power = 100o% 
3. 4. 4.1 For Entry, Transition, and Landing 
HPAVE = (16% + 24%) + 10% [100% - (16 + 24)]
 
HPAVE = 46% of Max Delivered Power
 
Adjusting to APU shaft power where delivered power t 0.9 shaft power,
 
HPAV E = 46%6_x 0.9 = 41. 5% of APU Shaft Output Power
 
3.4.4.2 	 For Cruise 
HPAVE = (16%+8%)+1%[100-24] 
HPAVE = 25% of Max Delivered Power
 
or 25 x 0. 9 - 23.5% of APU Shaft'Output Power
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3.4.4o3 	 Average power Over Total Mission 
a. 	 Orbiter: 
P 41.5% (Entry + Transition + Landing Time) + 23.5% (Cruise Time)HAVE 	 Total Mission Duration 
HP 41.5% (2000 + 100 + 300) + 23.5% (600) 
AVE 3000
 
HPAVE 38% of APU Rated Shaft Output Power
 
b. Booster: 
(920 +100-+ 480) + 23.5 (4700)
_41.5%HP
AVE 6200
 
HPAVE = 36% of APU Rated Shaft Output Power
 
The average power shown above converted to hp-hrs and used with specific fuel con­
sunption data shown in Section 6, Figure 6-10, dete'rmines fuel weight for each 
elevator configuration; see Section 7. 
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SECTION 4 
CONCEPTUAL DESIGN 
4.1 POWER CIRCUITS 
All aerodynamic surface controls are required-to be fail operate, fail safe. In this 
case fail safe means fail operate, degraded mode. Allowable degradation in terms of 
hinge moment is 67% for ailerons and rudders and no degradation for elevators.- To 
show convenient comparisons of the different applications, their requirements are 
converted to output power. This is done to provide a convenient base regardless of 
the type of power used (e.g., hydraulic, electrical, mechanical). The power listings 
below do not represent actual power developed but represent the minimum theoretical 
output required as shown on the constant power-curve, Figure 3-3, Section 3. The 
constant power curve passes through the half hinge moment, half rate point which is 
used for this comparison.. Table 4-1 shows the output power required when applying . 
.multiple circuits per the failure criteria. For example,. each of four circuits need 
only supply half the power (hinge moment) that is required of each of three circuits. 
This indicates that a'four-power circuit arrangement is a candidate for large load 
applications because of the possible weight reduction ove three-power circuits. The 
chart also identifies the type of power to be used b'.sed on the recommendations of the 
industry survey. 
Table 4-1. Output Power Required 
Min Req't Multiple Systems (hp/sys) 
Application (hp) 3 Systems 4 Systems 
Aileron - orbiter 3 2 1 
*Rudder - orbiter 6.4 4.3 2.15 
*Aileron - booster 12.2 8.1 4 
*Elevator - orbiter 31.5 .31.5 15.75 
*Rudder -booster 32 21.5 10.25 
*Elevator ­ booster 155 155 77.5 
*TVC 19.7 Based on 70.7% (Pitch + Yaw H.M. @ 10 deg/sec) 
*Applicable to hydraulic power and control only. Only hydraulics is con­
sidered for these applications because it is the only technology that has 
combined large power requirements, multiple system output, and auto­
matic failure correcting capability. 
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4.2 DESIGN APPLICATIONS 
Aerodynamic surface controls range from 9600 ft-lb hinge moment for the orbiter 
aileron to 650, 000 ft-lb for the booster elevator and sugges't no common solution for 
all. To do a separate tradeoff for each of six surfaces would dilute the overall effort. 
It is reasonable then to break the applications down as follows: 
a. Booster criticalapplication (largest hinge moment) 
b. Orbiter critical application (largest hinge moment) 
c. Smallest size. 
The elevator for each vehicle is the critical application. They have the greatest effect 
on vehicle weight (subsystem and interfaces). The orbiter aileron has the least effect 
on vehicle weight, is the smallest size, and is a candidate for something other than 
hydraulic power. The intermediate applications are not configured, but the data gen­
erated is applicable. For example, qualitative comparisons for the elevator servo­
actuators will apply to the intermediate size servoactuators due to similarity of the 
control portions. Weight is the major difference that might exdst between the orbiter. 
elevator and rudder. 
Three configurations are established for each application to provide basis for tradeoff 
evaluation. These configurations are all of the analog type. One digital configuration 
is established for comparison to the analog versions. 
Three analog configurations are established for each of the booster and orbiter TVCs. 
They are studied separately.because of the different levels of redundancy required. 
The number of power systems to be used for TVC is based solely on redundancy re­
quirements and not weight. 
4.3 DESIGN CONCEPTS 
As stated before, the majority of work has been accomplished in hydraulics. There 
are many types of redundancy mechanizations possible. Figure 4-1 is a flow chart 
showing many combinations that have been conceived to give automatic fault correc­
ting capability. Reviewing the space shuttle requirements, the aerodynamic surface 
controls must be fail operate, fail operate-degraded mode. This requires a minimum 
of three power circuits, three output actuators, and four control channels. Four 
channels are required to provide a two out of three agreement after one failure. Elec­
tronic models are not used in this study. 
The flow chart is broken down to show major classifications of techniques used to 
achieve automatic fault correcting capability. Some of these terms are unique to this 
report and may not agree with all published data to date. The fbllowing discussions 
describe these classifications. 
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AERODYNAMIC SURFACE CONTROLS 
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Figure 4-1. Flow Diagram - Redundancy Mechanization, 2 Fail Operate 
4.3.1 LOAD SHARING VS. ACTIVE/STANDBY. (Tis section is concerned only with 
the power output portion of a servoactuator. Sections 4.3.2 through 4.3. 11 are dis­
cussions on the control portions only.) 
Load sharing has all output actuators active where they share the load equally. Active/ 
standby has only one output actuator active at one time. All other output actuators are 
bypassed.
 
4.3.2 SECONDARY ACTUATORS VS. DIRECT DRIVEN SPOOLS., A secondary actu­
ator (sometimes referred to in other literature as servo ram or mod piston) is an 
intermediate actuator that converts an upper stage servochannel command to a mech­
anical output to drive a power spool. 
Secondary actuators came into being as a means of providing a mechanlical equivalent 
of an electrical signal so that convenient summation with a pilot's manual input to a 
servoactuator was possible. In a pure fly-by-wire arrangement, the need to produce 
a mechanical output from an electrohydraulic servd to sum with a pilot's mechanical 
command is unnecessary. A secondary actuator may be used, but for different reasons: 
remote location of a control package from a power valve and actuator, or the need to 
provide a conienient output of each command/servo channel for monitoring. 
"Direct driven spool" as used herein describes apower spool driven hydraulically by 
an upper stage (either a spool or first stage amplifier). In this case, secondary actu­
ators are not used. 
4.3.3 FORCE SUMMING. All channel outputs are active and in parallel. Where 
secondary actuators are used (see Figure 4-2A) the output positions are common, and 
any force unbalance is due primarily to channel mismatch. Force summing arrange­
ments must be synchronized to maintain static stiffness around null, prevent dead band, 
and reduce power drain. The power spools must also be synchronized either by some 
force balancing means or by close tolerance fabrication in the case of tandem spools. 
If secondary actuators are not used and direct driven spools cannot be synchronized by 
fabrication, force signals from the power output actuators can be used to synchronize 
the channels. Maintaining stability becomes a problem when inserting a pressure feed­
back loop within a position feedback loop where the control or synchronization loop gain 
is nearly equal to the controlled or position loop gain. 
The output force of each channel being unique to that channel is used for self monitoring 
or comparison with the other channels in fault detection and correction logic. In a 
hydraulic arrangement, signals proportional to AP developed at each channel output 
(secondary actuator) are usually used for this purpose. 
A change in output does not occur after a failure thereby allowing a long switching 
time. There is negligible loss in performance after failure. Complexity is high be­
cause of the synchronizatidn required. 
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Figure 4-2. Control Channel Mechanization 
Another method of force summing is mid value logic. In a four-channel, secondary 
actuator arrangement, all actuators are in parallel. Detants are used with unequal 
breakout forces in opposite directions. Channel mismatch causes the secondary 
actuators to break out of their detents in the ensuing force fight. The unequal break­
out forces are to ensure that one channel stays in detent and provides the output. There 
is a considerable problem in preventing all actuators from breaking out and/or suffer­
ing numerous channel disengagements (nuisance tripping) via fault detection and correc­
tion logic with this arrangement. 
4.3.4 POSITION SUMMING. All channel outputs are active and in series. Position 
summing, Figure 4-2B, does not require synchronization (no force fight between chan­
nels). Since an individual channel is not resisted by adjacent channels, a failure such 
as a hardover will cause output motion of the power actuator. In fact an output motion 
must occur for failure detection because position is unique to each channel and provides 
the intelligence for comparison to other channels to detect and switch out faults. When 
comparing force summing to position summing the methods used to deactivate a faulty 
channel are opposite. A secondary actuator in a force summing arrangement must be 
bypassed since all actuators are in parallel. A secondary actuator in a position sum­
ming arrangement is centered and locked. Therefore,. failures in a position summing 
arrangement reduce position authority of the common output which in turn reduces loop 
gain and maximum rate capability of the output actuators unless some means of gain 
changing is used. 
4.3.5 VELOCITY SUMMING. A redundancy mechanization technique employing elec­
tromechanical servo channels developed by LTV electrosystems uses velocity summing; 
see Figure 4-2C. The outputs of servo motors are summed through differentials to 
provide-an input to a hydraulic power spool. As channels are de-activated, velocity 
output of the ball screw to the hydraulic power spool is reduced. Velocity summing is 
similar to position summing in that all outputs are in series, but failures in velocity 
summing reduce the velocity of the power spool rather than position which affects ac­
celeration of the output actuator and not rate. 
4.3.6 ACTIVE/STANDBY--CONTROL CHANNELS. Active/standby is self explanatory 
in that there is usually only one active output at one time. Engagement of standby 
channels are by predetermined sequence. All channels receive commands and fault 
detection and switching is achieved by position comparison of an element within each 
channel. There is no degradation in performance after a failure. 
4.3.7 SYNCHRONIZATION. In a force summing arrangement, synchronization 
usually consists of an equalization (or compensation) signal feedback to force all 
channels to seek a common null. Self equalization is contained within the channel; 
see Figure 4-3A. Load pressure is allowed to build up in a secondary actuator to a 
limit that satisfies synchronization (approximately 1000 psi in a 4000 psi system). As 
load pressure exceeds this limit, a proportionally larger signal is fed back to bias the 
servovalve in the direction to reduce the actuator AP. The correction signal stays 
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Figure 4-3. Control Channel Synchronization 
nearly constant until the AP reaches a minimum value (approximately 200 psi) then will 
reduce to zero. To accomplish this hysteresis effect, the equalization network consists 
of a preloaded piston and a LVDT. The equalization signatis also directed to a detec­
tion and switching function for de-activating the channel at a 'failure threshold" limit. 
Force signals are averaged between two adjacent channels before being fed back as a 
biasing signal in a cross equalization scheme; see Figure 4-33. Detection and correc­
tion in this case consist of comparing channel outputs (force) two-by-two and logically 
determining the faulty channel. 
Self equalization and cross equalization are synchronizing techniques that were devised 
primarily to meet the broader classification of self monitoring and cross monitoring, 
respectively. 
4.3.8 CROSS MONITORING. Cross monitoring or inter channel monitoring refers 
to any comparison arrangement requiring interchannel connections to implement fault 
detection logic. Figure 4-33 is an example of cross monitoring where some form of 
"majority vote logic" is used to detect and switch out a failure. 
4.3.9 SELF MONITORING. Self monitoring or intra channel monitoring does not use 
interchannel connections. The self equalization technique of Section 4.3.7 and its fault 
indication method is an example of self monitoring. In Figure 4-4, a monitoring chan­
nel is added for comparison to each channel that provides an output. There are no 
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Figure 4-4. Self Monitoring - Active/Standby 
interconnections between the channels that provide outputs other than a device to engage 
standby channels. This approach requires more servo channels but fewer power sup­
plies when compared to cross monitoring. For example, using electro hydraulic servo 
channels, cross monitoring requires four servo channels and four hydraulic systems 
whereas self monitoring requires six servo channels andthree hydraulic systems for two 
fail operate capability. 
In Figure 4-5, the fault detection method is simply the comparison of output to input 
within one channel. This method is simple but has some disadvantages. For example, 
if the output meets stall load and the stall lasts the duration of a time delay; all channels 
may be de-activated at once. 
4.3.10 ELECTRONIC LOGIC VS. HYDRAULIC LOGIC. Two fault detection and cor­
rection methods widely used are electronic logic and hydraulic logic. Electronic logic 
has all comparison or monitoring information converted to electrigal signals and utilizes 
electronic devices for failure detection and switching. It is versatile in that it can be 
packaged remote from the servoactuator, or its funbtion can be removed entirely from 
the servoactuator subsystem and assigned to the vehicle computer. Hydraulic logic is 
more of a specialty design integrated with the type of redundancy mechanization em­
ployed by the servoactuator. For example, the hydraulic logic developed by Hydraulic 
Research for active/standby switching bears little resemblance to the hydromechanical 
logic used in the F-111 damper servoactuator. 19 Hydraulic logic by necessity is pack­
aged within the servoactuator. 
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4.3. 11 MONITOR VS. MONITORLESS. Figure 4-i with all of its classifications of 
techniques for redundancy mechanizations describes monitored-systems only. A moni­
tored servoactuator is synonomous with detection-correction in this text. In a monitor­
less servoactuator, a fault is not switched out but is simply overpowered by the remain­
ing good channels. An example of a monitorless servoactuator is the one developed for 
the Saturn S-IVB by Moog, commonly called a majority voting servoactuator. In general, 
to achieve the same level of failure capability, a monitorless design requires more re­
dundancy than a monitored design; however, it is not encumbered with detectlon and 
switching elements. 
4.4 CONFIGURATIONS 
4.4.1 SELECTION CRITERIA. As stated before in Section 4.2, three configurations 
for each of five applications were established and, per the recommendations based on 
the industry survey, hydraulic analog concepts are configured for all applications and 
one electromechanical configured for the smallest load application (orbiter aileron). 
In addition, one digital concept was established to meet the surface controls failure 
capability. It should be noted here that a concept using electromechanical servos to 
control hydraulic power stages is classified as a hydraulic concept. 
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Hydraulic concepts were given preliminary evaluation based on redundancy performance, 
complexity, and development status. Redundancy performance includes criteria such as 
nuisance tripping and effects after failure. 
The electromechanical concept (compared to other elec.tromechanidal) was evaluated on 
normal performance as well as the criteria above. 
4.4.2 AERODYNAMIC SURFACE CONTROLS. Refer to Figure 4-6 for descriptions 
of the configurations and where they are applied. These were selected to represent 
the best candidates and also to provide meaningful trends over wide ranges of loads 
and sizes. Electromechanical control (velocity summing) is used with three hydraulic 
power circuits to delete the need of a fourth small hydraulic circuit just for control 
channel power. Electromechanical control could also be used with four hydraulic power 
circuits. A weight comparison is made in Section 8 between electromechanical and 
hydraulic servo control portions only. The electromechanical control is a candidate 
for all three applications so that this comparison can be made. 
Although a four-power'system appears to weigh less than a three-power system for
 
large load applications, a three-power system is a candidate fot the -elevator applica-.
 
tions to show the weight trends of four versus three through this range of large loads.
 
The booster and orbiter elevators have the same configurations because they have much 
in common. Although the booster loads are much larger, both surfaces must be classi­
fied as being big. They are the driving functions for both vehicles (e.g., they determine 
interface sizes and quantities). 
'One principal difference between the elevator configurations 1 and 2 (see Figures 4-7 
and 4-8, respectively) is the physical installation, Configuration 1 has four separate 
control packages, each mounted integrally with an actuator. Configuration 2 has one 
large control package and could be installed remote from the actuator such that only 
fluid and electrical lines interconnect the two. The control package location must not 
be so remote that fluid line compliance would seriously degrade hydraulic stiffness. 
4.4.2.1 Booster and Orbiter Elevator - Configuration I (Figure 4-7). The unit has an 
all active-force summing control mechanization. Four hydraulic power systems and 
four separate valve/actuators are used. The control sections are force summed through 
a mechanical shaft. The secondary actuators are synchronized by a self-equalization 
loop fed back within each channel to keep all secondary actuators within predetermined 
synchronous limits. The equalization signal (force signal) is also used for fault detec­
tion and correction. When a chahuel output reaches a threshold of failure, power is 
removed from the continuously energized shutoff valve. With the shutoff valve off, the 
pressure operated bypass valve shifts to bypass the secondary actuator. Hydraulic 
pressure to a power actuator is not affected by a channel failure that de-activates a 
secondary actuator. Each control channel loop is closed by electrical position feedback 
from secondary actuator to servo amplifier. 
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Figure 4-6. Aerodynamic Surface Control Applications 
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Figure 4-7. Booster and Orbiter Elevator - Configuration 1 
Each power actuator is sized for one-half the maximum hinge moment so that 100% of 
the required hinge moment is available after two hydraulic failures. Null synchroni­
zation of the power spools is achieved by use of static pressure feedback. This in 
effect softens the pressure gain of each power spool at null, thus preventing a force 
fight between hydraulic circuits. A jammed secondary actuator or power spool can be 
driven out of its detent by the three good channels. The detent breakout force is set 
below the output of any two secondary actuators operating within their synchronous 
limits. This is to prevent disengagement of channels when they are driving against 
this load, Over pressure bypass on the output is provided to allow the three good out­
puts to follow commands. Mechanical feedback closes the outer loop from the actuator 
to the power spool. 
4.4.2.2 Booster and Orbiter Elevatdr - Configuration 2 (Figure 4-8). This unit is 
all active-force summing. Equalization (force) signals from secondary actuatoits are 
averaged between channels before fedback to the servoamplifiers to synchronize chan­
nels. Electronic fault detection and correction logic is used. When one channel fails, 
the logic conipares channels on a two-by-two basis, detects the faulty channel and by­
passes the secondary actuator by sending a signal to de-energize the normally ener­
gized shutoff valve which in turn cycles the bypass valve to bypass. The four channel 
control and the power spools are integrated into one packmge and can be remote from 
the output actuators. 
Each of the output actuators is sized for one-half hinge moment so that 100% of the 
required hinge moment is available after two hydraulic failures. The power spools are 
synchronized by fabrication, where all circuits null within approximately 1000 psi AP 
of each other. There are no provisions for power spool jams other than the overpower­
ing force of the secondary actuators. Electrical position feedback is"used to close all 
control loops. 
4.4.2.3 Booster and Orbiter Elevator - Configuration 3, (Figure 4-9); Orbiter Aileron-
Configuration 3. This unit is all electromechanical in the control stages. The ac servo­
motor and differentials arranged in an all active, velocity summing arrangement provide 
a ballserew output to drive hydraulic power spools. The servo motors incorporate a 
fixed phase and control phase winding and normally electrically energized brake (brake 
off). The control phase accepts a variable voltage input to control the output. Each 
channel incorporates velocity (tachometer) feedback which is also used for channel 
comparison. When a channel reaches threshold of failure (disagreement with adjacent 
channels) the electronic detection and switching logic signals the faulty channel to shut 
down. Power is removed from the control phase winding and brake, loking the output. 
The output velocity to the ballscrew is reduced 25% after each channel failure. A back­
up differential and ballscrew is provided. Should the primary ballscrew/differential 
jam, the back-up ballscrew is driven out of its detent to drive the power spools. 
Each output actuator is sized.for full hinge moment to provide 100% capability after two 
failures. The triple tandem spools are synchronized by close tolerance fabrication. 
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4.4.2.4 Orbiter Aileron - Configuration 1 (Figure 4-10). The unit is active/standby 
employing hydraulic logic. Secondary actuators are not used. The active and two 
standby circuits each have two servo channels, one being a monitor with no output, 
The system is self monitoring with no cross comparison between channels that have 
outputs. The lockout solenoid valves are energized momentarily to cycle the unit to 
the starting position shown. Fault correction logic consists of hydraulic flapper/nozzle 
assemblies that port pressure proportional to electrohydraulic valve spool position to 
a spring loaded slide valve called a comparator. If spool positions disagree between 
the active channel and its monitor by a predetermined amolt, the AP on the comparator 
causes it to shift, which in turn causes the engage valve to shift, bypassing the active 
output and engaging the first standby. The lockout valve (de-energized) cycles upon 
collapse of control pressure to prevent re-engagement of the channel. If either standby 
channel should fail first, separate shutoff valves cycle to prevent engagement. A hy­
draulic piston pressurized by the first standby circuit provides an additional engage 
valve position should the first standby fail first. Pressure switches in the comparator 
valve provide intelligence for failure indication. 
Because the mechanization requires six servo channels, voters are placed between the 
four channel inputs and the six driving servo amplifiers. This allows up to two erron­
eous command inputs to be voted out before reaching the servos. Electrical feedback 
is used to close the control loop. Each actuator is sized to 100% of maximum required 
hinge moment. 
4.4.2.5 Orbiter Aileron - Configuration 2 (Figure 4-11). This unit is all electro­
mechanical employing spring clutches. Three electrical power systems are clutched 
in upon electrical command and summed through a triple differential to provide output 
to a single ballscrew actuator. -Two clutches are required per circuit to give bi-direc­
tional motion. The input signals from four channels are conditioned to permit only 
signals of sufficient level to energize the solenoids (or coil energizers) to prevent 
clutch slipping. The clutches transmit power from a cqntinuous rotahng input shaft at 
constant rate. Fault detection is self monitoring, comparing input to output. If there 
is no output with an input-signal present, power is removed from that channel and the 
output is locked by means of a brake incorporated within each clutch assembly. The 
signal conditioning electronics also includes failure detection and switching logic to 
remove an erroneous command signal so that comparison can be made after one failure. 
Due to the triple differential summing arrangement, failures cause unequal effects. 
Should either channel 1 or 2 fail, for example; the output ballscrew rate is reduced 25%. 
If channel 3 fails, the output rate is reduced 50%. There is no degradation in hinge 
moment after failure but there is a degradation in surface rate. 
4.4.3 THRUST VECTOR CONTROLS. See Figure 4-12 for descriptions of the config­
urations and where they are applied. 
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Figure 4-12. TVC Applications 
The orbiter and booster TVC configuration Iare common and utilize the vehicle central 
APU driven hydraulic circuits. The centering power for this case is an accumnulator 
checked off from 	an active hydraulic circuit. 
To see how the APU systems are arranged, refe- to Figure 4-13. The dual blocks 
represent dual tandem actuators and the numbers within the blocks represent the power 
circuits. One can see that one hydraulic circuit loss does not shut down any TVC. A 
second hydraulic failure shuts down two TVC systems on the booster and one TVC sys­
tem on the orbiter. The configuration is more redundant than is normally required 
(fail to null) for the booster, but it eliminates the need for 11 separate hydraulic circuits, 
one per rocket engine. The addition of power distribution lines from the APU hydraulics 
is the only power penalty applied to this configuration since the power supplies are sized 
by the aerodynamic surface controls. 
Configurations 2 and 3for the orbiter require three active hydraulic systems per TVC 
due to continuous channel control power consumption. 
The booster configurations represent three levels of redundancy. Configuration I has 
the highest level to be able to use only 4 hydraulic power circuits for all 11 engines. 
Configuration 3 has the least redundancy in the control channels, sufficient to prevent 
hardover on the first failure. This configuration meets only the fail to null requirement. 
Configuration 2 has three channels because it is monitorless in the control channels. 
The only detection and switching occurs when the actuator is centered after loss of 
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Figure 4-13. APU Driven Hydraulic Circuits for TVC - Configuration 1 
hydraulic control power. Configuration 2 is fail operate degraded if the failure is con­
fined to the upper servo-portions where redundanqy eidsts. It can survive many com­
binations of failures providing there are no two like failures. 
4.4.3.1 Orbiter and-Booster TVC - Configuration 1 (Figure 4-14). The unit is 
active/standby employing hydraulic logic. The active and standby circuits each have 
two servo channels, one being a monitor ith no output. The unit is self monitoring 
with no cross monitoring between PI and P 2 outputs. The lockout solenoid valves (6) 
are energized momentarily to cycle the unit to the starting position shown. Fault 
correction logic consists of hydraulic flapper/nozzle assemblies (4) that port pressure 
proportional to electrohydraulic valve spool position to a spring-loaded slide valve (5) 
called a comparator. If spool positions disagree between active channel and its monitor 
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Figure 4-14. Orbiter and Booster TVC - Configuration 1 
by a predetermined amount, the AP on the comparator causes it to shift, which in turn 
causes the engage to shift bypassing the active output and engaging the standby. The 
lockout valve (de-energized) cycles upon collapse of control pressure to prevent re­
engagement of the channel. If the standby should fail first, its shutoff and bypass valve 
(9) prevents engagement. Pressure switches in the comparator provide intelligence 
for failure indication and actuator centering. After two failures, P1 and P 2 hydraulic 
pressure is shutoff and the centering valve energized, porting P 3 (accumulator) to the 
centering and locking actuator. 
Each half of the tandem actuator is sized for full hinge moment. Electrical position 
feedback is used to close the loop around the servoactuator. 
4.4.3.2 Orbiter TVC - Configuration 2 (Figure 4-15). Three active channels powered 
by three hydraulic circuits provide a common output that controls a tandem output actu­
ator. P 3 is used as a standby and switched into the power actuator in event of loss of 
either P 1 or P 2 . The servo channels use secondary actuators mechanized to provide 
a force summed output. To minimize the force unbalance the three channels are syn­
chronized-by force signals (AP) returned to the electronic comparison, detection and 
switching logic where an equalization signal is fed back to each channel forcing them 
to a common null. If one.channel (e.g., secondary actuator AP) reaches a predetermined 
threshold of disagreement with the other channels, it. is shut off via the detection and 
switching logic, and the secondary actuator is bypassed. 
Electrical position feedback closes the control loop from the secondary actuator to the 
servo amplifier. After a second failure all channels are shut down and all secondary 
actuators center. Center position of the secondary actuators is coincident with geo­
metric center of the power actuators due to the mechanical feedback arrangement. 
Each half of the tandem power actuator is sized to provide full hinge moment. 
4.4.3.3 Orbiter TVC - Configuration 3 (Figure 4-16). Two hydraulic circuits (P1 and 
P 2 ) and corresponding servo channels provide active outputs to a tandem power actuator, 
whereas the servo channel powered by P 3 serves only as a model. All channels use 
secondary actuators mechanized to provide position summing of the outputs of channels 
1 and 2. If one secondary actuator position reaches a predetermined threshold of dis­
agreement with the other secondary actuators, the electronic detection and switching 
logic shuts off that channel. As hydraulic pressure collapses the affected secondary 
actuator centers and locks. If an active actuator is centered, the output stroke to the 
power spool is halved and gain and output rate are reduced. A second failure that will 
cause sufficient disagreement between the two remaining channels will shut down all 
channels via the detection and switching logic. All secondary actuators center and lock. 
In addition the power control actuator is by-passed by action of the power by-pass valves, 
allowing the centering actuator to center and lock the TVC. The centering valve is 
energized by the same intelligence that de-activates all channels. 
Each half of the tandem power actuator is sized to provide-full hinge moment. 
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Figure 4-16. Orbiter TVC - Configuration 3 
4.4.3.4 Booster TVC - Configuration 2 (Figure 4-17). This unit is monitorless (no 
detection or correction in the servo channels). It has one active hydraulic circuit that 
powers three servo channels. The first stage eleotrohydraulic valve outputs are flow 
summed to drive a common power spool, which in turn controls the power actuator. A 
bad output from any channel will attempt to drive the power spool. Mechanical feedback 
from the spool to each first stage will direct the two good channels to oppose the dis­
crepant signal. Single faults in the servo upper stages, therefore, are overpowered 
and no switching is required. There is some degradation (unsymmetrical response, 
slight output position change, loss of control sensitivity about-null) after a failure de­
pending on the nature of failure. The unit can survive many combinations of dual fail­
ures but cannot tolerate two like failures (e.g., two channel hardovers in the same 
direction). 
Centering and locking provisions are incorporated into the power actuator. A second 
hydraulic circuit, P2 (accumulator), is switched in to center the actuator should the 
active circuit, P 1 , fail. 
4.4.3.5 Booster TVC - Configuration 3 (Figure 4-18). This unit has one active hy­
draulic circuit, P 1 . A second hydraulic circuit is used to power a monitoring channel 
and provide centering. The two servo channels are required to prevent a hardover 
output. Hydraulic logic is used (e.g., the monitors, comparator;- and shutoff and 
bypass are the same as described in Section 4.3.3.1). A secondary actuator is used 
on the active channel. When there is sufficient disagreement between channels, pres­
sure is removed from the secondary actuator and it centers. Center position is coin­
cident with geometric cehiter of the power actuator due to the mechanical feedback 
arrangement. The centering valve is triggered by either loss of P1 hydraulic pressure 
or servo channel disagreement, to poi-t centering power to -the tandem power actuator. 
Should P 2 fail first, P1 is available to center the power actuator. 
4.4.4 DIGITAL CONFIGURATION. .One digital design is configured to satisfy the two 
fail operate requirements for aerodynamic surface controls. This configuration, Fig­
ure 4-19, was selected because it is all digital except for the output actuator. To ex­
tend digital design' to include the output actuator (digital strut) would result in a very 
large and complex actuator. Torque motors rather than solenoid valves are used in 
the upper stages because of the severe cycling requirements (number and frequency). 
Figure 4-20 is a functional schematic that shows detail operation of one channel. Com­
mand signals are received in incremental form. For each signal pulse, the torque 
motor drives the pilot stage spool. Pressure is boot strapped to drive the pilot stage 
spool after initial movement to reduce the signal level and pulse duration required on 
the torque motor. The pilot stage spool directs pressure to the main power spool, 
positioning it to open pressure to one cylinder port. The flow from the opposite cylinder 
port drives the digitizer spool against a stop. The displacement of the digitizer spool 
represents the incremental displacement of the actuator for one pulse. When the signal 
is removed from the torque nyotor, the pilot stage and power spool center, blocking the 
actuator ports and recycling the digitizer spool. 
4-25 
Two digitizers are used. The smaller gives 0.2% positional accuracy per requirements 
of Section 3, but has limited rate capability,. Rate capability is based on the assumption 
that the maximum practical cycling rate attainable is 30 Hz. The larger digitizer gives 
maximum rate required but has a larger displacement per cycle. 
The large digitizer would normally receive signals for large surface position changes. 
The small digitizer acts as a vernier for accurate positioning. The digitizers operate 
in sequence, not in parallel. 
The fault correction consists only of overpressure sensing on the output actuators. If 
one actuator is not in agreemeht and is driven by the other three, it will be switched 
off when sufficient disagreement is reached. This 'Torce voting" on the output requires 
four systems to enable correction after a second failure. 
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SECTION 5 
FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
5.1 DEFINITIONS 
Refer to pages 5-2 through 5-23 for the failure modes and effects analysis of the 
eleven candidate configurations. 
Jamming failures of output linear hydraulic actuators are not considered in this 
analysis. This is in keeping with past experience that this type of failure mode 
is virtually non-existent. 
The last column, entitled Failure Category, carries the following definitions: 
Category I - Single failure or failure level that could cause loss of 
personnel or vehicle. 
Category II - Single failure or failure level whereby the next associated 
failure could cause loss of personnel or vehicle. 
Category III - Single failure or failure level that ban be sustained without 
loss of primary mission objectives; or the single failure or 
failure level whereby the next associated failure could cause 
loss of primary nission objectives.. 
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ASO 
IT FAILURE MODE 
CONFIGURATION I, ELEVATOR - BOOSTER AND ORBITER 
ITEM FAIURE ODE PRIARYDET 2* BYFAILUREPRIMARy CAUSE D lY FAILURE CORRECTION AUS EFFECT ON SYSTEM 
USAGE: Z PLACES 
EFFECT ON VEHICLE 
SHEET I 
CATEORY 
I LOSS OF ONE HYD. 
SYSTEM 
o FLUID LOSS 
. PUMP FAILURE 
LOW PRESS WARN-
ING 
SECONDARY 
PASSED 
ACTUATOR BY- NO OUTPUT FROM ONE CIA-
CULT. PASSIVE SEC. ACTU-
ATOR DRIVEN BY 3 GOOD 
CHANNELS 
NO DEGRADATION ILL 
'2 LOSS OF TWO HYD. 
SYSTEMS 
SAME AS 1 SAME AS I TWO SECONDARY ACTUATOR 
BYPASSED 
NO OUTPUT FROM TWO CI-
CULTS. PASSIVE SEC. ACTU-
ATORS DRIVEN BY Z GOOD 
CHANNELS 
DEGRADATION IN 
SURFACE RESPONSE 
GAIN L STIFFNESS 
Il 
3 HARDOVER SIGNAL - LOSS OF SIGNAL 
* ELECT. HARDOVEP 
' OPEN FEED BA K 
O PLUGGED NOZZLE 
HYD. AMPLIFIER 
FAULT INDICATIO 
-DETECTION AND 
SWITCHING LOGIC 
FORCE ( P) SIGNAL PROM 
SEC. ACTUATOR DE-
ENERGIZES SHUTOFF. SEC. 
ACTUATOR BYPASSED. 
OUTPUT FROM ONE CON-
TROL CHANNEL DE-
ACTIVATED. ALL POWER 
CIRCUITS OPERATIVE 
SAME AS I III 
C-I 
10ITH 
4 HARDOVER SIGNAL-
W ONE CHAN-NEL Dl-mACTiVATE 
SAME AS 3 SAME AS 3 SAME AS 3 2 CONTROL CHANNELS 
DE-ACTIVATED. ALL POWERCIRCUITS OPERATIVE 
SLIG1-T DEGRADA- 
TION IN SURFACERESPONSE 
11 
5 JAMMED BYPASS 
SPOOL - (WONT 
BYPASS) 
- CONTAMINATION 
- BROKEN SPRING 
NOT DETECTED NONE NONE BY ITSELF NO EFFECT IlI. 
HARDOVER SIG-
NAL4SECONDFAILURE) 
SAME AS 3 FORCE SIGNAL DE-ENERGIM 
SHUTOFF. SEC. ACTUATORWONT BYPASS 
SECONDARY ACTUATOR 
BREAKS OUT DETENT ANDDRIVES POWER SPOOL. 
SAME AS Z 
GOOD CIRCUITS 'BUCK' OUT 
HARDOVER ATTEMPT. 
SMALL SURFACE POSITION 
CHANGE 
6 JAMMED SEC. 
ACTUATOR 
-CONTAMINATION 
-STRUCTURAL 
FAILURE 
SAME AS 3 FORCE SIGNAL 
SHUTOFF 
DE-ENEROIT 3 GOOD CHANNELS MAIN-
TAIN POSITION CONTROL 
AND DRIVE JAMMED ACTUA-
TOR OUT OF DETENT. OVER-
PRESSURE BYPASS OPENED 
ON AFFECTED POWER 
ACTUATOR 
SAME AS Z 11 
7 JAMMED MAIN 
POWER SPOOL 
SAME AS 6 SAME AS 3 SAME AS 6 SAME AS 6 SAME AS 2 it 
ASC CONFIGURATION I. ELEVATOR - BOOSTER AND ORBITER USAGE: Z PLACES SHEET Z 
ITEM FAILURE MODE PRIMARY CAUSE DETECTED BY 
____________ 
FAILURE CORRECTION 
______________________________CATEGORY 
EFFECT ON SYSTEM EFFECT ON VEHICLE FAILURE 
8 DETECTION AND 
SWITCHING LOGIG 
ONE OPEN 
BROKEN WIRE OR 
OPEN CONNEC-
TION 
FAULT INDICATION 
DETECTION AND 
SWITCHING LOGIC 
SHUTOFF VALVE DE-ENERGIZ 
ED SEC. ACTUATOR BY-
PASSED 
OUTPUT FROM ONE CONTROL NO DEGRADATION 
CHANNEL DE-ACTIVATED. 
ALL POWER CIRCUITS OPERA 
TIVE 
Ill 
9 SOL SHUTOFF 
VALVE - OPEN 
SAME AS 8 NOT DETECTED SAME AS S SAME AS 8 SAME AS 8 II1 
10 SOL SHUTOFF 
VALVE-STUCK IN 
ENERGIZED POSI-
TION 
CONTAMINATION NOT DETECTED NONE NONE NO EFFECT II 
HARDOVER SIGNAL 
(ZND FAfLURE) 
SAME AS 8 SHUTOFF VALVE DE-ENERGIZ 
ED. VALVE WONT CYCLE 
SAME AS S SAME AS 2 II 
I I 
Ol 
DO(NUISANCE 
CONTROL MIS-
MATCH, PRM 54 
VOLTAGE, GAIN, 
RESPONSE 
NOT DETECTED 
UNLESS MIS-
MATCHES REACH 
FAILURE DETEC-
TION THRESHOLD. 
TRIP) 
NONE REQUIRED UNTIL FAIL-
URE THRESHOLD IS REACHED, 
THEN RESULT IS SAME AS 3 
-EQUALIZING CIRCUITS ON 
EACH CHANNEL PROVIDE 
BIAS SIGNAL TO SERVO AMP 
TO FORCE ALL CHANNELS 
TQ COMMON NULL. 
NO EFFECT III 
12 SYNCHRONIZING 
SHAFT-BROKEN 
STRUCTURAL 
FAILURE 
NOT DETECTED NONE LARGE DEAD ZONE AND LOSS 
OF STIFFNESS 
SERIOUS DEGRADA-
TION IN PERFOR-
MANCE & POSSIBLE 
LOSS OF PITCH CON 
TROL 
I 
13 INTERNAL LEAK- 
AGE HIGH RATE 
-FAILED SEAL 
ACTUATOR PIS-
TONS . 
* EROSION/WEAR 
LAPPED SPOOLS 
NOZZLE 
NOT DETECTED 
UNLESS CHANNEL 
PERFORMANCE DE 
GRADES TO FA:LUM-
THRESHOLD 
NONE UNTIL FAILURE THRES-
HOLD IS REACHED, THEN RE-
SULT IS SAME AS 3 
'FLUID HEATING 
* LOWER SERVO GAIN 
-LOWER LOAD CAPABILITY 
ON ONE CIRCJIT 
SAME AS I InI 
14 EXTERNAL LEAK-
AGE HIGH RATE 
"ROD DYNAMIC . 
SEAL 
-STATIC SEAL TO 
AMBIENT 
LOW PRESS 
WARNING WHEN 
CIRCUIT FLUID IS 
DEPLETED 
SECONDARY ACTUATOR BY-
PASSED WHEN CIRCUITIS 
DEPLETED. 
SAME AS i. POTENTIAL 
SAFETY HAZARD EXISTS 
WITH OIL SPILLAGE 
SAME AS I In 
ASC CONFIGURATION Z, ELEVATOR - BOOSTER AND ORBITER USACEM 2 PLACES SHEET I 
ITEM FAILURE MODE PRIMARY CAUSE DETECTED BY FAILURE CORRECTION EFFECT ON SYSTEMEFFECT__ 
_ON_SYSTEM___ONVEHICL  
EFECT ON VEHICLE 
_ 
AILURE 
CATEGORY 
I LOSS OF ONE HYD. 
SYSTEM 
* FLUID LOSS 
-PUMP FAILURE 
*LOW PRESS WARN-
ING 
.FAULT INDICATIO 
- DETECTION AND 
SWITCHING LOGIC 
PASSIVE FAILURE DETECTED 
BY CROSS MONITORING. SHUT 
OFF VALVE DE-ENERGIZED. 
SEC ACTUATOR BYPASSED 
NO OUTPUT FROM ONE CI,-
CUIT. PASSIVE SEC. ACTU-
ATOR DRIVEN BY 3 GOOD 
CHANNELS 
NO DEGRADATION III 
2 LOSS OF TWO HYD 
SYSTEMS 
SAME AS I SAME AS I TWO SECONDARY ACTUATORS 
BYPASSED 
NO OUTPUT FROM TWO CiR-
CUITS. PASSIVE SEC, ACTU-
ATORS DRIVEN BY Z GOOD 
CHANNELS 
DEGRADATION IN 
SURFACE RESPONSE 
GAIN & STIFFNESS 
1 
3 HARDOVER SIGNAL * LOSS OF SIGNAL 
- ELECT. HARDOVER 
* OPEN FEEDBACK 
FAULT INDICATIO 
- DETECTION & 
SWITCHING LOGIC 
ACTIVE FAILURE DETECTED 
BY CROSS MONITORING. SHUT 
OFF VALVE DE-ENERGIZED. 
OUTPUT FROM ONE CONTRI 
CHANNEL DE-ACTIVATED. 
ALL POWER CIRCUITS 
SAME AS I III 
*PLUGGED NO2Z7L 
HYD. AMPLIFIER 
SEC. ACTUATOR BYPASSED. OPERATIVE 
4 HARDOVER SIGNAL 
- WITH ONE CHAN-
NEL DE-ACTIVATE] 
SAME AS 3 SAME AS 3 SAME AS 3 2 CONTROL CHANNELS DE-
ACTIVATED. ALL POWER 
CIRCUITS OPERATIVE 
SLIGHT DEGRADA-
TION IN SURFACE 
RESPONSE 
II 
S JAMMED BYPASS 
SPOOL-(WONT BY-
PASS) 
- CONTAMINATION 
*BROKEN SPRING 
NOT DETECTED NONE NONE BY ITSELF NO EFFECT III 
HARDOVER SIGNAL 
(ZND FAILURE) 
SAME AS 3 DETECTION SIGNAL DE- 
ENERGIZES SHUTOFF. SEC. 
ACTUATOR WONT BYPASS 
3 GOOD CHANNELS MAIN-
TAIN CONTROL. LOSS IN 
SERVO GAIN & RESPONSE 
SAME AS Z II 
6 JAMM4ED SEC. 
ACTUATOR 
* CONTAMINATION NOT DETECTED - EACH SECONDARY ACTUA- 
TOR HAS 800 LBS NET FOCE 
,4 CHANNELS HAVE 3200 LBS 
AVAILABLE, APPROX 10 TIMES 
FORCE NEEDED TO SHEAR 
CHIP 
- NO EFFECT IF JAM IS 
CLEARED 
NO EFFECT III 
-STRUCTURAL 
FAILURE 
* JAM WOULD NbT CLEAR 
ONLY IF MASSIVE STRUC-
TURAL FAILURE OCCURRED 
- SERVO ACTUATOR CAN'T 
FOLLOW COMMANDS. 2ND 
SERVOACTUATOR STALLED 
'LOSS OF CONTROL 
SURFACE POSITION 
FECED 
I 
7 JAMMED MAIN 
POWER SPOOL 
SAME AS 6 SAME AS 6 SAME AS 6 SAME AS 6 SAME AS 6 I 
-4_ _ __ _ _ _ _ 
ASC 
ITEM FAILURr MODE 
CONFIGURATION 
PRIMARY CAUSE 
Z, ELEVATOR - BOOSTER AND ORBITER 
DETECTED BY FAILURE CORRECTION 
USAGE: Z PLACES 
EFFECT ON SYSTEM EFFECT ON VEHICLE 
SHEET 2 
FAILURE 
8 DETECTION AND 
SWITCHING LOGIC-
ONE OPEN 
BROKEN WIRE OR 
OPEN CONNECTION 
SAME AS 3 SAME AS 3 SAME AS 3 SAME AS I III 
9 SOL. SHUTOFF 
VALVE - OPEN 
SAME AS S SAME AS 3 SAME AS 3 SAME AS 3 SAME Ad I III 
10 SOL. SHUTOFF 
VALVE - STUCK IN 
ENERGIZED POSI-
TION 
CONTAMINATION NOT DETECTED NONE NONE NO EFFECT III 
HARDOVER SIGNAL 
(2ND FAILURE) 
SAME AS 3 DETECTION SIGNAL TO SHUT- 
OFF VALVE. VALVE CAN'T 
SHUTOFF. SECONDARY ACTUA-
TOR WON'T BY-PASS 
3 GOOD CHANNELS MAINTAIN 
CONTROL. LOSS IN SERVO GAIN 
& RESPONSE 
SAME AS 2 
0 
11 CONTROL MIS-
MATCH - PRESS, 
VOLTAGE, GAIN 
RESPONSE 
NOT DETECTED UN-
LESS MISMATCHES 
REACH FAILURE 
DETECTION THRES-
HOLD (NUISANCE 
TRIP) 
NONE REQUIRED UNTIL FAIL-
URE THRESHOLD IS REACHED, 
THEN RESULT IS SAME AS 3 
EQUALIZING CIRCUITS BE-
TWEEN CHANNELS PROVIDE 
AVERAGING BIAS SIGNALS TO 
EACH SERVO AMP TO FORCE 
ALL CHANNELS TO A COMMON 
NULL 
NO EFFECT III 
12 INTERNAL LEAK-
AGE - HIGH RATE 
- FAILED SEAL 
ACTUATOR PISTONS 
'EROSION/WEAR 
LAPPED SPOOLS 
NOZZLE 
NOT DETECTED 
UNLESS CHANNEL 
PERFORMANCE , 
DEGRADED TO 
FAILURE THRES-
HOLD 
NONE UNTIL FAILURE THRES-
HOLD IS REACHED, THEN RE-
SULT IS SAME AS 3 
-FLUID HEATING 
'LOWER SERVO GAIN 
'LOWER LOAD CAPABILITY 
ON ONE CIRCUIT 
SAME AS I 
" 
III 
13 EXTERNAL LEAZ-
AGE - HIGH RATE 
- ROD DYNAMIC SEAL 
-STATIC SEAL TO 
AMBIENT 
LOW PRESS WARN-
ING WHEN CIRCUIT 
FLUID IS DEPLETED 
SECONDARY ACTUATOR BY-
PASSED WHEN CIRCUIT IS 
DEPLETED 
SAME AS I. POTENTIAL SAFETY 
HAZARD EXISTS WITH OIL 
SPILLAGE 
SAME AS I III 
~-L._ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _1 
ASC 
ITEM IFAILURE MOD 
CONFIGURATION 
ITEM 
PRIARY CAUSE 
3, ELEVATOR - BOOSTER AND ORBITER 
FILUREMODE PDVIAR 
DETECTED BY FAILURE CORRECTION 
CONFIGURATION 3, AILERON - ORBITER USAGE: 2 PLACES SHEET 
CAUS 
EFFECT ON SYSTEM EFIWC r ON VEHICLE CATEGORY 
I LOSS OF ONE HYD. 
SYSTEM 
-FLUID LOSS 
-PUMP FAILURE 
LOW PRESS 
WARNING 
NONE NO OUTPUT FROM ONE 
CIRCUIT 
NO DEGRADATION III 
2 LOSS OF TWO HYD. 
SYSTEMS 
SAME AS I SAME AS I NONE NO OUTPUT FROM 2 CIR. 
CUlTS 
DEGRADATION IN 
SURFACE RESItNS£ 
11 
GAIN & STIFFNESS 
3 HARDOVER SIGNAL -LOSS OF SIGNAL 
-ELECT HARDOVER 
'-OPEN-FEEDBACK 
FAULT INDICATION 
DETECTION AND 
SWITCHING LOGIC 
FAILURE DETECTED BY 
CROSS MONITORING. POWER 
REMOVED FROM SERVO 
MOTOR AND BRAKE. 
OUTPUT FROM ONE CHANNEI SLIGHT DEGRATION 
LOCKED. VELOCITY OUTPUT IN SURFACE RE-
OF BALL SCREW (SECOND- SPONSE 
ARY ACTUATOR) REDUCED 
25% 
INI 
4 HARDOVER SIGNAL, 
ONE CHANNEL OF 
AND LOCKED 
SAME AS 3 SAME AS 3 SAME AS 3 SAME AS 3, EXCEPT WITH 
2 CHANNELS OF, VELOCITY 
OF OUTPUT REDUCED 50% 
SAME AS 3 II 
C 
5 LOSS OF TACH. 
FEEDBACK 
- OPEN COIL 
-BROKEN WIRE 
SAME AS 3 AFFECTED CHANNEL OUT-
PUT VELOCITY BECOMES NOD 
LINEAR WITH RESPECT TO 
MOTOR ROTATION AT NULL. 
3 GOOD CHANNELS COUNTER 
ROTATE TO RREVENT OUTPUT 
SAME AS 3 I1 
ERROR SIGNAL. IF FAILURE 
THRESHOLD REACHED, POWER 
REMOVED FROM SERVO 
POSITION CHANGE. INCREASED 
POWER CONSUMPTION AT NUI 
IF DEM. CTION REMOVES 
MOTOR AND BRAKE POWER FROM MOTOR, RESUL! 
IS SAME AS 3. 
6 LOSS OF 2 TACH. 
FEEDBACKS 
SAME AS 5 SAME AS 3 SAME AS 5 SAME AS 4 SAME AS 3 It 
7 JAMMED DIFF-
ERENTIAL OUT-
PUT -SUMMING 
OUTPUT OF 2 
MOTORS 
* CONTAMINATION 
.SEARING FAIL-
URE 
-STRUCTURAL 
FAILURE 
NOT DETECTED NONE. FA ILURE EQUIVALENT 
TO Z SIMULTANEOUS CHANNEL 
FAILURES. LOGIC DISABLED 
& ALL CHANNELS REMAIN ON. 
SAME AS 4 SAME AS 3 II 
HARDOVDR SIGNAL 
(ZND FAILURE) 
SAME AS 3 WITH THIS ADDITIONAL FAIL-
URE LOGIC WILL SHUT OFF 
THE NON JAMMED SYSTEMS 
ONE SERVOACTUATOR FIX-
ED. 2ND SERVOACTUATOR 
STALLED (ELEVATOR) 
-ONE SERVOACTUATOR FIX-
ED. OPP SIDE ACTUATOR 
-ELEVATOR FIXED. 
LOSS OF CO TROL 
.IF FIXED POSITION 
IS NEAR EXTIREME 
I 
I 
STILL OPERABLE POSITION - LOSS 
(AILERON) OF CONTROL 
ASC CONFIOURATION 3 ELEVATOR - BOOSTER AND ORBITER CONFIGURATION 3, AILERON - ORBITER SHEET 2 
ITEM FAILURE MODE PRrIARY CAUSE DETECTED BY FAILURE CORRECTION EFFECT ON SYSTEM EFFECT ON VEHICLE FAILURECATEGORY 
JAMMED STANDBY 
OUTPUT - BALL 
SCREW OR DIE-
FERENTIAL 
SAME AS 7 NOT DETECTED NONE- STANDBY NORMALLY 
GROUNDED AGAINST FUNK 
STRUT 
NO EFFECT NO EFFECT ill 
9 JAMMED ACTIVE 
OUTPUT - BALL 
SCREW OR DIf-
FERENTIAL 
SAME AS 7 SAME AS 8 .WHENFORCE LEVEL EXCEEDS 
FUNK SHIUT BREAKOUT, STAND-
BY BALL SCREW CONIROLS 
OUTPUT FROM ALL CHANNELS 
NO EFFECT NO EFFECT III 
10 JAMMED HYDRAU-
LIC POWER SPOOL 
-CONTAMINATION 
'STRUCTURAL 
FAILURE 
SAME AS8 -BALL SCREW OUTPUT IS 
800 LBS. SUFFICIENT TO 
SHEAR CONTAMINATION 
*JAM WOULD NOT CLEAR ONL 
IF MASSIVE STRUCTURAL 
FAILURE OCCURRED 
'NO EFFECT IF JAM IS 'NO EFFECT 
CLEARED 
'ELEVATOR SERVOACTUATORS -LOSS OF CONTROL 
STALLED 
'ONE AILERON SERVGACUAIOR -IF FIXED ACTUATOR 
OPERABLE & ONE STALLED. IS NEAR EXIREME 
IOSITION ' LOSS OF 
CONTROL 
III 
I 
Ii 
FAILED MOTOR 
BRAKE - (LOCKED 
MOTOR) 
-OPEN COIL SAME AS 3 ONE MOTOR LOCKED. FAIL-
URE DETECTED BY CROSS 
MONITORING. POWER RE-
MOVED FROM SERVO MOTOR 
AND DRAKE. 
SAME AS 3 SAME AS 3 I1 
12 FAILED MOTOR 
BRAKE (WONT 
LOCK) 
'JAMMED 
MECHANISM 
NOT DETECTED NONE' NONE BY ITSELF NO EFFECT EI 
HARDOVER SIGNAL 
(ZND FAILURE) 
SAME AS 3 'SAME AS 3 REMAINING CHANNELS BACK 
DRVE THRU OPEN. NO OUT-
PUT UNLESS HYD POWER 
SPOOLS' FLOW FORCES & 
CENTERING SPRING FORCE 
SERIOUS DEGRADA-
TION. LOSS OF 
CONTROL SENSI-
TIVITY. 
II 
LESS THAN MOTOR FIXED 
PHASE REACTING TORQUE.' 
13 INTERNAL HYDRAU-
LIC LEAKAGE -
HIGH FLOW 
*PISTON SEAL 
*EROSION/WEAR 
POWER SPOOL 
NOT DETECTED NONE -FLUID HEATING 
'LOWER LOAD CAPABILITY 
ON ONE CIRCUIT 
-SAME AS I III 
14 EXTERNAL HY-
DRAULIC LEAKAGE 
- HIGH FLOW 
-ROD DYNAMIC SCAL 
'STATIC SEAL TO 
AM3JENT 
LOW PRESS WARN-
ING VHEN FLUID 
CIRCUIT IS DIQEZI 
NONE SAME AS I SAME AS I III 
ASC CONFIGURATION 1, AILERON - ORBITER USAGE: Z ?LACES SHEET I 
ITEM FAILURE MODE PRIMARY CAUSE DETECTED BY FAILURE CORRECTION 
F CCATEGORY 
EFFECT ON SYSTEM EFFECT ON VEHICLE FAILURE 
I LOSS OF ACTIVE 
HYD. SYSTEM 
-FLUID 
-PUMP 
LOSS 
FAILURE 
LOW PRESS 
WARNING 
ENGAGE VALVE SHIFTS AT 
LOW PRESS. LOCKOUT VALVE 
SHIFTS TO PREVENT RE-EN-
GAGEMENT 
ACTIVE CIRCUIT BYPASSED. 
FIRST STANDBY ENGAGED 
NO PERFORMANCE DEGRAD-
ATION 
NO DEGRADATION III 
Z LOSS 
HYD. 
OF STANDBY 
SYSTEM 
SAME AS I SAME AS I SHUTOFF & BYPASS VALVE ! 
AFFECTED CIRCUIT SHIFTS 
TO BYPASS. LOCKOUT, SAME 
AS I. 
AFFECTED STANDBY CIR-
CUIT CANNOT BE ENCGrED 
NO EFFECT III 
S LOSS OF TWO HYD 
SYSTEMS - ONE 
ACTIVE 
SAME AS I SAME AS 1 SAME AS 2. ENGAGE VALVE 
SHIFTS TO NEW POSITION. 
REMAINING CIRCUIT ENGAG -
ED. NO PERFORMANCE 
DEGRADATION 
SAME AS I II 
4 HARDOVER SIGNAL-
ACTIVE OR MONI-
TOR CHANNEL 
-ELECT HARDOVEI 
-PLUGGED NOZZLI 
HYD. AMPLIFIER 
FAIL INDICATION 
COMPARATOR 
SPOOL 
- CQMPARATOR SPOOL SHIFTS, 
DUMPING PRESS. ENGAGE 
VALVE SHIFTS AT LOW PRESS. 
SAME AS I. SAME AS I lB 
LOCKOUT, SAME AS I 
0 
5 IIARDOVER SIGNAL 
STANDBY OR 
MONITOR CHANNEI 
SAME AS 4 SAME AS 4 COMPARATOR SPOOL SHIFTS, 
CYCLING SHUTOFF & BYPASS 
VALVE. LOCKOUT, SAME AS I 
FAILED CIRCUIT CANNOT BE 
ENGAGED. NO CHANGE TO 
ACTIVE CONTROL 
SAME AS I III 
6 
7 
HARDOVER SIGNAL 
ON FIRST STAND-
BY - (ACTIVE 
CHANNEL FAILED) 
SUMMING AMPLI-
FIER - BAD OUT-
PUT 
SAME AS 4 
-ELECT OPEN 
-ELECT SHORT 
-OPEN FEEDBACK 
SAME AS 4 
NOT DETECTED 
COMPARATOR SPOOL SHIFTS, 
DUMPING PRESS. TO HYD 
CPLING. ENGAGE VALVE 
SHIFTS AT LOW PRESS LOCK-
OUT, SAME AS I 
NNOE 
SAME AS 3 
NONE. BAD SIGNAL BLOCK- 
ED BY VOTERS & DISEN-
GAGED FROM VOIER LOGIC 
SAME AS 1 
NO EFFECT 
II 
III 
8 SUMMING AMPLI-
FIER - a FAILED 
SAME AS 7 NOT DETECTED NONE NONE. BAD SIGNAL BLOCK- 
ED BY VOTERS 
NO EFFECT II 
9 IAMMED POWER 
SPOOL 
CONTAMINATION SAME AS 4 -SAME AS 4 - IF ACTIVE 
-SAME AS 5 - IF STANDBY 
SAME AS 4 - IF ACTIVE 
SAME AS 5 - IF STANDBY 
SAME AS I III 
10 FAILED HYDRAUIC 
MONITOR 
* BROKEN 
* BLOCKED RE-
STRICTOR 
SAME AS 4 SAME AS 9 SAME AS 9 SAME AS I III 
ASC CONFIGURAION 1, AILERON - ORBITER SHEET 2 
ITEM FAILURE MODE PRIMARY CAUSE DETECTED BY FAILURE CORRECTION EFFECT ON SYSTEM EFFECT ON VEHICLE FAILURE 
- CATEGORY 
II JAMMED COMPAR- -CONTAMINATION 'NOT DETECTED NONE NONE BY ITSELF NO EFFECT III 
ATOR (INEUTRAL BROKEN SPRING 
HARDOVER SIGNAL 'NOT DETECTED NONE. IF ON ACTIVE CHANNEL OUTPUT WILL FOLLOW HARD LARGE ROLL I 
(ZND FAILURE) CREW MUST SWITCH OFF AC. OVER. OPPOSITE AILERON TRANSIENT. SAMZ AS 
TIVE SYSTEM HYD. PRESSURE WILL MOVE IN SAME DIRECION I AFTER SWITCHING 
IZ JAMMED COMPARA- CONTAMINATION SAME AS 4 NONE THIS FAILURE IS RESULT OF NO EFFECT IIl 
TOR SPOOL-END PREVIOUS CHANNEL FAILURE. 
POSITION HAS NO EFFECT ON SUB-
SEQUENT FAILURES 
3 SOL. LOCKOUT SAME AS 1Z NOT DETECTED NONE NONE DY ITSELF NO EFFECT III 
VALVE-STUCK IN EN 
ERGIZED POSrION 
ERRATIC CHANNEL SAME AS 4 COMPARATOR SPOOL CYCLES FAILURE MODE OF LOCKOUT INTFRMrlTENT II 
OUTPUT BETWEEN NEUTIRAL & END VALVE CANNOT PREVENT ER- SWITCHING BETWE 
(2ND FAILURE) POSITION, SHIFTING ENGAGE RATIC CHANNEL FROM RE- CHANNELS CAUSE 
VALVE ENGAGING UNDESIRABLE BUT 
NOT CATASTROPIC 
c n TRANSIENTS 
wo 14 SOL LOCKOUT -BROKEN WIRE NOT DETECTED NONE IN FLIGHT NONE IN FLIGHT. AFFECTED NO EFFECT Ill 
VALVE - OPEN -OPEN COIL CHNNEL CANNOT E ENCCGD 
DURING GRD CHECKOUT 
15 JAMMED ENGAGE 'CONTAMINATION NOT DETECTED NONE NONE BY ITSELF NO EFFECT III 
VALVE 
HARDOVER-ACTIVE SAME AS 4 NONE DEFECTIVE CIRCUIT CANNOT LOSS OF CONTROL I 
CHANNEL BE DISENGAGED. OUTPUT GO&' 
(ZND FAILURE) HARDOVER. OPP. AILERON 
MOVES IN SAME DIRECTION 
16 FAILED VOTER- 'ELECT OPEN SAME AS 4 SAME AS 4 - IF ACTIVE SAME AS 4 - IF ACTIVE SAME AS I ill 
BAD OUTPUT 'ELECT SHORT SAME AS 5 - IF STANDBY SAME AS 5 - IF STANDBY 
17 INTERNAL LEAK- -PISTON SEAL NOT DETECTED NONE. UNLESS CREW 'FLUID HEATING POSSIBLE REDUC- Ill 
AGE - HIGH4 RATE -EROSION/WEAR SWITCH TO STANDBY -LOWER SERVO GAIN TION IN VEHICLE 
LAPPED SPOOLS -LOWER LOAD CAPABILITY ROLL RESPONSE 
UNTIL CREW 
SWITCHES TO 
STANDBY 
18 EXTERNAL LEAK- 'ROD DYNAMIC SAME AS I SAME AS I SAME AS I. POTENTIAL SAME AS I Ill 
AGE-ZHIGH RATE SEAL SAFETY HAZARD WITH 
STATIC SEAL TO OIL SPILLAGE 
AMBIENT 
ASO NIC__ATEO , LKEB N_- ORBITER USAGE: 2 PLACES SHEET I 
ITM FAILURE lODE PRfARY CAUSE DETECTED BY FAILURE CORRECTION EFFECT ON SYSTEM EFFECT ON VEHICLE FAILURE 
.... __CATEGORY 
NOTE: SPEED REDI CTION AFTER FAILL RE DEPENDS ON CH NNEL FAILURE DUE TO SUMMI 4G ACTION Or DIFFERENTIAL. 
FOR THIS At ALYSIS, THE FOLLO NING DEFINITIONS A PLY FOR ONE AILERON: 
CHANNEL OUTPUT LOCKED MAX. RATE CAPABILITY 
NO. I 755 
Np. 2 751, 
NO. 3 50% 
NO. t & 2 50% 
NO. L& 3 25% 
No. 2 &3 Z5% 
I LOSS OF NO. I -ELECT OPEN- INPUT TO OUTPUT DETECTION SWITCHES OFF OUTPUT OF CHANNEL NO. I VEHICLE ROLL III 
POWER INPUT - MOTOR DETECTION INPUT POWER TO AFFECTED LOCKED. SERVOACTUATOR RESPONSE 88% 
ONE AILERON -JAM OR OPEN CLUTCH OPERATES AT 75%. MAX. RATE OF NORMAL MAX. 
GEAR BOX 
2 LOSS OF NO. Z SAME AS I SAME AS I SAME AS I SAME AS I EXCEPT CHANNEL SAME AS I III 
POWER INPUT- NO. Z LOCKED 
ONE AILERON 
3 LOSS OF NO. 3 SAME AS I SAME AS I SAME AS I OUTPUT OF CHANNEL NO. 3 VEHICLE ROLL III 
POWER INPUT- LOCKED. SERVOACTUATOR RESPONSE 75% 
ONE AILERON OPERATES AT 507o MAX. RATE OF NORMAL MAX. 
4 LOSSOFNO. I &NO SAMEAS I SAME AS I SAME AS 1 OUTPUT OF NO. I&NO. Z SAVIEAS3 11 
2 POWER INPUT -ONE AILERON LOCKED. SERVOACTUATOROPERATES AT 50%. MAX. RATE 
5 LOSS OP NO. I OR SAME AS 1 SAME AS 1 SAME AS I OUTPUTS OF AFFECTED VEHICLE ROLL II 
NO. Z & NO.3 POWE CHANNELS LOCKED. SERVO- RESPONSE 62. 5% 
INPUT-ONE AILERON ACTUATOR OPERATES'AT OF NORMAL MAX 
Z5% MAX, RATE 
6 LOSS OF NO. I OR SAME AS I SAME AS I SAME AS I OUTPUTS OP AFFECTED SAME AS 3 II 
NO. 2 POWER WNPUI CHANNELS LOCKED. SERVO­
.BOTH AILERONS ACTUATOR OPERATES AT 
50% MAX RATE 
7 LOSS OF NO. I OR SAME AS I SAME AS I SAME AS i SAME AS 5 SAME AS 5 II 
NO. Z-ONE AILE-
RON 
LOSS OF NO. 3 -
ONE AILERON 
8 LOSS OF NO.3 - SAME AS I SAME ASL SAME AS I EACH SERVOACTUATOR VEHICLE ROLL RE- 11 
BOTH AILERONS OPERATES AT 50% MAX, RATE SPONSE 50% OF NOR-
MAL MAX 
ASO CONFIGURATION Z, AILERON - ORBITER SHEET 2 
ITEM FAILURE MODE PRIMARY CAUSE DETECTEDBY FAILURE CORRECTION EFFECT ON SYSTEM EFFECT ON VEHICLE FAILURE 
9 HARDOVER SIGNAL "ELECT HARDO'ER 
-ELECT OPEN 
-OPEN FEEDBACK 
FAULT INDICATION 
- ELECTRONIC 
VOTER & AVERPAGER 
_____________________________________CATEGORY 
FAULTY SERVO AMPLIFIER 3 CHANNELS STILL AVAIL-
CHANNEL SWITCHED OFF ABLE FOR FAULT DETEC-
TION 
NO EFFECT III 
10 IARDOVER SIGNAL 
'ONE CFANNELOF 
SAME AS 9 SAME AS 9 SAME AS 9 2 REMAINING CHANNELS IN 
CONTROL. CANNOT SUSTAIN 
ANOTHER LIKE FAILURE 
NO EFFECT 
I ONE SOLENOID -
STUCK IN ENER-
GIZED POSITION 
OR OPEN 
-CONTAMINATION 
"MECH.JAM 
-ELECT OPEN 
SAME AS 1 SAME AS I WORST CASE -SAME AS 3 SAME AS 3 III 
IZ SPRING CLUTH - -BEARING SAME AS I SAME AS I WORST CASE - SAME AS 3 SAME AS 3 I1 
JAMMED FAILURE 
01 
13 SPRING CLUTCH -
OPEN 
*BROKEN SPRING SAME AS I SAME: AS I NO OUTPUT FROM DIFFER-
ENTIAL IN ONE DIRECTION. 
Z GOOD SYS. BACRDRIVE THE 
DISCONNECTED SHAFT 
SERIOUS DEGRADA- 
TION, ONE AILERON 
DISCONNECTED IN 
ONE DIRECTION. 
I 
-
ROLL RESPONSE 
50% OF NORMAL IN 
ONE DIRECTION & 
75% IN OPP. DIREC-
TION 
14 LOSS OF DETEC-
TION rEEDYACK 
'ELECT OPEN SAME AS I SAME AS I WORST CASE - SAME AS 3 SAME AS 3 If! 
15 JAMMED OUTPUT -DIFFERENTIAL 
BEARING SEI-. 
ZURE, STRUCT. 
FAILURE 
- OUTPJT ACIUATOR 
CONTAMINATION 
BEARING SEI-
ZURE 
STRUCT.FAILURE 
SAME AS I DETECTION SWITCHES OFF 
INPUT POWER TO ALL 
CLUTCHES 
NO OUTPUT FROM DIFFER. 
ENTIAL. AILERON JAMMED. 
-IF JAM IS AT TRAIL, 
VEHICLE ROLL RE-
SPQNSE 50% OF 
NORMAL 
"IF JAM IS AT OR 
NEAR EXTREME 
AILERON POSITION, 
LOSS OF CONTROL 
II 
I 
NOTEZ WITH SEL MONITORING (INTR 
PERIOD I) CEEDING DETECTIO 
MUST BE RTRODUCED TO PRE 
-CHANNEL), SURFA E HINGE MOMENT SATURATIO 
TIME DELAY WILL ( AUSE MASSIVE SHUTDOWN AS 
ENT THIS OR RELIA CE MUST REST ON RESET OF 
OR SURFACE AGAINST THE Sl OPS FOR A 
FHOWN IN ITEM 16. ADDITIONA CIRCUITRY 
NPUT POWEiR BY CREW, 
TVC CONFIGURATION I, BOOSTER AND ORBITER USAGEz 2 PLACES - PITCH AND YAW SHEET I . 
ITEM FAILURE MODE PRIMARY CAUSE DETECTED BY FAILURE CORRECTION EFFECT ON SYSTEM EFFECT ON VEHICLE CATEGORY 
I LOSS OF ACTIVE 
HYD. SYSTEM 
* FLUID LOSS 
'PUMP FAILURE 
LOW PRESS 
WARNING 
ENGAGE VALVE SHIFTS AT 
LOW PRESS. LOCKOUT VALVE 
SHIFTS T0 PREVENT RE-ENGACE 
MENT. 
ACTIVE CIRCUIT BYPASSED. 
STANDBY ENGAGED. NO 
PERFORMANCE DEGRADATION 
NO DEGRADATION III 
Z LOSS OF STANDBY 
HYD. SYSTEM 
SAM= AS I SAME AS I SHUTOFF & BYPASS VALVE IN 
STANDBY CIRCUIT SHIFTS TO 
BYPASS. LOCKOUT, SAME AS I. 
STANDBY CIRCUIT CANNOT 
BE ENGAGED 
NO EFFECT III 
3 LOSS OF TWO 
HYD SYSTEMS 
SAME AS I SAME AS I AFTER ZND FAILURE, BOTH 
CIRCUITS BYPASSED. CENTER 
INC CURCUIT SWITCHED IN. 
* I TVC CENTERED ON 
ORBITER 
* 2 TVC SUBSYSTEMS CENT. 
*ORBITER CONTROL 
LED BY REMAINING 
TVC. PERFORMANCE 
II 
LOCKOUT, SAME AS I ERED ON BOOSTER DEGRADED 
-BOOSTER CONTROL 
ED BY 9 REMAINING 
TVC. PEREORMANCE 
11 
DEGRADED 
In 
4 LOSS OF CENTER-
ING SYSTEM 
(ACCUMULATOR 
BY APU HYD.CIR-
CUIT) 
- LOSS OF GAS 
PRESS 
' FLUID LEAK TO 
AMBIENT 
NONE 
SAME AS I 
NONE 
DEPENDING ON CIRCUIT LOSS 
VALVES SHIFT PER I OR Z 
NONE BY ITSELF 
SAME AS I OR Z 
NO EFFECT 
SAME AS I OR Z 
II 
II 
LOSS OF REMAIN-
ING HYD CIRCUIT 
(2ND FAILURE) 
SAME AS I SAME AS I AFTER 2ND FAILURE, 
CIRCUITS BYPASSED 
. 
BOTH * I TVC INOPERATIVE ON 
ORBITER - CANT CENTER 
.2 TVC INOPERATIVE ON 
BOOSTER - CANT CENTER 
YESSIBLE LOSS CF 
CONTL ON ORBITER 
'POSSIBLE COLLI-
SION OF ADJACENT 
ENGINES-BOOSTER 
I 
I 
5 HARDOVER SIGNAL 
-ACTIVE OR MONI-
TOR CHANNEL 
* ELECT HARDOVER 
- PLUGGED NOZE 
'OPEN FEEDBACK 
FAIL INDICATION. 
COMPARATOR 
SPOOL 
COMPARATOR SPOOL SHIFTS, 
DUMPING PRESS. ENGAGE 
VALVE SHIFTS AT LOW PRESS 
LOCKOUT, SAME AS 1. 
SAME AS I. SAME AS I III 
6 HARDOVER SIGNAL 
STANDBY OR 
MONrIOR CHANNEL 
SAME AS 5 SANE AS. 5 COMPARATOR SPOOL SHIFTS, 
CYCLING SHUTOFF & BYPASS 
VALVE. LOCKOUT SAME AS I 
SAME AS 2 NO EFFECT III 
7 HARIDOVER SIGNAL. 
ONE CHANNEL OFF 
SAME AS 5 SAME AS S SAME AS 3 SAME AS 3 SAME AS 3 II 
8 POWER SPOOL JAM 
-ACIlVE OR MONI-
IT O R 
CONTAMINATION SAME AS 
_ 
S SAME AS 5 SAME AS I SAME AS I Ill 
TVC CONFIGURATION I. - BOOSTER AND ORBITER SHDE 
ITEM FAILURE MODE PRIMARY CAUSE DE.TECTED BY FAILURE CORRECTION EFFECT ON SYSTEM EFFECT ON VEHICLE FAILUCATEG 
9 POWER SPOOL JAM-
3TANDBY OR MONI-
LOR 
SAME AS 8 SAME AS 5 SAME AS 6 SAME AS Z NO EFFECT III 
10 COMPARATOR SPOOL 
JAM - NEUTRAL 
-CONTAMINATION 
'BROKEN SPRING 
NOT DETECTED NONE NONE BY ITSELF NO EFFECT nI 
ACTIVE CHANNEL 
HARDOVER SIGNAL-
ACTIVE CHANNEL 
(ZND FAILURE) 
- NOT DETECTED NONE 'OUTPUT FOLLOWS COMMAND. 
REMAINING TVC CORRECTS 
ERROR. MINIMUM CONTROL 
-LOSS OF CONTROL, 
'POSSIBLE COLLI-
SIGN OF ADJACENT 
I 
ENGINES-BOOSTER 
II COMPARATOR SPOOL 
JAM - NEUTRAL -
STANDBY CHANNEL 
SAME AS 10 SAME AS 10 NONE NONE NO EFFECT II 
HARDOVER SIGNAL 
ACTIVE OR STAND-
BY (ZND FAILURE) 
- SAME AS 5 - ACTIVE 
NOT DETECTED -
STANDBY 
SAME AS 5 - IF ACTIVE 
NONE - IF STANDBY 
SAME AS 5 - IF ACTIVE 
NONE - IF STANDBY 
SAME AS I 
NO EFFECT 
l 
111 
cI I COMPARATOR SPOOL SAME AS 10 SAME AS S NONE THIS FAILURE RESULT OF PRE NO EFFECT III 
H 
co 
JAM-END POSITION VIOUS CHANNEL FAILURE. HAS 
NO EFFECT-ON SUBSEOUENT 
FAILURES 
13 
14 
SOL. LOCKOUT 
VALVE-STUCK IN 
ENERGIZED POSI-
TION 
SOL. LOCKOUT 
VALVE - OPEN 
CONTAMINATION 
-BROKEN WIRE 
-OPEN COIL 
NOT DETECTED 
NOT DETECTED 
NON= 
NONE IN FLIGHT 
NONE BY ITSELF. CANNOT 
PREVENT ERRATIC CHANNEL 
FROM RE-ENGAGING 
NONE IN FLIGHT. AFFECTEDCHANNEL CANNOT BE RE-EN- -
NO EFFECT UNLESS 
NUISANCE TRIPPING 
OCCURS - THEN 
TRANSIENT SWrIC-NG 
NO EFFECT 
IIl 
IH 
15 ENGAGE VALVE JAM CONTAMINATION NOT DETECTED NONE 
- " GAGED DURLNG GRD. CHECIOUT 
NONE BY ITSELF NO EFFECT II 
HARDOVER SIGNAL-
ACTIVE CHANNEL 
(ZND FAILURE) 
SAME AS 5 NONE. STANDBY 
SWITCHED IN 
CAN'T BE' OUTPUT FOLLOWS COMMAND 
REMAINING TVC'S CORRECT 
ERROR. 
'LOSS OF CONTROL 
ON ORBITER 
'ADJACENT ENGINE 
I 
± 
16 INE-RNAL LEAKAGE 
- HIGH RATE 
'PISTON SEAL 
"EROSION/WEAR 
LAPPED SPOOLS 
NOT DETECTED NONE 
- . 
'FLUID HEATING 
'LOWER SERVO GAIN 
'LOWER LOAD CAPABILITY 
COLLISION-BOOSIR 
-REDUCED VEHICLE 
RESPONSE-ORBITER 
'NO DEGRADATION-
III 
17 EXTERNAL LEAK-
AGE . HIGH RATE 
'ROD DYN. SEAL 
STATIC SEAL TO 
AMBIENT 
SAME AS I SAME 
SAME 
AS I -IF ACTIVE CIRCUIJ 
AS Z - IF STANDBY 
SAME AS I OR 2. 
POTENTIAL SAFETY HAZARD 
WITH OIL SPILLAGE 
BOOSTER 
-SAME AS I OR 2 Ill 
TVC CONFIGURATIONZ, - ORBITER 
ITEM FAILURE MODE PRIMARY CAUSE 
I 	 LOSS OF ONE * FLUID LOSS 
HYD. CIRCUIT -PUMP LOSS 
Z LOSS OF BOTH SAME AS I 
ACTIVE HYD 
S)STEMs 
3 	 LOSS OF STANDBY SAME ASI 
HYD SYSTEM 
4 	 HARDOVER SIGNAL °LOSS OF SIGNAL 
* ELECT. HARDOVEP 
* OPEN FEEDBACK
I 	 - PLUGGED NOZZU 
5 	 HARDOVER SIGNAL SAME AS 4 
WITH ONE CHANNEL 
DE-ACTIVATED 
6 	 JAMMED BYPASS -- CONTAMINATION 
SPOOL (WONT BY- *BROKEN SPRING 
PA SS) 
HARDOVER SIGNAL 
(2ND FAILURE) 
7 	 JAMMED SECON- CONTAMINATION 
DARY ACTUATOR 
STRUCTURAL 

FAILURE 
DETECTED BY 

*LOW PRESS WARN. 
ING 
-FAULT INDICATION 
-DETECTION & 
SWITCHING LOGIC 
SAME AS I 
SAME AS I 
FAULT INDICATIO 
-DETECTION & 
SWITCHING LOGIC 
SAME AS 4 
NOT DETECTED 
SAME AS 4 
NOT DETECTED 
NOT DETECTED 
FAILURE CORRECTION 
___________I________________ 
PASSIVE FAILURE DETECTED 
BY CROSS MONITORING. SHUT 
OFF VALVE DE-ENERGIZED. 
SECONDARY ACTUATOR BY-
PASSED. 
ALL CHANNELS BYPASSED. 
SEC. ACTUATORS CENTER. 
SAME AS I 
ACTIVE FAILURE DETECTED 
-BY CROSS MONITORING. SHUI 
OFF VALVE DE-ENERGIZED. 
SEC. ACTUATOR BYPASSED 
SAME AS Z 
NONE 

DETECTION SIGNAL DE-
ENERGIZES SHUTOFF. SEC. 
ACTUATOR WONT BYPASS 
-EACH SEC. ACTUATOR HAS 
APPROX 400 LBS NET FORCE 
TO SHEAR CONTAMINATE OR 
1200 LBS TOTAL. 
-JAM WOULD NOT CLEAR 
ONLY IF MASSIVE STRUC-
TURAL FAILURE OCCURRED 
USAGE 2 PLACES -
EFFECT ON SYSTEM 
________________CATEGORY.. 
STANDBY CIRCUIT SWITCHER 
INTO POWER ACTUATOR. 
PASSIVE SECONDARY ACrU-
ATOR DRIVEN BY Z GOOD 
CHANNELS.
 
STDBY CIRCUIT SWITCHED 
INTO POWER ACTUATOR. 
POWER ACTUATOR CENT-
ERED & LOCKED 
PASSIVE SECONDARY ACTU-
ATOR DRIVEN BY 2 GOOD 
CHANNELS. NO CHANGE IN 
OUTPUT 
PASSIVE SECONDARY ACT-
UATOR DRIVEN BY 2 GOOD 
CHANNELS
 
SAME AS 2, EXCEPT ACTIVE 
HYD CIRCUITS CENTER THE 
POWER ACTUATOR 
NONE BY ITSELF 
2 GOOD CHANNELS OVER-
POWER FAILED CHANNEL. 
LOSS IN SERVO GAIN, 
RESPONSE 
* 	NO EFFECT IF JAM IS 
CLEARED 
-SERVOACTUATOR CANT 
FOLLOW COMMAND. RE-
MAINING TVC CORRECTS 
ERROR 

PITCH AND YAW 
EFFECT ON VEHICLE 
NO DEGRADATION 
SHEET 
FAILURE 
III 
1 
ORBITER CONTROL 
LED BY REMAINING 
TVC. PERFORL&CE 
DEGRADED 
SAME AS 1 
II 
I1 
SAME AS I InI 
SAME AS 2 II 
NO EFFECT III 
DEGRADATION IN 
TVC CONTROL 
SENSITIVITY 
II 
NO EFFECT III 
POSSIBLE LOSS OF 
CONTROL-DEPEND 
ENT ON JAM POSI-
TION 
I 
TVC 
ITEM 
CONFIGURATION 
FAILURE MODE 
Z, - ORBITER 
~FAILURE 
PRIMARY CAUSE DETECTED BY FAILURE CORRECTION EFFECT ON SYSTEM EFFECT ON VEHICLE 
SHEET 2 
CATEGORY 
8 MAIN SPOOL-JAM SAME AS 7 SAME AS 7 SAME AS 7 SAME AS 7 SAME AS 7 III OR I 
9 DETECTION & 
SWITCHING LOGIC 
ONE OPEN 
BROKEN OR OPEN 
CONNECTION 
SAME AS 4 SAME AS 4 SAME AS 4 SAME AS I III 
10 SOL SHUTOFF 
VALVE - STUCK IN 
ENERGIZED POSI-
TION 
CONTAMINATION SAME AS 6 SAME AS 6 SAME AS 6 SAME AS 6 I1 OR 1 
11 SOL SHUTOFF -
VALVE - OPEN 
BROKEN OR OPEN 
CONNECTION 
SAME AS 4 SAME AS I SAME AS 4 SAMAE AS I II 
12 CONTROL MIS-
MATCH - PRESS, 
VOLTAGE, GAIN 
RESPONSE 
NOT DETECTED UN-
LESS MISMATCHES 
REACH FAILURE 
DETECTION THRES-
NONE UNTIL FAILURE THRES-
HOLD IS REACHED, THEN 
RESULT IS SAME AS 4 
EQUALIZING CIRCUITS BE-
TWEEN CHANNELS PROVIDE 
AVERAGING BIAS SIGNALS TO 
EACH SERVO AMP TO FORCE 
NO EFFECT III 
HOLD 
(NUISANCE TRIP) 
ALL CHANNELS TO A COM_ 
MON NULL. 
c1 
H 
c. 
13 INTERNAL LEAK-
AGE - HIGH RATE 
-FAILED SEAL ACID 
ATOR PISTONS 
* EROSION/WEAR 
LAPPED SPOOLS 
NOZZLE 
NOT DETECTED 
UNLESS CHANNEL 
PERFORMANCE 
DEGRADED 70 FAIL- 
URE THRESHOLD 
NONE UNTIL FAILURE 
THRESHOLD IS REACHED, 
THEN RESULT IS SAME AS 4 
-FLUID HEATING 
-LOWER SERVO GAIN 
-LOWER LOAD CAPABILITY 
ON ONE CIRCUIT 
SAME AS 1 I1 
14 EXTERNAL LEAK-
AGE'. HIGH RATE 
- ROD DYNAMIC SEAL 
'STATIC SEAL TO 
AMBIENT 
LOW PRESS WARN-
ING WHEN FLUID 
CIRCUIT IS DEPLED 
SECONDARY ACTUATOR SAME AS 1. POTENTIAL 
SAFETY HAZARD EXISTS 
WITH OIL SPILLAGE 
SAME AS I II 
15 SWITCHING VALVE 
- INTERSYSTEM 
LEAKAGE 
'EROSION/WEAR 
'SEAL 
SAME AS I SAME AS I FLUID FROM ONE SYSTEM 
LOST THRU LOW PRESS RE-
LIEF OF ZND SYSTEM. 
SAME AS I IlI 
EFFECT SLIILAR TO ITEM 1 
16 
LOSS OF HYD CIR-
CUIT (2ND FAILURE 
SWITCHING VALVE-
JAMMED, NORMAL 
POSITION 
CONTAMINATION 
SAME AS I 
NOT DETECTED 
SAME AS Z 
NONE 
ACTUATOR CENTERED BY 
REMAINING HYD. CIRCUIT 
NONE BY ITSELF 
SAME AS 2 
NO EFFECT 
II 
III 
LOSS OF ACTIVE 
HYD. CIRCUIT 
(ZND FAILURE) 
SAME AS I SAME AS I STANDBY CIRCUIT CAN'T 
SWITCH IN. POWER ACTUATOR 
DRIVEN BY GOOD CIRCUIT 
NO EFFECT II 
-I 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______ 
TVC CONFIGURATION 3, ORBITER USAGE: 2 PLACES - PITCH AND YAW SHEET I 
ITEM FAILURE MODE PRIMARY CAUSE DETECTED BY FAILURE CORRECTION ON SYSUEM EFFECT ON VEHICLE LEFFECTCATOR 
LOSS OF ONE 
HIYD SYSTEM 
• FLUID LOSS 
-PUMP FAILURE 
-LOW PRESS WARN-
ING 
*FAULT INDICATION 
-DETECTION & 
SWITCHING LOGIC 
PASSIVE FAILURE DETECTED 
BY CROSS MONITORING. SHUT 
OFF VALVE DE-ENERGIZED. 
SECONDARY ACTUATOR CENT 
ERED & LOCKED 
INNER LOOP GAIN & OUTPUT 
RATE ON SERVOACTUATOR 
REDUCED 50%.OUTPUT CIR-
CUIT TO POWER ACTUATOR 
BYPASSED 
VEHICLE RESPONSE 
LOWERED IN ONE 
PLANE Z5% 
In 
Z LOSS OF BOTH 
ACTIVE HYD SYS. 
SAME AS I SAME AS I ALL SHUTOFF VALVES DE-
ENERGIZED. SEC. ACTUATORS 
CENTER & LOCK. CENTERING 
VALVE OPENS 
NO CONTROL OUTPUT. 
CENTERING ACTUATOR 
CENTERS k LOCKS TVC 
ORBITER CON-
TROLLED BY RE-
MAINING TVC. PER-
FORMANCE DE-
GRADED 
iI 
3 LOSS OF CENTER-
ING HYD SYSTEM 
SAME AS I SAME AS I MONITOR CHANNEL SHUTOFF 
SECONDARY ACTUATOR CENTEREE 
NO EFFECT NO EFFECT II 
FAILED CHANNEL 
OR HYD CIRCUIT 
(ZND FAILURE) 
- SAME AS I ACTIVE CHANNELS SHUTOFF 
ALL SEC. ACTUATORS 
CENTERED & LOCKED 
SERVOACTUATDR BYPASSED 
-POSITION CONTROLLED BY 
LOAD.REMAINING TVC COR-
RECTS-ERROR 
POSSIBLE LOSS OF 
CONTROL 
I 
O 
I 
4 HPRDOVE SIGNAL, 
ACTIVE CHANNEL 
* ELECT HARDVER FAULT INDICATIOD 
*ELECT OPEN -DETECTION & 
.PLUGGED NOZZL ] SWITCHING LOGIC 
-OPEN FEEDBACK 
ACTIVE CHANNEL SHUTOFF, 
SECONDARY ACTUATOR 
CENTERED & LOCKED 
SAME AS 'I SAME AS I III 
HARDOVER SIGNAL 
WITH ONE CHAN-
NEL OFF 
SAME AS 4 SAME AS 4 SAME AS Z SAME AS 2 SAME AS 2 Il 
6 JAMMED BYPASS-
SECONDARY ACT­
UATOR(WONT BY-
PASS) 
CONTAMINATION NOT DETECTED NONE NONE BY ITSELF NO EFFECT III 
HARDOVER SIGNAL 
(2ND FAILURE) 
SAME AS 4 CHANNEL SHUTOFF. SECON-
DARY ACTUATOR WONT 
CENTER. REMAINING ACTIVE 
SECONDARY GOES HARDOVEP 
IN OPP DIRECTION 
OUTPUT WILL RESPOND TO 
COMMAND IN ONE DIREC-
TION ONLY 
UNSYMMETRICAL 
VEHICLE RESPONS 
11 
7 JAMMED BYPASS- CONTAMINATION N6T DETECTED NONE NONE NO EFFECT III 
POWER ACTUATOR 
(WONT BYPASS) 
HARDOVER SIGNAL 
(ZND FAILURE) 
SAME AS 4 SAME AS 4 SAME AS I EXCEPT POWER 
ACTUATOR WONT BYPASS 
NO EFFECT III 
TVC CONFIGURATION 3, - ORBITER 
ITEM F RFAILUREITEM i FAILURE MODS 
8 	 SECONDARY ACT-
UATOR SAM - AC-
TIVE CHANNEL 
9 	 JAMMED POWER 
SPOOL 
10 	 DETECTION AND 
SWITCHING LOGIC- 
ONE OPEN 
11 	 SOL SHUTOFF -
STUCK IN ENER-
H GIZED POSITION 
HARDOVER SIGNAL 
(ZND FAILURE) 
1Z 	 SOL SHUTOFF -
OPEN 
13 	 INTERNAL LEAK-
AGE-HIGH RATE 
14 EXTERNAL LEAK. 
AGE-HIGH RATE 
PRDARY CAUSE 
-STRUCTURAL 
FAILURE 
CONTAMINATION 
- STRUCTURAL 
FAILURE 
- CONTAMINATION 
BROKEN OR OPEN 
CONNECTION 
CONTAMINATION 
'BROKEN OR OPEN 
CONNECTION 
* FAILED SEAL 
'ACTUATOR PIS. 
TONS. 
'EROSION/WEAR 
LAPPED SPOOLS 
NOZZLE 

ROD DYNAMIC 
SEAL 
'STATIC SEAL TO 
AMBIENT 
DETECTED BY 
SAME AS 4 
NOT DETECTED 
SAME AS 4 
NOT DETECTED 
SAME AS 4 
NOT DETECTED 
SAME AS 4 
SAME AS 4 
NOT DETECTED 
UNLESS CHANNEL 
PERFORMANCE 
DEGRADED TO 
FAILURE THRES-
HOLD
 
SAME AS I WHEN 
FLUID CIRCUIT IS 
DEPLETED. 
FAILURE CORRECTION 
ACTIVE CHANNEL SHUTOFF. 
SECONDARY ACTUATOR 
WONT CENTER 
EACH SEC. ACTUATOR HAS 
SUFFICIENT FORCE TO SHEAR 
CONTAMINANT 
MONITOR CHANNEL SHUTOFF. 
SEC. ACTUATOR CENTERS 
EACH SEC. ACTUATOR HAS 
SUFFICIENT FORCE TO SHEAR 
CONTAMINANT 
SAME AS 4 
NONE 
SAME AS 6. 
SAME AS 4 
NONE UNTIL FAILURE 
THRESHOLD IS REACHED, 
THEN RESULT IS SAME AS 4 
SAME AS I 
EFFECT ON SYSTEM 
INNER LOOP GAIN & OUTPUT 
RATE REDUCED IN DIEREC-
TION OPP. JAM 
NO EFFECT IF JAM IS CLEAR 
ED WITHIN FAILURE DETEC-
TION(POSITION) THRESHOLD 
SERVO ACTUATOR FIXED. 
REMAINING TVC CORRECTS 
ERROR 
NO EFFECT IF JAM IS 

CLEARED
 
SAME AS I 
NONE 
SAME AS 6 
SAME AS I 
-FLUID HEATING 
-LOWER SERVO GAIN 
*LOWER LOAD CAPABILITY 
ON ONE CIR\CUIT 
SAME AS I. POTENTIAL 

SAFETY HAZ ARD EXISTS
 
WITH OIL SPILLAGE
 
SHEET Z 
EFFECT ON VEHICLE CATEGORY 
UNSYMMETRICAL II 
VEHICLE RESPONSE 
NO EFFECT II 
LOSS OF CONTROL 
IF JAM OCCURRED 
AT ACTUATOR EX-
TREME POSITION 
NO EFFECT III 
SAME AS I III 
NO EFFECT U! 
SAME AS 6 II 
SAME AS I II 
NO DEGRADATION It! 
UNLESS ONE " 
CHANNEL SHUTDFF 
THEN SAME AS I 
SAME AS I III 
TVC CONFIGURATION 2 - BOOSTER 
ITEM FAILURE MODE PRIMARY CAUSE DETECTED BY FAILURE CORRECTION 
USAGE' Z PLACES - PITCH AND YAW 
EFFECT ON SYSTEM EFFECT ON VEHICLE 
SHEET 1 
FAILURE 
CATEGORY 
I LOSS OF ACTIVE 
HYD SYSTEM 
-FLUID LOSS 
- PUMP FAILURE 
LOW PRESSURE -
WARNING 
POWER PISTON BYPASSED. 
CENTERING VALVE OPENED 
NO OUTPUT FROM I TVC. 
TVC CENTERED U LOCKED 
VEHICLE CONTROL-
LED BY REMAININGTVC SUBSYSTEM. 
III 
SMALL DEGRADA-
TION IN VEHICLE 
RESPONSE 
Z LOSS OF CENTER-
ING SYSTEM 
SAME AS I SAME AS I NONE NONE BY ITSELF NO EFFECT III 
LOSS OF ACTIVE 
SYS. (2ND FAILURE) 
SAME AS I SAME AS I SAME AS I NO OUTPUT FROM AFFECTEI POSSIBLE COLLISIO1 
TVC & WONT CENTER OF-ADJACENT 
ENGINES 
I 
3 HARDOVER SIGNAL 
INPUT-
CONTROL 
FEEDBACK 
-ELECT HR-DOVER 
- PLUGGED NOZZLE 
NOT DETECTED ACTIVE FAULT OPPOSED BY 
Z GOOD CHANNELS 
SMALL NULL SHIFT OF POW-
ER SPOOL. SLIGHT OUTPUT 
POSITION CHANGE 
NEGLIGIBLE 
DEGRADATION 
It 
01 4 OPEN 
INPUT 
CONTROL 
FEEDBACK 
-LOSS OF SIGNAL 
*OPEN CABLE 
-BROKEN FEED-
BACK WIRE 
NOT DETECTED PASSIVE FAULT OPPOSED BY 
2 GOOD CHANNELS 
REDUCTION IN SENSITIVITY 
ABOUT NULL 
NEGLIGIBLE 
DEGRADATION 
II 
5 Z HARDOVERS IN 
OPP.DIRECTION 
SAME AS 3 NOT DETECTED Z CHANNELS CANCEL EACH 
OTHER OUT. OUTPUT CON-
TROLLED BY 3RD CHANNEL 
RESPONSE 33% OF NORMAL 
ON AFFECTED SERVOACTUA 
AME AS 4 U 
6 Z HARDOVERS IN 
SAME DIRECTION 
SAME AS 3 NOT DETECTED GOOD CHANNEL OVERCOME 
BY 2 LIKE FAILURES. 
SERVOACTUATOR GOES 
HARDOVER 
POSSIBLE COLLI-
SION OF ADJACENT 
ENGINES 
I 
7 Z OPENS SAME AS 4 NOT DETECTED SAME AS 5 SAME AS 5 SAME AS 4 11 
8 1 OPEN AND 
HARDOVER 
I NOT DETECTED DEPENDING ON FAILURE 
COMBINATIONS, OUTPUT 
WILL BE LIMITED TO CON-
POSSIBLE COLLI-
SION OF ADJACENT 
ENOINES 
I 
TROL IN ONE DIRECTION 
ONLY 
9 JAMMED 
SPOOL 
POWER 'CONTAMINATION 
-STRUCTURAL 
,_FAI _URE 
NOT DETECTED 
NOT DETECTED 
FORCE (PRESS) ON SPOOL 
AREA SUFFICIENT TO SHEAR 
CONTAMINANT 
NONE 
NONE 
OUTPUT FIXED AT 
,TAMMT POSITTON___ 
0 EFFECT 
SAME AS 8 
III 
DETECTED DY 
NOT DETECTED 
SAME AS I 
NOT DETECTED 
SAME AS 1 
FAILURE CORRECTION 
NONE 
CENTERING VALVE OPENED 
NONE 
SAME AS I 
EFFECT ON SYSTEM 
NONE BY ITSELF 
NO OUTPUT. CENTERING 
RATE IS SLOW, CONTROLLED 
BY LEAKAGE RATE ACROSS 
POWER SPOOL 
-FLUID HEATING 
-LOWER SERVO RESPONSE 
,LOWER LOAD. CAPABILITY 
SAME AS I 
EFFECT ON VEHICLE 
NO EFFECT 
SAME AS I 
NEGLIGIBLE 
DEGRADATION 
SAME AS I 
SHEET 2 
FAILURE 
CATEGORY 
IlI 
III 
III 
Ill 
TVC CONFIGURATION Z - BOOSTER 
ITEM FAILURE MODE 
10 JAMMED BYPASS 
SPOOL-WONT 
BYPASS 
LOSS OF ACTVE 
HYD SYSTEM 
(ZND FAILURE) 
11 INTERNAL LEAK-
AGE - HIGH RATE 
iZ EXTERNAL LEAK-
AGE - HIGH RATE 
UT 
..0 
PRIMARY CAUSE 
CONTAINATION 
-
- FAILED SEAL 
ACTUATOR PIS-
TON 
*EROSION/WEAR 
LAPPED SPOOLS 
NOZZLE
 
*ROD DYNAMIC 
SEAL 
-ANY STATIC SEAL 
TO AMBIENT 
TVC CONFIGURATION 3 - BOOSTER USAGE: Z PLACES PITCH AND YAW SHEET I 
ITEM 
1 
FAILURE MODE 
LOSS OF ACTIVE 
PRIMARY CAUSE 
. FLUID LOSS 
DETECTED BY 
'LOW PRESS 
FAILURE CORRECTION 
SHUTOFF , BYPASS VALVE 
EFFECT ON SYSTEM 
POWER ACTUATOR CENTE. 
EFFECT ON VEHICLE 
VEHICLE CONTROL-
FAILURE 
CATEGORY 
IIt 
HID SYSTEM . PUMP FAILURE WARNING 
'FAULT INDICATION 
COMPARATOR 
SHIFTS AT LOW PRESS. SECON 
DARY ACTUATOR CENTERS. 
CENTERING VALVE OPENS 
BY CENTERING CIRCUIT & 
LOCKED 
LED BY REMAINING 
TVC SUBSYSTEMS. 
SMALL DEGRADA-
TION IN VEHICLE 
RESPONSE 
Z LOSS OF CENTER-
ING I4YD SYSTEM 
SAME AS I SAME AS I SAME AS 1 POWER ACTUATOR CENTEREIE 
BY ACTIVE CIRCUIT. LOCK 
DOES NOT ENGAGE 
SAME AS I I.t 
3 1ARDOVER SIGNAL 
ACTIVE OR MONI-
TOR CHANNEL 
-ELECT HARDOVER 
-ELECT OPEN 
-PLUGGED NOZZLE 
-OPEN FEEDBACK 
FAULT INDICATION- COMPARATOR SPOOL SHIFTS, 
COMPARATOR DUMPING PRESS TO BYPASS. 
SECONDARY ACTUATOR 
CENTERS. CENTERING VALVE 
OPENS , 
SAME AS 1 SAME AS I III 
4 JAMMED 
SPOOL 
SERVO CONTAMINATION SAME AS 3 SAME AS 3 SAME AS I SAME AS I III 
. 
to 
C 
5 JAMMED BYPASS 
VALVE (WONT 
BYPASS) 
-CONTAMINATION 
'BROKEN SPRING 
NOT DETECTED NONE NONE BY ITSELF NO EFFECT It 
HARDOVER SIGNAL 
(ZND FAILURE) 
SAME AS 3 COMPARATOR SPOOL SHIFTS, 
DUMPING PRESS TO BYPASS, 
SECONDARY ACTUATOR CANT 
OUTPUT FOLLOWS COMMVND 
HARDOVER 
COLLISION OF AD-
JACENT ENGIINES 
I . 
CENTER. 
OPENS 
CENTERING VALVE 
6 FAILED HYDRAUIC 
MONITOR 
'BROKEN FLAPPED 
'EXCESSIVE WEAR 
SA ME AS 3 SAME AS 3 SAME AS I SAME AS 1 111 
-BLOCKED 
TOR, 
RESTRI( -
JAMMED COM-
PARATOR SPOOL-
NEUTRAL 
SAME AS S NOT DETECTED NONE NONE BY ITSELF. N0 EFFECT 11 
HARDOVER SIGNAL 
(ZND FAILURE) 
NOT DETECTED NONE OUTPUT FOLLOWS COM-
MAND HARDOVER 
COLLISION OF 
DJACENT 
MOIhNES 
I 
TVC CONFIGURATION 3 - BOOSTER SHEET Z 
ITEM FAILURE MODE PRIMARY CAUSE DETECTED BY FAILURE CORRECTION EFFECT ON SYSTEM EFFECT ON VEHICLE FAILURE 
____________CATEGORY 
8 JAMMED COM- SAME AS 5 SAME AS 3 NONE THIS FAILURE RESULT OF O EFFECT III 
PARATOR SPOOL- PREVIOUS FAILURE. HAS NO 
END POSITION EFFECT SINCE POWER ACTUI 
TOR IS CENTERED & LOCKED 
9 JAMMED SECON- -CONTAMINATION NOT DETECTED SECONDARY ACTUATOR HAS NONE NO EFFECT III 
DARY ACTUATOR SUFFICIENT FORCE TO 
SHEAR CONTAMINANT 
'STRUCTURAL NOT DETECTED JAM WOULD NOT CLEAR SERVOACTUATOR CANT POSSIBLE COLLI- I 
FAILURE ONLY IF MASSIVE STRUC- FOLLOW COMMAND SION OF ADJACENT 
TURAL FAILURE OCCURRED ENGINES 
10 SOL LOCKOUT -BROKEN OR OPEN NOT DETECTED NONE IN FLIGHT NONE IN FLIGHT. CONTROL AME AS I III 
ALVE-FAILED CONNECTION CANNOT BE RE-ENGAGED 
PEN DURING GROUND CHECKOUT 
1I1 SOL LOCKOUT CONTAMINATION NOT DETECTED NONE NONE BY ITSELF. CANNOT NO EFFECT UNLESS III 
VALVE - STUCK IN PREVENT ERRATIC CHANNEL NUISANCE TRIPPING 
E NERGIZED POSI- FROM RE-ENGAGING OCCURS - THEN 
TION TRANSIENT SWITCH-
ING 
12 CENTERING VALVE 'FAILED SEAL NOT DETECTED NONE 'FLUID HEATING NO EFFECT III 
- FAIL OPEN OR 'EROSION/WEAR 
INTERNAL LEAK- LAPPED SPOOL 
AGE 
13 INTERNAL LEAK- SAME AS 12 NOT DETECTED NONE 'FLUID HEATING .NEGLIGIBLE III 
AGE - HIGH RATE SLOWER SERVO GAIN DEGRADATION 
-LOWER LOAD CAPABILITY 
14 EXTERNAL LEAK- 'ROD DYNAMIC SAME AS I SAME AS I SAME AS I SAME AS I Ill 
AGE-HIGH FLOW SEAL 
-ANY STATIC SEAL 
TO AMBIENT 
ASC 
ITEM 
DIGITAL CONFIGURATION - AILERON 
FAILURE MODE PRIMARY CAUSE 
- ORBITER 
DETECTED BY FAILURE CORRECTION 
USAGE: 2 PLACES-LEFT AND RIGHT 
EFFECT ON SYSTEM EFFECT ON VEHICLE 
SHEET IFPALURECATORY 
1 LOSS OF ONE 
SYSTEM 
HYD 'FLUID 
'PUMP 
LOSS 
FAILURE 
-LOW PRESS 
WARNING 
POWER ACTUATOR BYPASSED NO OUTPUT FROM ONE CIR-
CUIT. REDUCTION IN ACTUA-
TOR STIFFNESS 
SMALL DEGRADA-
TION IS SYSTEM 
STIFFNESS 
III 
2 
3 
LOSS OF TWO HYD 
PYSTEMS 
4ARDOVER INPUT 
SAME AS 1 
-SHORTED SWITCH 
-JAMMED TORQUE 
MOTOR ARMATURE 
"JAMMED PILOT 
STAGE SPOOL 
SAME AS I 
FAULT INDICATION 
-OVERPRESSURE 
SENSOR 
Z ACTUATORS BYPASSED 
OUTPUT ACTUATOR OPPOSED 
BY 3 GOOD CIRCUITS-OVER 
PRESSURE SENSOR SIGNALS 
SHUTOFF VALVE TO OPEN.. 
POWER ACTUATOR BYPASSED 
NO OUTPUT FROM TWO CIR-
CUITS. 67% HINGE MOMENT 
AVAILABLE & REDUCTION 
IN SERVOACTUATOR STIFF-
NESS 
SAMEI AS I 
DEGRADATION IN 
SYSTEM STIFFNESS 
ROLL RESPONSE 
5AME-1 AS I 
11 
III 
4 Z HARDOVERS SAME AS 3 SAME AS 3 SAME AS S SAME AS Z SAME AS Z I 
S LOSS OF CHA'NEL 
OUTPUT 
-LOSS OF SIGNAL 
-BROKEN WIRE 
SAME AS 3 SAME AS 3 SAME AS I SAME AS I Iii 
,o 
t'3 
6 JAMMED DIGIIER 
SPOOL - ANY 
POSITION 
CONTAMINATION SAME AS 3 OUTPUT ACTUATOR CANT 
RESPOND TO COMMAND. 
RESULT SAME AS 3 
SAME AS I SAME AS I Ill 
7 JAMMED POWER 
SPOOL-BLOCK-
ING POSITION 
CONTAMINATION SAME AS 3 SAME AS 3 SAME AS I SAME AS 1 II 
8 JAMMED POWER 
SPOOL-END POSI-
TION 
CONTAMINATION SAME AS 3 SAME AS, 3 WHEN COMMAND 
DRIVES GOOD CIRCUITS TO 
OPPOSE AFFECTED ACTUATOR 
OUTPUT 
SAMEB AS I SAME AS 2 111 
9 OL SHUTOFF -
FAILED OPEN 
BROKEN OR OPEN 
CONNECTION 
NOT DETECTED SAME AS I SAME: AS I SAME AS I III 
___ 
ASG DIGITAL CONFIGURATION - AILERON - ORBITER 
ITEM FAILURE MODE PRIMARY CAUSE DETLCTED BY 
___________ 
FAILURE CORRECTION EFFECT ON SYSTEM EFFECT ON VEHICLE 
SHEET 2 
CFAILURE 
ATE GORY 
10 JAMMED PILOT 
SPOOL- NEUTRAL 
CONTAMINATION SAME AS 3 SAME AS 6 SAME AS I SAME AS I In 
11 JAMMED PILOT CONTAMINATION SAME AS 3 SAME AS 3 SAME AS I SAME AS I III 
SPOOL. E14D 
POSITION 
12 SOL SHUTOFF -
STUCK.IN ENER-
GIZER POSITION 
CONTAMINATION NOT DETECTED NONE NONE BY ITSELF NO EFFECT ill 
HARDOVER SIGNAL 
(ZND FAILURE) 
- SAME AS 3 OVERPRESSURE RELIEF 
OPERATES WHEN ACTUATOR 
IS DRIVEN BY GOOD CIRCUITS,
ACTUATOR CANT BE BYPASS-
ED 
677 HINGE MOMENT CAPA-
BILITY. REDUCTION IN 
STIFFNESS 
SAME AS 2 i 
I 
to 
13 INTERNAL LEAK-
AGE - IGH RATE 
'FAILED SEAL 
ACTUATOR pFE-
TON 
-EROSION/WEAR 
NOT DETECTED NONE ONE CIRCUIT LOSES 
EFFECTIVE STIFFNESS. 
SURFACE POSITION HELD BY 
REMAINING CIRCUITS 
SAME AS I il 
POWER SPOOL 
14 EXTERNAL LEAK-
AGE - HIGH RATE 
- ROD DYNAMIC 
SEAL 
-STATIC SEAL TO 
AMBIENT 
SAME AS I SAME AS I SAME AS I SAME AS I III 
SECTION 6
 
PARAMETERS AND DATA
 
6,1 TRADE-OFF PARAMETERS 
This section deals with the parameters used in the trade-off evaluation and the origin of 
data used. Weight is displayed where possible inparametric form and serves as the cri­
teria for establishing the point design weights in Section 7 for the various configurations. 
All other parameters listed below are used to make qualitative comparisons. 
Weight 
Reliability 
-Maintainability 
Performance 
Checkout capability 
Cost 
6.2 WEIGHT 
6.2.1 HYDRAULIC TRANSMISSION. Figure 6-1 is a parametric curve of specific 
weight of transmission tubing versus flow. The two lines represent the end limits of 
0 ft length and 200 ft length. The 0 line represents a minimfium for short runs. The 
200 ft line is based on 500 psi allowable pressure drop. This line was modified from 
Vickers data. 2 0 The Vickers data were based on 3000-psi circuits where maximum 
efficiency (total vehicle minimum weight impact) occurred with approximately 33% 
of maximum pump discharge lost in tubing pressure drop at maximum flow. For 
this study, the ground rule circuit pressure is 4000 psi. The AP allowed in the 
tubing is 500 psi or 12% of maximum pump discharge pressure. This is to conserve 
power because the pump discharge pressure drops to 2500 psi at maximum flow. 
Limiting the tubing drop would impose sizable weight penalties if performance were 
required at low fluid temperatures. For the space shuttle, the operating oil temper­
ature is assumed to be 70°* or warmer where friction (viscosity) losses are low. 
The tubing weights are based on using AM 350 high strength stainless steel and per­
manent joint fittings. 
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Figure 6-1. Transnission Line Weight 
0.I 
6.2.2 HYDRAULIC POWER GENERATION. A typical hydraulic power generation 
circuit schematic is presented in Figure 6-2. The total weight of a circuit is broken 
down into the following elements: 
a. Tubing and fluid in tubing 
b. Pump (dry) 
c. Reservoir (dry) 
d. Miscellaneous components (dry) 
e. Fluid in components 
6.2.2. 1 Power Generation Tubing. The tubing within the power generation circuit 
cannot be estimated from Figure 6-1 because less pressute drop is allowed. Figure 
6-1 applies to transmission lines only, where up to 500 psi drop is allowed. The 
power generation tubing is based on an allowable pressure drop of I psi/ft. Figure 
6-3 shows this relationship. Comparing Figure 6-3 to Figure 6-1, one .can see the 
specific weight of tubing is heavier. Another contributing factor to the increased 
specific weight is the addition of a pump case drain line. 
FILTER 
VALVERESRVOI 
PRESSURE
 
FILTER 
AC*CU MUULAIOR •RELIEF VALVE 
PRESSURE 
RETURN
 
CASE DRAINI 
Figure 6-2. Hydraulic Power Generation Circuit 
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Figure 6-3. Hydraulic Power Generation Tubing Weight 
6.2.2.2 Pump Weights. The hydraulic pump weight was established as a function 
of rated flow. See Figure 6-4. Pump weights were obtained using Vickers data for 
inline pumps and adding a correction factor for operation at 350°F maximum and 
4000 psig. 
6.2.2.3 Reservoir. The hydraulic reservoir weights are shown as a function of 
swept volume. See Figure 6-5. The reservoir is assumed to be a piston type. These 
data are based on previous designs used at Convair. Reservoir weight is more closely 
associated with total oil volume and differential displacement than with circuit flow. 
A reservoir size for any given circuit is approximately 15% of total circuit fluid volume 
plus differential volumes (accumulators only for flight control systems). The 15% in­
cludes allowance for thermal contraction, fluid compressibility, thermal expansion, 
and leakage. 
6.2.2.4 Miscellaneous Components. The remaining components in the hydraulic 
power generation circuit include such items as filters, valves, ground connections, 
accumulator, and instrumentation. The weight of these miscellaneous components 
is shown in Figure 6-6. This curve is based on a fixed weight of 10 lb and a variable 
weight that is a function of flow rate. 
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Figure 6-4. Hydraulic Pump Weight 
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100 
6.2.2.5 Summary. The preceding data on power generation elements are shown to 
give background information that was used to develop the total hydraulic power gener­
ation weight shown on Figure 6-7. The curve is not truly parametric. The change in 
slope of the curves between the booster and orbiter circuits is primarily due to the 
following factors: 
a. Longer transmission lines for the booster. (Transmission lengths assumed are 
shown in Section 7.) This influences reservoir and reservoir fluid weights. 
b. Longer power generation lines for the booster. 
follows: 
The lengths are assumed as 
1. Orbiter: 25 ft each of pressure, return, and pump case drain. 
2. Booster: 40 ft each of pressure, return, and pump case drain. 
The booster line lengths are longer primarily due to larger power circuits and 
distance to ground connections. 
Also shown oh Figure 6-7 is weight for a rocket engine driven TVC hydraulic circuit.
 
This falls on the orbiter curve because of the similarity of the assumed tubing lengths.
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Figure 6-T. Hydraulic Power Gone ration Weight 
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6.2.3 HYDRAULIC CONDITIONING. The hydraulic conditioning weight includes the 
heat exchanger (hydrogen-to-oil) and associated control valves. The heat exchanger 
size and heat load was determined for four oases: 
a. 	 Orbiter with four hydraulic circuits. 
b. 	 Orbiter with three hydraulic circuits, 
c. 	 Booster with four hydraulic circuits. 
d. 	 Booster with three hydraulic circuits. 
Figure 6-8 displays hydraulic circuit flow rate and conditioning weight versus thermal. 
rate. The ratio of environmental heat rate to hydraulic generated heat rate (constant) 
varies from approximately 0.66 for a 27 gpm circuit to 0.28 for a 265 gpm circuit. 
The thermal load was determined using the following assumptions: 
a. 	 Maximum ambient temperature of the horizontal stabilizer is 600OF. 
b. 	 Only elevator equipment (lines and components) contribute to environmental load. 
[The wing hydraulics also contribute but are much smaller and are not included 
so that vehicle weight impact becomes a function of elevator systems only. 3 
c. 	 Total length of tubing exposed to high ambient temperature: 
Orbiter: 50 ft (horizontal stabilizer runts) 
Booster: 75 ft (horizontal stabilizer runs) 
d. 	 Emissitivity of lines and components in high temperature area = 0.6. 
e. 	 Nominal temperature of hydraulic system is 300F. 
f. 	 Hydraulic equipment is insulated from hot structure (e.g., conductive heat load 
is neglected). 
g. 	 Total heat load consists of: 
Environmental heat load 
Pump losses (Case drain flow 5% of rated flow)
 
Leakage losses (5% of rated flow)
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The heat exchanger size and weight were based on: 
a. 	 Cross/counter flow heat exchanger. 
b. Hydrogen gas is available as 	a heat sink (200OR and 100 psia). 
c. 	 lean AT in heat exchanger: outlet oil to inlet hydrogen = 360°R 
inlet oil to outlet hydrogen = 100F. 
d. 	 The weight is a fixed weight of 10 lb plus an incremental weight which is a function 
of equivalent tube weight to provide sufficient surface area, 
6.2.4 POWER SOURCE AND FUEL. Figure 6-9 shows APU weight versus shaft 
horsepower. The basic APU is shown as well as the total APU installation weight. 
The total weight is based on an installation weight of 50% of the APU weight plus a 
fixed weight of 15 lb for fire detection and fire extinguishing equipment. Figure 6-10 
shows specific reactant (fuel) consumption (SRC) versus per cent rated capacity. The 
SRC varies slightly with APU size but is not significant. Per cent rated capacity is 
significant, however. The average hp as established in Section 3 (38% for orbiter and 
30% for booster) converted to hp-hr and used with Figure 6-9 determines the fuel weight 
required for each elevator configuration. See Sectlon 7. 
1000 ­
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6.2.5 HYDRAULIC ACTUATORS. Figure 6-11 shows actuator weight versus work 
capability. This is essentially the base weight of the actuator including fluid but not 
valving or other integrated equipment. Work capability is used as the m6st convenient 
measurement for sizing actuators. The curve is independent of pressure and actuator 
geometry. It is assumed that geometric efficiency (ratio of moment arm length at 
maximum load point to bellcrank length) is approximately 90%. 
6.2.6 HYDRAULIC VALVES AND VALVE MANIFOLDS. Two curves are shown in 
Figures 6-12 and 6-13. The first curve lists electrohydraulic servovalve weights 
versus a flow function as shown. The upper portion (high flow rates) of the curve is 
not applicable because in high flow applications additional valve stages are added to 
keep the electrohydraulic servo relatively small. The second curve, Figure 6-13, 
identifies power valve and manifold weights. A 6.5-lb fixed minimum weight is 
assumed. 
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6.2.7 ELECTRICAL. Two basic elements are defined: motors and amplifiers. 
Amplifier weights are showvn because of the gro.s differences in power levels required 
between electrohydraulic and electromechanical control. Additionally, some con­
figurations employ more servoamplifiers than others. The delta weight differences 
are small when compared to overall weight but are displayed here so that a comparison 
can be made of servoactuator control portions. Figure 6-14 shows ac motor weights 
versus hp. The curve is based on Westinghouse data. Figure 6-15 shows amplifier 
weight versus power output and is derived from informatior; within Convair. 
6.2.8 MECHANICAL. Spring clutch weight versus output torque is shown in Figure 
6-16. The curve is based on Curtiss-Wright data for bi-directional clutch assemblies 
-withoutbrake provisions. The curve is modified to incorporate braking. 
Differential weights, shown in Figure 6-17, are derived from data that established 
weights of gear trains in a previous study conducted at Convair.21 
Figure 6-18 is used to size the output ballscrew actuator used in the orbiter aileron 
configuration 2 and the secondary actuators used in the electromechanical control 
portions of orbiter aileron configuration 3, and orbiter and booster elevator con­
figuration 3. Determining output ballscrew actuator weights is straightforward, with 
output force, stroke, and rate determined by surface hinge moment requirements. 
Sizing secondary actuators is not straightforward in that the ballscrew is sized by 
hydraulic power spool flow forces, friction, control loop maximum actuator rate and 
gain, power spool stroke, and secondary actuator/power spool geometry: The most 
predominant factor is power spool.flow forces, especially in the very large servo­
actuators where each of three power spools may be controlling up to 75 gpm. An 
equation used for correlation between the secondary actuator and hydraulic power 
spool size is: 
FPV 9.Q +400 
where 
F = power valve force 
Q flow rate, gpm. 
The term 9. IQ is a function of flow forces and 400 is established as a minimum force 
capability. 
Ballscrew actuator weights in Figure 6-18 are shown in relation to force for different 
strokes. Unlike a hydraulic linear actuator, the ballscrew weights cannot be shown 
in terms of work capability because within reasonable values of strokes and rotational 
speed, the ballscrew weight is more sensitive to force. 
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6.3 RELIABILITY 
A computer program in existence at Convair was used to generate the reliability com­
parisons shown in Section 7. The analysis consisted of the following basic steps: 
a. Determine failure rate data from existing sources. 
b. Convert failure rates to failures/flight. 
c. Computer programming. 
d. Normalize results. 
6.3.1 FAILURE RATE DATA. Two basic sources of failure rate data were used. 
They are rADC-TR-68-114I -and FARADA. 23 Low, high, and average failure rates 
were taken from these sources. The failure rates covered a wide range, but for this 
study the failure rates picked were, in general, conservative or representative of the 
high failure rates listed. 
6.3.2 FAILURES/FLIGIIT. Table 6-1 lists the failure rate data used and the con­
version to failures/flight. The column headings ar identified as: 
X = failure rate per 106 hours (fLom reliability data sources) 
X b I = expected failures x 10-6 /flight - boost phase - booster (. 05 hr) 
-6
XB = expected failures x 10 /flight - total flight time - booster (2. 5 hr) 
Xtol = expected failures x 10 6/flight - boost phase - orbiter (2. 1 hr) 
- flight time -[orbiter (2.9 br)
't02 = expected failures x 10-6 /flight 
The above mission times are not necessarily actual operating times for the various 
servoactuators but include total time that the units may be exposed to extreme en­
vironments and/or be powered up. 
The failure rate data shown for hydraulic actuators, item 6, must obviously include 
all discrepancies that require maintenance action, but not necessarily serious failures. 
Two computer runs were made, one using the failure rate data as shown to establish 
maintainability comparisons. The failure rate of 765/106 hours was reduced to 76. 5 
on the second run to establish reliability comparisons. Item 3 failure rates are shown 
divided into two groups. The first number is "fail to open" failure mode and the sec­
ond number represents "fail to close" failure mode. 
6.3.3 COMPUTER PROGRAMMING. The serv6actuator is broken down in functional 
sets where all components in a set are in series. For example, consider a servo­
actuator that employs three servo channels, three hydraulic circuits, a tandem power 
6-18 
Table 6-1. Failure Data 
Item Nomenclature x l xtB2 XtO xtO2 
1 Hydraulic Pump 85 4.2 212 179 246 
2 E/H 2 Stage Servovalve 125 6.2 311 262 362 
3 Solenoid Valve 287/143 14.4 717/358 603/301 832/416 
4 Spool Valve 62 3.1 155 130 180 
5 Spool Valve, Spring Loaded 62 155 130 180 
6 Hydraulic Actuator 765 38.2 1912 160.7 2220 
7 LVDT 38 1.9 94 79 169 
8 Servo Amplifier 160 8 400' - 336 464. 
9 Power Amplifier 320 800 929 
10' Servo Motor 107 268 310 
11 Differential 41 103 119 
12 Ball Screw 23 58 67 
13 Electronic Voter 263 658 552 763 
14 Solenoid .. 72 209 
15 Spring Detent 20 50 58 
'16 'Spring Clutch . 28 81 
17 Gear Reduction 46 133 
18 Tachometer 126 315 365 
19 Motor, A.C. 470 1363 
20 Pressure Switch 368 18 920 811 1067 
21 AP Transducer 368 920 811 1067 
22 Hydraulic Monitor 30 1.5 75 87 
23 Hydraulic Comparator 62 3.1 130 180 
24 Time Delay Relay 103 258 300 
25 Valve Controller ' 4 10 12 
26 Integrator 96 239 278 
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actuator, cross monitoring, detection, and correction. It is fail operate whereby it 
can lose one channel and/or one hydraulic circuit. The functidnal sets might be: 
SET 
1 Servo Channel No. 1 
2 Servo Channel No. 2 
3 Servo Channel No. 3 
4 Hydraulic Supply No. 1 
5 Hydraulic Supply No. 2 
6 Hydraulic Supply No. 3 
7 Tandem Actuator (and Power Spool) 
8 By-Pass Function No, 1 
9 By-Pass Function No. 2 
10 By-Pass Function No. 3 
11 Monitoring and Detection 
A servo channel includes a servo amplifier, two-stage servo valve, LVDT feedback, 
and a secondary actuator. A reliability number for the servo channel is assigned 
using the failure rate data of all the components in the set and considering that all 
the components are in series. This procedure is repeated for each functional set. 
For example, reliability of the bypass function is the reliability of a solenoid shutoff 
valve (to shut off) times the reliability of a pressure/spring-operated bypass valve 
(to by pass). 
A "minimum truth table" is then developed (based on the .ailure modes and effects 
analysis) that describes all of the minimum ways in which the servoactuator can 
function and still be successful. The minimum truth table is prepared in binary form 
where a 1 means the set must function and a 0 means the set is not required-to function. 
Shown below is an example of the table where the sets correspond to those shown above 
and the rows represent the combinations (minimum number of ones) that can exist for 
success.
 
SET 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 .0 0 1 1 
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 O" 1 
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
The reliabilities for the sets and the minimum truth tables were then submitted to 
the DCS and 7094/7044 computer to calculate the system reliability. The computer 
determines all the combinations that can be successful and computes the probability 
of any successful combination that might exist. For example, the computer calculates 
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the probability of all sets functioning correctly, then proceeds downward to a minimum 
limit established by the minimum truth table. The summation of the probabilities of 
all the successful combinations that can exist is the reliability of the unit. 
6.3.4 NORMALIZE RESULTS. Since absolute reliability numbers are only as good 
as the original failure rate data used, an additional step was taken. The reliability 
numbers are normalized based on the least reliable configuration (in a group being 
compared) reduced to 1. Therefore all comparisons are in whole numbers and the 
larger the number the better the ranking. 
6.4 QUALITATIVE COMPARISONS 
Maintainability, checkout capability, performance, and cost are treated qualitatively. 
Major features or chatacteristics are shown in tables in Section 7. The following 
paragraphs list criteria that was used for comparison. 
6.4.1 MAINTAINABILITY. Criteria for comparison. 
a. Mean flights between maintenance action (MFBMA). 
The probability (PS) that all functions work successfully within a servoactuator 
was determined from the first computer run using the high failure rate data for 
actuators. 1 - PS is then the probability of failure (maintenance action). The 
reciprocal 1/1 - PS = MFBIlA. The MFBMA data is normalized in the same 
manner as described in Section 6.3.4. 
b. Number of components, 
For aerodynamic surface control actuators only servoactuator components are 
totaled. Electronic logic where used was assumed to be equivalent to many com­
ponents (up to 20) and the actual number was estimated based on apparent com­
plexity. TV( servoactuator component count includes hydraulic power circuit 
components where rocket engine driven circuits are used. Twelve components 
per circuit were assumed. 
c. Installation complexity. 
6.4.2 CHECKOUT CAPABILITY. Comments in Section 7are based on capability 
*of performing three checkouts listed below in order of importance. 
a. Normal operation. 
b. Health status of each servo channel. 
c. Health status of fault detection and switching. 
6.4.3 COST. Relative comments in Section 7 are based on the three factors listed 
below: 
a. Unit procurement cost. 
b. Operational cost. 
c. 	 Development cost. 
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SECTION 7
 
TRADE-OFF EVALUATION
 
7.1 GENERAL 
This section contains the tabulation of all results and comments and is arranged as 
follows: 
7.;2 BOOSTER AND ORBITER ELEVATOR 
7.2.1 BOOSTER WEIGHT 
7,2.2 ORBITER WEIGHT 
7.2.3 ALTERNATE ORBITER ELEVATOR ARRANGEMENT 
7.3 - ORBITER AILERON 
7.4 DIGITAL SERVOACTUATOR COMPARISON 
7.5 ORBITER TVC 
7.6 BOOSTER TVC" 
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7.2 BOOSTER AND ORBITER ELEVATOR 
7.2.1 BOOSTER WEIGHT 
Basic data used to generate weight: 
3 Hydraulic 
Power Circuits 
4 Hydraulic 
Power Circuits 
Hinge Moment Total Req'd, Ft-lb 
Hinge Moment/Power Circuit, ft-lb 
Hinge Moment/Actuator/Side, ft--lb 
Flow to Elevator System/Circuit, gpm 
Flow to Each Actuator/Side, gpm 
Length - APU to Aft Vehicle , ft 
Length - Actuators to Vehicle (L, ft 
Max APU HP/Hydraulic Circuit, hp 
Ave Hp/Circuit - % of Max, & 
Flight Hours - Operating Time, hr 
Hp-Hr 
650,000 
650,000 
325,000 
265 
133 
25 
75 
430 
30 
1.72 
222 
650,000 
325,000 
162,500 
133 
67 
25 
75 
215 
30 
1.72 
ill 
Table 7-1. Weight - Elevator, Booster 
Nomenclature 
No. 
Configuration I 
Unit Wt. Total Wt. 
Lb Lb No. 
Configuration 2 
Unit Wt. Total Wt. 
Lb Lb No. 
Configuration 3 
Unt Wt. TotalWt. 
Lb Lb 
Senroactuator: 
Actuator 
Pwr Valve & Manifolds 
Control Portion 
Synch. Shaft 
Hyd. Power Generation 
Hyd. Transmission 
Hyd. Conditioning 
APU 
APU Fuel 
Total Vehicle Weight 
AXeight 
8 
2 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
315 
13 
4.4 
332.4 
10 
716 
285 
18 
182 
416 
2659 
20 
28&1 
1140 
72 
728 
1664 
9147 
0 
4 
2 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
630 
52 
18 
70 
716 
285 
18 
182 
416 
2520 
140 
2864 
1140 
72 
728 
1664 
9128 
6 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
585 
120 
52 
172 
1222 
455 
30.5 
325 
832 
3510 
344 
3666 
1365 
92 
975 
2496 
12448 
3300 
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7.2.2 ORBITER WEIGHT 
Basic data used to generate weight: 
.3 Hydraulic 
Power Circuits 
4 Hydraulic 
Power Circuits 
Hinge Moment Total Req'd, ft-lb 
Hinge Moment/Power Circuit, ft-lb 
Hinge Moment/Actuator/Side, ft-lb 
Flow to Elevator System/Circuit, gpm 
Flow to Each Actuator/Side, gpm 
Length - APU to Aft Vehicle L, ft 
Length - Actuators to Vehicle q,, ft 
Max APU Hp/Hydraulic Circuit, hp 
Ave Hp/Circuit - % of Max, % 
FlightHours - Operating Time, hr 
Hp-Hr 
133,000 
133,000 
66,500 
54 
27 
15 
50 
88 
38 
0.83 
28 
133,000 
66,500 
33,250 
27 
13.5 
15 
50 
44 
38 
0.83 
14 
Table 7-2. Weight - Elevator, Orbiter 
Nomenclature 
No. 
Configuration 1 
Unit Wt. Total Wt. 
lb Lb 
i 
No." 
Configuration 2 
Unit WI. Total 
l3b lb 
o. 
No. 
Confluration 3 
] Unit Wt. Total Wt. 
1b Lb 
Servoactuator 
Actuator 
Pwr Valve & Manifolds 
Control Portion 
8 
76 
6.8 
3.2 
86 688 
4 
2 
152 
27 
14 
41 
608 
"82 
6 
2 
142 
21 
48 
69 
852 
138 
Synch. Shaft 
Hyd. Power Generation 
Hyd. Transmission 
Hyd. Conditioning 
APU 
APU Fuel 
Total Vehicle Weight 
AWeight 
2 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
6 
191 
61 
12 
62 
48 
12 
764 
244 
48 
248 
192 
2196 
0 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
191 
61 
12 
62 
48 
764 
244 
48 
248 
192 
2186 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
285 
99 
13 
95 
96 
855 
297 
39 
285 
288 
2764 
+540 
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Table 7-3. Reliability Comparison - Elevator, Orbiter and Booster 
Criteria Configuration I Configuration 2 Configuration 3 
probability of Mission 
.99918
.99995 	 .99927Sjccess 

1.12 	 1Relative Ranking 	 16.4 
Table 7-4. Maintainability Comparison - Elevator, Orbiter and Booster 
Criteria Configuration 1 Configuration 2 Configuration 3 
MFBMA (Mean Flights
 
Between Maintenance
 
Action)
 
a. 	 Probability of All
 
Elements Working .9639 .9748 .9929
 
b.. 	 MFBMA 28 39. 7 141 
c. 	 Relative Ranking 1 1.4 5 
Conponents/Vehicle 134 120 	 132 
Installation 	 8 Separate Valve Packages, 2 Unitized Valve Packages 0 2 Unitized Valve 
Integral with Actuators. Remote Fromn Actuators. - Packages, Remote 
Difficult to Troubleshoot From Actuator. 
Installation. e Large and Heavy 
Table 7-5. Performance Comparison - Elevator, Orbiter and Booster 
Criteria Configuration 1 Configuration 2 Configuration 3 
Normal Performance 0 	 Lower Static Stiffness 0 Stiffness Better Than 1 0 Stiffness Better Than 1 
and Positional Accuracy If Dual Tandem Spools If Triple Tandem Spools 
Due to Power Spool Can Be SynchronizedfBy Can Be Synchrnized By 
Synch. Method Fabrication. Fabrication. 
0 	 More Adaptable To 0 May Be Subject To Small 
Spreading Actuators Amplitude Limit Cycling
Along Rear Spar IfTach Feedback Gain 
Can't Hold Channels At 
Null. 
Redundancy Performance e 	Nuisance Tripping May S Less Nuisance Tripping e Same as 1. 
Be Problem. Than 1 Due to Cross 
0 Negligible Degradation Equalization. 
After Channel Failure. o Negligible Degradation 
After Channel Failure. 
Versatility And/Or Fault Correction Can Be Same as 1. 0 Requires Automatic Fault 
Commonality Manual Function of Crew Correction. 
Due to Force Summing 
Can Be Used With 2,3
Mechanization. 
Or 4 Hydraulic Power 
Systems With No Change. 
Criteria 
Normal Operation 
Single Channel Operation 
Fault Detection 
Criteria 
Unit & Instl. Costs 
Operational Cost 
Development 
Table 7-6. Checkout Capability 
Configuration 1 
Add Surface Position 
XDCR Or Surface 
End Position Limit 
Switches To Provide 
Output Signal To The 
Checkont/Monitoring 
Function. 
e 	Add Switching To Dis-
able Self Equalization 
And Fault Detection. 
e 	Add Switching to De-
energize Solenoid Shutoff 
Valves. Operate One On 
At A Time. 
G Add Program 
to Introduce 
Hardover Failures 
I 	 Add Reset Provisions. 
Table 7-7. Cost Comparison -
Configuration 1 
High - Due To 4 Power 
Circuits And 4 Power 
Actuators. 
High - Complexity And' 
Low MFBIJA Means High 
Maintenance. 
Low - Similar Unit Of 
Same Size Range Under 
Development. 
- Elevator, Boostei and Orbiter 
Conflguration 2 Corifiguration 3 
Use Actuator Position Same as 2. 
XDCP. Signal. 
0 	Add Switching To Disable 0 Add Switching To Disable 
Cross Eqtlization & Fault Deteotion Logic. 
Fault Detection Logic. 
o Add Switching to De- o Add Switching to Shut Off 
energize Solenoid Shutoff Elect Power To Each
 
Valves. Operate One On Channel.
 
At A Time.
 
o 	Do-energize Shutoff Valves o Switch Off Elect Power To 
in Sequence and Observe Servos In Sequence And 
Failure Indication " ObserVe Failure Indica­
tion. 
a Add Reset Provisions e Add Reset Provisions. 
Elevator, Booster and Orbiter 
Configuration 2 
High - SameAs 1. 
High - Same As 1 
Medium - Similar Unit 
Of Small Size Under 
Development. Problem 
With Power Spools' 
Synchronization. 
Configuration 3 
Lower Than Configura­
tion 1 Or 2 Due To 3 
Power Circuits And 3 
Power Actuators. 
Less Than Baseline. 
Fewer Power Circuits, 
Higher MFBMIA. 
Mledium - Control 
Portion Under Develop­
ment. Problem With 
Power Spools' Syn­
chronization. 
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7.2.3 ALTERNATE ORBITER ELEVATOR ARRANGEMENT. The previous three 
configurations for the orbiter elevator required one servoactuator package in each 
left and right horizontal stabilizer. There are many alternate physical installation 
options to consider, but one that deserves attention is a center fuselage installation 
using four power actuators. The servoactuator has many advantages: 
a. Less severe environment (vibration and temperature). 
b. Only four valve/actuators instead of eight. 
c. More installation space. 
d. Less weight in the actuators and elimination of horizontal stabilizer, 
transmission lines. 
e. Better maintenance. 
A key structural consideration in determining the required actuator configuration is 
flutter. For the center-fuselage-mounted arrangement the moment will be reacted 
in the body, whereas for the hctuators mounted in the horizontal stabilizer, the 
moments will be reacted there. In the case of the fuselage-mounted actuators, the 
" elevator torsional stiffness must be sufficient to prevent excess aeroelastic losses 
due to elevator twist. In the case of actuators mounted, in the stabilizer, the elevator 
torsional stiffness is not as dritical since it is effectively clamped in torsion at the 
actuator points. The horizontal stabilizer twist due to the elevator hinge moment in 
this case should be small because the horizontal stabilizer structure is sized for 
m-ax uq. 
By actuating the surface at the root only, a large structural weight increase may be 
required in the elevator to provide enough stiffness to prevent flutter. It is not the 
intent of this discussion to determine what that weight increase is, but to point out 
that with a center-fuselage-mounted servoactuator grouping, a weight savings of 
approximately 250 lb can be realized within the servoactuator and power supply sub­
systems. 
7-6
 
7.3 ORBITER AILERON 
Basic data used to generate weight: 
Hinge Moment Req'd, ft-lb 
Hinge Moment Req'd/Power Circuit, ft-lb 
Hinge Moment/Actuator/Side, ft-lb 
Flow to Aileron System/Hyd Circuit, gpm 
Flow to Each Actuator/Side, gpm 
Length - APU to Mid Vehicle (, ft 
Length - Actuators to Vehicle ,, ft 
Aileron Max. No Load Rate, deg/sec 
Table 7-8. Weight.- Aileron, 
Configuration 1 
Nomenclature UiL Wt. Total Wt. 
No. Lb Lb No. 
Servoactuator: 
Power Actuator 6 10 60 2 
Control Portion 22.5 2 
Pwr Valve &/or 
Manifolds 13.5 
2 36 72 
Differential 2 
Solenoids & Spring 
Clutch 6 
132 
Hlyd. Transmission 3 53 159 
Elect. Motor and Gearing -- 6 
Total Weight 291 
tWeight 0 
3 Power Systems 
Active/Standby 
Hydraulic 
or Load 
Elect/Mech Sharing 
9,600 9,600 
9,600 6,400 
4,800 3,200 
5.2 3.5 
2.6 1.75 
50 50 
100 100 
40 40 
Orbiter 
Confiuraqtion.2 Configuration 3 
Unit Wt. Total Wt. IUntiL. Total Wt. 
Lb Lb No. ILb lb 
50 100 6 7.2 43 
7.0 14 45.0 
19.5 
2 64.5 129 
11 22 
7..7 46 
182 172 
3 42.5 128 
36.2 217 ­
399 300 
+108 +9 
7-7
 
Criteria 
Probability Of Mission 
Success 

Relative Ranking 
Criteria 
MFBMA (Mean Flights 
Between Maintenance 
Action) 
a. 	 Probability Of All 
Elements Working 
b. 	 MFBMA 
c. 	 Relative Ranking 
Components/Vehicle 
Installation 
Criteria 
Normal Performance 
Redundancy Performance 
Versatility And/Or 
Commonality 
Table 7-9. Reliability Comparison - Aileron, Orbiter 
Configuration 1 Configuration 2 
.999998 .999027 
,486 1 
Table 7-10, Maintainability Comparison - Aileron, Orbiter 
Configuration 1 
.9736 
37.9 
1 
98 
Smallest Envelope. 

Most Feasible To Install 

And Remove. 

Configuration 2 
.9866 
74.6 
2 
128 
Integrated Power Supply 
Makes Unit Large And 
Heavy. 
Table 7-11. Performance Comparison - Aileron, Orbiter 
Configuration 1 
Good. No Fight Between 
Outputs, Only 1 Active At 
A Time. 
o May Be Subject To 
Nuisance Tripping. 
0 No Degradation After 
Failure. 
0 Fault Correction Hyd. 
Logmc Must Remain With-
in Servoactuator Inter­
face. 
o Requires Automatic 
Fault Correction. 
Configuration 2 
Poor. Subject To Limit 
Cycling, High Threshold 
And Dead Zone. 
0 Output Rate Is Degraded 
After Failure. 
0 Dependent On No Jamming 
At Output. 
0 	Requires Automatic 
Fault Correction. 
Configuration 3 
.99918
 
1. 19 
Configuration 3 
.9929 
141 
3.7 
132 
Similar to I But Larger 
Envelope And Heavier. 
Configuration 3 
May Be SubjCt To Small 
Amplitude Limit Cychng 
If Tach Feedback Gain 
Can't Hold Channels At 
Null. 
Same As 1. 
e Requires Automatic 
Fault Correction. 
a Can Be Used With 2, 3 
Or 4 Hydraulic Power 
Systems With No Change. 
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Table 7-12. Checkout Capability - Aileron, Orbiter. 
Crteria 

Normal Operation 

Single Channel Operation 
Fault Detection 
vShutting Off Hydraulic 
Power Will Not Check 
Status of Monitors And 
Comparator. 
Criteria 
Unit & Instl. Costs 
Operational Cost 
Development Cost 
Configuration 1(Baseline) 
Use Actuator Position 
XDCR To Provide Output 
Signal To Checkout/ 
Mom toring Function. 
Must Stait Up And Shut 
Down Hydraulic Systems 
In Sequence Or Add 
Hydraulic Shutoff Valves 
And Control Switches. 
e*Add Program To 
Introduce Hardover 
Signals Sequentially To 
Servoamplifiers Down-
stream of Voters. 
o Must De-pressure And 
Repressurize Hydraulic 
Circuits For Reset Or 
Add Shutoff Valves. 
Configuration 2 
Use Actuator Position 
XDCR Signal. 
Add Switching To Shut 
Off Electrical Power 
In Sequence. 
o Introduce Command 
Input With Electrical 
Power Off To All 
Clutches An Observe 
Power Stage Failure 
Indication. 
a Add Piogram To Intro­
duce Hardover Signals 
(Electrical Power Off 
To Power Stages) 
Sequentially And Ob­
serve Command Failure 
Indication. 
e 	 Add Reset Provisions. 
Table 7-13. Cost Comparison - Aileron, Orbiter 
Configuration 1 
Low. Smaller Envelope, 
Fewer Parts. 
High Due To High Main-
tenance Required (Low 
MFBMA). 
Low. Similar Units 
Under Development. 
Configuration 2 
Medium. Difficult Instl. 
Fabrication. 
Less Than Configuration 1. 
(Less Maintenance 
Required). 
High. Requires Extensive 
Development. 
Configuration 3 
Use Actuator Position 
XDCR Signal. 
e Add Switching To Disable 
Fault Detection Logic. 
i 	Add Switching To Shut 
Off Electrical Power To 
Each Channel. 
a Switch Off Electrical 
Power To Servos In 
Sequence And Observe 
Failure Indication. 
0 Add Reset Provisions. 
Configuration 3 
Low. 
Low. (High MFBMA). 
Medim Control Portion 
Under Development.
Problem With Power 
Spools' Synchronization. 
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7.4 DIGITAL SERVOACTUATOR COMPARISON 
A digital configuration weight was established for the orbiter aileron, orbiter elevator, 
and booster elevator. They are compared to the analog configurations as shown in 
Figure 7-i. The weight is approximately equal to Configuration 1, aileron orbiter, 
but tends to become heavier than analog electohydraulic when compared at the elevator 
applications (+70 lb for the orbiter, +260 lb for the booster). In the case of the aileron, 
the digital configuration has less weight in the actuators, but more weight in transmis­
sion lines. This is due to the four power circuits it has compared to three. (The 
digital configuration uses four power circuits, analog Configuration 1 uses three.) The 
flow rates are small allowing small digitizers to be used; thus they have little influence 
on weight but become sensitive to fabrication tolerances. 
For the larger applications, the increased weight trend of the digital configuration 
over that of analog Configurations 1 and 2 is due primarily to the digital valving (all 
use four power circuits). The valving becomes unwieldy at high flows and the assump­
tion of a 30-Hz cycling rate may not be valid for the large digitizer spools. 
The reliability of the digital configuration compares favorably with the analog configura­
tions even though the upper stage servo failure rates were assumed to be 10 times that 
of an equivalent analog. This assumption was made to compensate for the increased 
number of cycles imposed on a torque motor for digital applications. 
The reliability of the digital configuration remains high, apparently, due to the multiple 
redundancy and failure effects, which are less severe in digital systems. 
The maintainability suffers drastically in the digital configuration. The duplication of 
servos and digitizers in each channel coupled with high failure rates result in an esti­
mated MFBMA of 7.5. This compares with analog configurations that range from 28 
to 140. 
The critical comparisons between the digital and analog configurations are in the area 
of performance and deyelopment. Performance of the analog type has been verified by 
development, testing, and usage. As stated before, the digital configuration in this 
report is a concept only and does not represent any previous develophent effort with 
regard to redundancy mechanization. Without detailed investigation, there remains 
considerable doubt that pulse synchronization and exact positioning between channels 
can be achieved. 
In summary, the comparisons show that a digital configuration can be conipetitive in 
most areas with analog types, but more investigation and development effort is needed. 
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Figure 7-1. Analog vs. Digital Weight Comparison 
7.5 ORBITER TVC 
NOTE: 	 Configuration 1 for the orbiter is the same as Configuration 1 for the 
booster. These configurations operate off the vehicle APU driven 
hydraulic circuits. 
Basic data to generate weight: 
Max Hinge Moment/Axis/TVC, ft-lb 65,000 
Hinge Moment at Max Rate/Axis/TVC, ft-lb 44,000 
Max Flow Rate/Axis/TVC, gpm 8.8 
Max Flow Rate/TVC (1.41 X Max Flow/Axis), gpm i2.3, 
Flow Rate/Circuit/Engine Mounted Hyd. Supply, gpm 12.3 
Flow Rate/Circuit/APU Driven Hyd. Supply, gpm 12.3 
Length - ASC Junction to Engine Bulldlead, ft 21 
Length - Bulkhead to Actuators/TVC/Circuit, ft 17 
Lefigth - Engine Mounted Hydraulic Transnission/TVC/Circuit, -ft 16 
Table 7-14. Weight Comparison - TVC, Orbiter 
Conguration 1 Configuration 2 Configuration 3 
Nomenclature Unit Wt. Total Wt. Unit Wt. £oal %,Vt. ni . aL. 
No. Lb Lb No. Lb Lb No. Lb Lb_ 
Servoactuator 4 4 4 
Power Actuator 58 GO 58 
Control Portion 18.5 15 14 
Pwr Valve And/Or 
Manifold 
-
9 13 16 
85.5 342 88 352 88 352 
Centering 
Actuator 4 20 80 4 20 80 
Accumulator 2 20 40 
Valve 2 2 4 2 2 4 2 2 4 
Hyd. Power Generation 6 125 750 4 124 496 
2 83 166 
Hyd. Transmission 4 30 120 6 13 78 6 13 78 
Total Weight 586 1184 1176 
AWeight 0 +598 +590 
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Table 7-15. Rebablity Comparison - TVC, Orbiter 
Criteria Configuration I Configuration 2 Configuration 3 
Probability of Mission 
Success .99998 .99941 .99904 
Relative Ranking 48.5 1.65 1 
Table 7-16. Maintainability Comparison - TVC, Orbiter 
Criteria Configuration 1 Configuration 2 Configuration 3 
lIFBIMA 
Probability Of All Elements 
Working .9915 .9862 .9876 
MFBMA 118 73 81 
Relative Ranking 1.62 1 1.11 
Components/Vehicle 128 252 212 
Installation Difficult Actuators' InsU., Poor. Due to Separate Poor. Difficult Actuators' 
But Requires No Engine Engine Mounted Hydraulic Insti. Plus Engine Mounted 
Mounted Hydraulic Circuits. Circuits. Hyd. Circmts.-
Table 7-17. Performance Comparison - TVC, Orbiter 
Criteria Configuration 1 Configuration 2 Configuration 3 
Normal Performance a Good. No Fight Between Good May Be Subject To Small 
Outputs, Only 1 Active At Amplitude Limit Cycling. 
A Time. 
Redundancy Performance 0 No Degradation After 0 Slight Degradaton After a Output Actuator Rate
 
Failure. Failure. Reduced 50% After
 
Failure.
 
a Nuisance Tripping May
 
Be Problem a Nuisance Tripping May
 
Be Problem.
 
Versatility And/Or Common To Booster 
Commonality Configuration. 
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Criteria 
Normal Operation 
Single Channel Operation 
Fault Detection 
Criteria 

Unit & Instl. Costs 

Operational Costs 
Development Cost 
Table 7-18. Checkout Capability - TVC, Orbiter 
Configuration 1 Configuration 2 
Use Actuator Position Add Actuator Position 
XD R To Provide Output XDCR Or End Position 
Signal To Checkout/ Limit Switches. 
Momtoring Function. 
Must Start Up And Shut e Add Switching To Dis-
Down Hydraulic Circuits able Cross Equaliza-
In Sequence Or Add Lion & Fault Detection 
Hydarulic Shut Off Valves Logic. 
And Control Switching. o Add Switching To Do-
energize Shut Off Valves. 
e 	 Add Program To Intro- o Do-energize Shut Oft 
duce Hardover Signals Valves In Sequence 
Sequentially To Servo And Observe Failure 
Amplifiers. Indication. 
o Add Reset Provisions. 
Table 7-19. Cost Comparison - TVC, Orbiter 
Configuration 1 Configuration 2 
Low. Fewer Parts. High. Due To Multiple 
Engine Mounted Hydraulic
Circuits. 
Low. Same As Above. High, Same As Above. 
Low. Low. 
Configuration 3 
Same as 1. 
o Add Switching To Dis­
able Fault Correction 
Logic. 
o Add Switching To De­
.energize Shut Off
 
Valves.
 
e 	Same as 2. 
Configuration 3 
High. SameAs 2. 
High. Same As Above. 
Low. 
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7.6 BOOSTER TVC 
NOTE: Configuration 1 for the booster is the same as Configuration 1 for the 
orbiter. These configurations operate off vehicle APU driven hydrau­
lic circuits. 
Basic data to generate weight: 
Max Hinge Moment/Axis/TVC, ft-lb 65,000 
Hinge Moment at Max Rate/Axis/TVC, ft-lb 44,000 
Max Flow Rate/Axis/TVC, gpn 8.8 
Max Flow Rate/TVC (1. 414 x Max Flow/Axis), gpm 12.3 
Flow Rate/Circuit/Engine Mounted Hyd. Supply, gpm 12.3 
Flow Rate/Circuit/APU Driven Hyd. Supply, gpm 74 
Length - ASC Junction to Engine Bulkhead, ft 35 
Ave Length - Bulkhead to Actuators/TVC. (AP.U Hyd.), ft 30 
Length - APU Hyd. Transmission (6 Engines/Circuit, ft 180 
Length - Engine Mtd. Hyd. Transmission/TVC/Circuit, ft 16 
Table 7-20. Weight comparison - TVC, Booster 
Configuration I Configuration 2 Configuration 3 
Nomenclature -
NO. 
Unit Wt. 
Ib 
Total Wt. 
Lb No. 
Unit Wt. 
Ib 
Total Wt. 
Lb No. 
Unit Wt. 
Lb 
Total Wt. 
Lb 
Servoactuator 22 22 22 
Power Actuator 58 51 51 
Control Portion 18.5 5 7.5 
Pwr Valve And/Or 
Manifolds 9 6.5 13 
85.5 1881 62.5 1375 71.5 1573. 
Centering 
Actuator 22 20 440 
Accumulator 11 20 220 11 20 220 
Valve 11 2 22 ii 2 22 11 2 22 
Hyd. Powei Generation 11 125 1375 11 125 1375 
11 83 915 
11 13 143 22 13 286Hyd. Transmission 4 258 .1032 
Total Weight 3595 3135 4171 
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Table 7-21. Reliability Comparison - TVC, Booster 
Criteria Configuration I Configuration 2 Configuration 3 
Probability of 
Mission Success .999996 .999996 .000890 
Relative Ranking 2,5 2.5 1 
Table 7-22. Maintainability Comparison - TVC, Booster 
Criteria Configuration 1 Configuration 2 Configuration 3 
MFBMA 
Probability Of All Elements 
Working .99984 .99991 .99983 
MFBMA 6250 11, 111 5888 
Relative Ranking 1.06 1.89 1 
Components/Vehicle 766 444 720 
Installation Difficult Actuators Fewer Actuators To Poor. Tandem Actuator 
Instl., But Requires No Maintain, But Requires Insti. Plus 22 Engine 
Engine Mounted Hydrauic 11 Engine Mounted Mounted Hldraulic 
Circuits. Hydraulic Circuits. Circuits. 
Table 7-23. Performance Comparison - TVC, Booster 
Criteria Configuration 1 Configuration 2 Configuration 3 
Normal Performance 	 Good. Good. Good. 
Redundancy Performance e 	 No Degradation After 0 Fail Operate in Upper o Fail To Null Capability 
Failure (Fail Operate Servo Stage. Some Only. 
Capability). Degradation After 
Failure.o Nuisance Tripping May 
Be Problem., 0 	Not Fail Safe After 2 
Like Failures. 
Versatility And/Or 0 Common To orbiter a No Monitoring - Health 
Commonality Configuration. Status Cannot Be 
Verified In Flight. 
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Table 7-24. Checkout Capability - TVC, Booster 
Criteria 
Normal Operation 
Single Channel Operation 
Fault Detection 
Critena 
Unit & Inst. Costs 
Operational Costs 
Development Costs 
Configuration 3 
Same As 2. 
Same As Normal 
Operation. 
Add Program To Intro­
duce Hardover Signal To 
Either Servoamplifier. 
Configuration 3 
High. Excess No. Of 
Engine Mounted Hydraulic 
Circuit lnstls. 
Same As 1. 
Low. 
Configuration 1 
Use Actuator Posiltion 
XECR To Provide Output 
Signal To Checkout/ 
Monitoring Function. 
Must Start Up And Shut 
Down Hydraulic Circuits 
In Sequence Or Add 
Hydraulic Shutoff Valves 
And Control Switching. 
Add Program To Introduce 
Hardover Signals Sequen-
tiaily To Servo Amplifiers. 
Table 7-25. Cost Comparison - TVC, Booster 
Configuration 2 
Add Actuator Position 
XDCR Or End Position 
Limit Switches. 
Add Program To 
Introduce Opposite Hard-
over Signals To 2 Servo 
Channels Sequentially 
To Disable All But One. 
Not Applicable. 
Servoactuator Is 
Monitorless (No Detec-
tion, Correction) 
Configuration 1 
High. To Be Common To 
Orbiter And Also Use APU 
Power, Excess Redundancy 
Is Applied At All 22 
Actuator Instls. 
High. Due To Number Of 
Components To Stock & 
Maintain. 
Low. 
Configuration 2 
Lower Than 1. Simpler 
Actuator Partially Offset 
By The 11 Engine Mounted 
Hydraulic Circuits. 
Low. Fewer Parts. 
Minimum. Similar Unit 
Fully Developed. 
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SECTION 8
 
DISCUSSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 
8.1 DISCUSSION 
8.1.1 WEIGHT TRENDS 
8; 1.1.1 Intermediate Applications. Figure 8-1 is a plot of servoactuator and trans­
mission line weights for three and four power circuits through all hinge moments of 
interest for aerodynamic surface controls. This trend is only valid if the ground 
rules and requirements of this study apply. That is, there is no alternate function 
to back up an aerodynamic control surface, and fail operate, fail safe (e. g., fail 
operate) performance is required. The fail operate, fail operhte rule allows each-of 
the four actuators to be designed for 50% of the required hinge moment after two fail­
ures. This concept weighs less than a three-actuator arrangement down to the lower 
limit where valve and hydraulic transmission weights begin to have influence. No 
other power weights are included. 
8.1.1.2 Electromechanical. The only pure electromechanical configuration studied 
was applied to the orbiter aileron. The weight did not compare favorably with hydrau­
lic configurations primarily due to the electric motor weight. The motor sizes were 
determined by torque 'requirements resulting in oversized motors with respect to 
horsepower rating. Due to the limited tine available for detail design analysis, no 
attempt was made to apply the balanced power concept. 2 4 This concept involves the 
use of flywheel inertia to absorb power peaks allowing the motors to be sized for 
average power demand, thus reducing overall weight. The electromechanical unit 
was configured as an integrated package (power and control). This configuration 
would be very difficult to install in the limited space in the wing and more likely would 
consist of control channels, clutches, and motors in the fuselage with mechanical 
shafting installed in the wing to an output ballscrew or power hinge. No weight penalty 
was assigned for mechanical shafting to offset the over-design of the motors. 
8.1.1.3 Electromechanical Control. The electromechanical velocity summing con­
trol unit was used with three hydraulic circuits (Configuration 3, aerodynamic surface 
controls). This configuration is obviously heavy because of the use of three Hydraulic 
power circuits. Figure 8-2 shows the comparison of just the electromechanical and 
electrohydraulic control components. The electromechanical weights for this study 
are shown by the upper solid line. The criteria used for sizing channel control outputs 
were conservative and affected electromechanical weights more than electrohydraulic. 
The dotted line reprbsents a reduced size for electromechanical control where the 
output force ranges from 40,0 lb at small flows to iboo lb at high flows. The reduced 
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Figure 8-2. Weight - Electromechanical vs. Electrohydraulic Control 
electromechanical control is still heavier than its electrohydraulic counterpart but 
the A weight is less significant in comparison to power actuator and power circuit 
weights. 
8.1.1.4 Redundancy vs. Weight - Aerodynamic Surface Controls. The configurations 
in this study define the limits of redundancy required to'meet fail operate, fail operate 
criteria. The redundancy was carried through to the power stages. The result is a 
rather dismal weight total. It is no surprise to note that most of the weight is packed 
into the power systems and power actuators. 
We assume that a hydraulic power actuator never jams. If redundant seals are used 
to reduce leakage failures and adequate margins are built in to preclude any structural 
failures (barrel rupture) the actuator becomes very reliable and as such may not need 
to be as redundant as other elements. Figure 8-3 shows the effects on weight when 
power actuator and power circuit redundancy are reduced. The curves are based on 
averaged data: 1. 5 hr flight time, 35% average power and 40 ft transmission length. 
Curve A is the four-power circuit, four-actuator/side configuration per this study for 
the booster and orbiter elevator. Curve B eliminates two actuators per side but re­
tains the four power circuits. Switching valves are used to switch in.two standby 
power circuits. Curve C goes one step further and eliminates the two actuators/side 
and two power circuits. In this case each pair of actuators has to provide 100% hinge 
moment. The trend shows that eliminating power circuits is not effective, especially 
at the orbiter hinge moments, because the remaining two circuits must produce twice 
the output required of each of the four circuits. 
8.1. 1.5 Redundancy vs. Weight - TVC. Following the same procedure as mentioned 
-in Section 8.1.1.4, the weights of all configurations could be reduced. In Configura­
tion 3 for the booster TVC, the centering power circuit is also used in the servo 
channel to ensure that the system will fail to null at the first power circuit failure; 
This requires two hydraulic circuits for the configuration. If only one power circuit 
were used in the servo channels, the servoactuator could be centered by accumulator 
power. By eliminating one half of the tandem actuator and spool (add a switching 
valve) the total weight could be reduced 1256 lb from the 4157 lb tabulated in Section 7. 
This arrangement is not as safe as Configuration 3 because centering capability is 
lost after h failure combination of accumulator gas pressure and hydraulic circuit. 
If power actuator redumdancy is elimihated in the booster TVC configurations, the 
A weight decrease is as shown in Table 8-1. 
8.1. 2 COMMONALITY. Configuration 1 for the orbiter and booster TVC was com­
mon and operated off vehicle APU systems. The results show that the booster TVC 
systems become heavy and quite complex in the servoactuator. The 22 actuator in­
stallations should not be configured by orbiter requirements for the sake of common­
ality alone. However, when power actuator redundancy is reduced, the absolute 
weight penalty between Co.figurations 1 and 2 (least weight configuration) for the 
booster is 262 lb as shown above. Later studies will have to determine the allowable 
penalty to attain comnonality. 8-4 
Table 8-1. A Weight Decrease 
Vehicle Weight (lb) 
Booster No Redundancy in 
TVC Per This Study Power Actuator A Weight 
Configuration 1 3595 *2979 -616 
Configuration 2 3135 **2717 -418 
Configuration 3 4171 ***2915 -1256 
*Delete one half of tandem actuator. Add switcling valve and incorporate 
centering provisions in power actuator. 
**Delete centering portion of power actuator. 
***Delete one half of tandem actuator and valve manifold, one engine-driven 
hydraulic circuit, and add switching valve and centering accumulator. 
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I CONDITIONS: .. .ii 1. ELEOTROHYDAULIC CONTROL. 
2. LOAD SHARING POWER OUTPUT. 
4 PWR CIRCUITS, 4 ACT. /INSTL, 
4 PWR CIRCUITS, 2 ACT. /INSTL.1'- - - 2 PWR CIRCUITS, 2ACT, tISTL. 
1000105 r l0 106 
HINGE MOMENT (rI), lb-ft/vehicle 10 
Figure 8-3. Vehicle Hydraulic Weight 
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The electromechanical velocity summing control is attractive because of the potential 
commonality on aerodynamic surface controls. It can be applied to any application 
independent of the number of hydraulic power circuits used. The unit is essentially 
the same whether it controls two, three, or four hydraulic power circuits. Hydraulic 
control requires small hydraulic circuits for servo power, in addition to the circuits 
supplying output actuators if the control is more redundant than the output. 
8.1.3 RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY. A review of reliability indicates 
that self-monitoring techniques offer a substantial gain in reliability. This reflects 
the paralleling effect that self-monitoring provides. It does not require cross con­
nections or cross monitoring'voting logic which tends to place all detection and switch­
ing elements in series in a reliability model. This trend can be seen by observing the 
relative reliability ranking of each Configuration 1 for aerodynamic surface controls 
and TVC. Self monitoring is common to these configurations. 
In the orbiter aileron, Configuration 1 is two orders of magnitude better than Configura­
tions.2 and 3. This gain is due to hydraulic logic detection and switching (not depen­
dent on electronic or electrical switching) as well as self monitoring. In this case 
self monitoring is accomplished by massive redundancy at the control level (six chan­
nels). 
Another noticeable trend, however, is that maintainability is usually lower for self­
monitoring schemes in terms of MFBMA. These results agree with the normal con­
flict between reliability and maintainability; that is, when channel or system redundancy 
is used to increase reliability, maintainability-suffers.: 
8.1.4 AUTOMATIC VS. MANUAL SWITCHING. The force summing redundancy 
mechanization has the advantage over all other methods in that switching does not 
have to be immediate because the output of a bad channel is prevented from feeding 
through to the output. Thus a servoactuator (for aerodynamic surface controls) can 
be simplified (human factors permittting) by assigning the switching function to the 
crew. 
8.1.5 INTEGRATED HYDRAULICS. Integrated hydraulics (power and control by 
wire) was not considered in this study. A cursory look at sizes for the elevator of 
both vehicles indicated a prohibitive package size for installation. Once central 
hydraulic circuits were assumed, they were then available to supply any load applica­
tion. Installing integrated packages at low load applications would introduce small 
hydraulic power circuits in addition to the APU-driven central circuits causing an 
unnecessary cdmplexity. Additionally, an integrated package would no doubt require 
cooling lines to route into the fuselage, thus hydraulic transnission could not be 
eliminated entirely. 
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8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
a. 	 Hydraulic power and analog servoactuators should be used throughout all flight 
control applications. 
b. 	 Four hydraulic power circuits should be available and all four used on aero­
dynamic surface controls where they are competitive in weight. 
c. 	 Power actuator and power circuit redundancy as defined by this study be 
retained on aerodynamic surface controls. 
Reasons: 1. Length of operating time/flight. 
2. 	 Need to spread actuator reaction points on large single surfaces. 
3. 	 Number of power circuits required on board is not solely a 
function of flight controls. (Utility functions will probably 
require a minimum of four circuits.) 
d. 	 Power actuator redundancy should be reduced or eliminated on TVC and failure 
criteria applied to control channels only. 
Reasons: 1. Short operating time reduces probability of failure/flight. 
2. 	 Save weight. 
3. 	 Difficult actuator installation. 
e. 	 Mechanical feedback be employed in TVC if possible to eliminate separate 
centering actuator (fail to null). 
f. 	 Central APU-driven circuits be used for TVC if power actuator redundancy is 
eliminated and APU driven bircuits are sized by aerodynamic surface controls; 
If TVC sizes the APU (not true based on requirements used in this study) 
additional study is required to determine impact on power source and power 
source fuel weight. (Aerodynamic surface controls operating at lower part 
load will increase fuel consumption.) 
g. 	 Obvious superiority of one control redundancy mechanization method could not 
be established. The many different techniques under development in the indus­
try today indicate that no one solution has a clear advantage. Quite often a 
particular technique evolves as a result of special requirements. However, 
based on the requirements and findings of this study the following techniques 
are 	recommended as best candidates: 
1. 	 Force summing control (self monitored) for aerodynamic surface controls 
[similar to Configuration 1 for the elevator]. 
Reasons: a) Nearly fully developed concept (SST). 
b) Provides protection against jas. 
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c) 	Has potential of providing control after three control 
failures. (e.g., three channels may be able to provide 
tAo fail operate capabilities in a pure fly-by-wire system,) 
d) 	Versatile: Switching can be manual. 
2. 	 Electromechanical velocity summing for aerodynamic surface controls 
[similar to Configuration 3 for the elevators]. 
Reason: 	 Easier to achieve commonality for all load applications. Unit 
is functionally the same regardless of the number of hydraulic 
power circuits used. (Use is contingent on fabrication of 
multiple tandem power spools.) 
3. 	 Active/standby control (self monitored) using secondary actuator for TVC 
[similar to Configuration 1, TVC, except secondary actuator, and mechan­
iqal feedback from power actuator added, and power actuator redundancy 
reduced]. 
Reasons: 	 a) Common to orbiter and booster. 
b) 	 Can use vehicle APU-driven circuits (four per vehicle). 
c) 	 Attains fail operate capability with only two hydraulic circuits. 
d) 	Redundancy level is consistent with available command chan­
nels. Requires no voters or additional servoamplifiers. 
4. 	 Monitorless "majority voting" for booster TVC only
 
[similar to Configuration 2 for the booster TVC].
 
Reasons: 	 a) Least weight. 
b) 	 Fully developed concept. 
c) 	Least complex servoactuator. 
d) 	Monitorless arrangement more adaptable to booster than 
orbiter. (System checkout on the ground prior to flight.) 
h. 	 A single orbiter elevator package be installed in the fuselage area if at all pos­
sible. If elevator stiffness can be improved satisfactorily with a 250-lb A weight 
increase, no weight penalty is involved and the servoactuator complexity, 
installation, and performance are vastly improved. 
8.3 ENVELOPE SIZES 
Installation configurations were not possible at this time due to the preliminary state 
of vehicle design. To show some representative sizes3 reasonable geometric pro­
portions were used based on very preliminary vehicle configuration data. Figures 
8-4 and 8-5 are examples of booster elevator and orbiter elevator envelope sizes 
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SECTION A A 
Figure 8-4. Envelope Sizes for Booster Elevator 
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SECTION A 
Figure 8-5. Envelope Sizes for Orbiter Elevator 
respectively. These examples are shown only for the sake of ball park estimating. 
To ptusue this exercise further was not considered productive in that actual envelope 
sizing requires more vehicle physical definition. One point is obvious from the 
figures: the installation designer will be hard pressed to install the three power 
circuit actuators in the available space. 
8-11
 
SECTION 9 
REFERENCES
 
1. 	 Emfinger, J.E., A Prototype Fly-By-Wire Flight Control System, AFFDL-TR­
69-9, Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 
Ohio, August 1969. 
2. 	 Emfinger, J. E., "Fly-By-Wire Redundant Actuator," Sperry Rand Engineering 
Review, Vol. 22, 1969. 
3. 	 Jenney, G. D. , "B-47 Fly-By-Wire Investigation," Prepared for SAE A-6 
Committee Meeting, Cocoa Beach, Florida, April 6-10, 1970. 
4. 	 Redundant Controls .Study Integrated Launch and Recovery Vehicle, (No Report 
No.); Hydraulic Research and Manufacturing Company, Valencia, California, 
March 1970. 
5. 	 Sethre, V. C., R. V. Hupp, and G. A. Rayburna, Design and Evaluation of a 
Single Axis Redundant Fly-By-Wire System, AFFDL-TR-68-81, Air Force 
Flight Dynamics Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, July 
1968. 
6. 	 Koch, W. G., Research and Development of an Integrated Servo Actuator 
Package for Fighter Aircraft, AFFDL-TR-69-109, Air Force Flight Dynamics 
Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, November 1969. 
7. 	 Horizontal Tail Design Status Review, Bertia Corporation, Irvine, California, 
November 1969 (informal brochure). 
8. 	 Thayer, W. J., Majority Voting Servoactuator For Space Launch Vehicles, 
Technical Bulletin 116, Moog Inc., East Aurora, New York, (no date). 
9. 	 Curtiss-Wright Mechanical Control and Actuation Systems, Curtiss-Wright 
Corporation, Caldwell, New Jersey, (brochure, no date). 
10. 	 A Summary of Testing of a Toroidal Mechanical Servo in a Mechanical Aileron 
Control System on an F-100 Simulator, Report No. NA-64-298, North American 
Aviation, Inc. , Los Angeles, California, March 1964. 
9-1
 
11. 	 Harmonic Drive, Harmonic Drive Division, United Shoe Machinery, Beverly, 
Massachusetts (brochure), 1962. 
12. 	 Read, R. G., and K. W. Verge, Design Study for. a Flightworthy Pneumo­
mechanical Servomechanism, AFFDL-TR-66-131, Air Force Flight Dynamics 
Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, August 1966. 
13. 	 Trautner, VI. C. , Program Summary Report of Electro-Pnzumatic Actuation 
System, EDR 5640022, Parker Aircraft Co., Los Angeles, California, 
December 1967. 
11. 	 Banfield, R. T., T. Cayvood and H. M. Roberts, Research on a Digital Flight 
Control System Electro-Hydraulic Servo Control Valve, ASD-TDR-62-558, 
Flight Control Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, February 
19630 
15. 	 Yount, E. N., "Development of a Digital Hydraulic Servo," Paper presented 
at SAE-Committee A-18 Meeting, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 1966. 
16. 	 Sanchez, J. A., and M. Tremblay, "Digital Servo Actuator Development," 
Paper Presented at Vickers Aerospace Fluid Power Conference, Detroit, 
Michigan, October 28-29, 1963. 
17. 	 Abshire, Robert W., "Technical Considerations in Designing a Hydraulic 
System for the SST," Paper Presented to SAE Aerospace Fluid Conference, 
May 1965. 
18. 	 Thayer, W. J.., Supply Pressure Considerations For Servoactuators, Technical 
Bulletin 119, Voog Inc., East Aurora, New York, (no date). 
19. 	 Thayer, W. J., Redundant Damper Servoactuators for the F-111 Airplane, 
Technical Bulletin 107, Moog Servocontrols, Inc., East Aurora, New York, 
(no date). 
20. 	 Hydraulic Transmission Line Optimization Study, Vickers Incorporated, 1957. 
21. 	 Saslove, N. , Thrust Vector Control by Electrical or Pneumatic Servoactuators, 
GDC-ERR-AN-1171, General Dynamics, Convair Division, San Diego, 
California, December 1967. 
22. 	 Data Collection for Nonelectronic Reliability Handbook; Report No. RADC-TR­
68-114. 
9-2 
23. 	 Failure Rate Data Handbook, Report No. SP63-470, Triservice and NASA. 
24. 	 Toomey, G. R., "The Balanced-Power Actuation Concept," Paper 650579, 
SAE-NASA Aerospace Vehicle Flight Control Conference, Los Angeles, 
California, July 13-15, 1965. 
9-3
 
